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In the last thirty years or so, many attempts to elucidate the logic of 
educational theory and its relation to practice have been informed by the idea 
that educational theory should guide rational practice by providing knowledge 
whose 'objectivity' is founded on the notion of 'experience'. Consequently many 
curricular and managerial practices in education are also informed by this 
idea. It is argued, however, that some of these practices have undesirable 
educational implications and that the idea that informs them is underpinned by 
an empiricist foundationalist epistemology that has been widely criticised on 
philosophical grounds. 
This thesis offers the beginnings of an al~~(:rnative elucidation of the logical 
links between educational theory and practice based on a notion of 
hermeneutics derived from the work of H.G. Gadamer, T.S. Kuhn, R. Rorty and 
C. Taylor. It is argued that educational, natural scientific and other types of 
theory develop holistically within a theoretic network rather than individually 
against the foundations of 'experience' and that the linguistic practices of 
theoretical communities share a set of 'family resemblances' in discourse that 
makes it possible for theorists to interpret what each of them is doing and in 
this way to come to prefer some theories over others. 
A discussion of 'critical theory' serves to illustrate the basis on which some 
interpretations are to be preferred over others and from this discussion, it is 
proposed that educational theory should be seen as an interpretive practice. In 
order that such theory might be validated, some curricular and managerial 
changes within educational institutions are suggested and the thesis concludes 
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During the past thirty years or so the relationship between educational theory 
and practice has been much debated within a number of contexts and from a 
variety of theoretical points of view. I Philosophical interest has been 
directed both towards the alleged logical primacy of educational theory and 
more recently towards the primacy of educational practice within the theory-
practice relationship, 2 though the existence of a continuing concern to 
elucidate this relationship suggests that neither philosophical interest has been 
entirely successful in elucidating the logical links between educational theory 
and practice. 3 
Presently the empirical links between educational theory and practice have 
been informed by the idea that trainees should be prepared for their future 
careers as various sorts 0 f practitioners within academic (theoretical) 
institutions. This idea of a vocational preparation is apparent in a number of 
contexts - for example in colleges of further education, to some extent in 
secondary schools, and especially in the Colleges and Departments of Education 
where educational theorists prepare teacher -trainees for their future careers 
as practising teachers. In all three cases, there is an institutionalisation of the 
assumption that "theory guides practice" and, in all three cases, there is some 
evidence to support the view that such institutionalisation is not entirely 
satisfactory. 4 
The philosophical move towards the 'primacy of practice' may be a reflection 
of this view as may the move within the present institutional structures to 
incorporate more "practical experience" within pre - vocational curr icula. 5 For 
example in the case of the teacher education curr iculum, there has been a 
move to increase the amount of "school experience". 6 Yet far from easing the 
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problem of the lack of an account of the logical links between educational 
theory and practice, this move makes a solution to the problem more urgent, 
for unless it is going to be claimed eventually that theory and practice are 
totally unrelated, it is even more important that whatever time is left for 
trainees to reflect upon their practices should be used wisely. Yet few, one 
imagines, would wish to argue that theory and practice are unrelated for, even 
minimally conceived as thinking about what to do next, educational theory 
gIves some direction to educational practice. Moreover theory is necessarily 
involved in the identification 0 f a practice for, without some kind of 
organising principle and interest, behaviour appears random and disparate. 
The problem to which this thesis is addressed concerns the purpose of 
educational theory and the nature of its logical links with practice. It may be 
di vided in three parts: first, I identify some of the issues that have arIsen In 
the course of recent debate about the logic of educational theory. I go on to 
identify empiricist foundationalist epistemology that can be seen to be 
underpinning both the assumption that 'theory guides practice' and the 
institutional manifestations of that assumption, especially those curricular and 
manager ial practices that support the ideas of pre-vocationalism and 
bureaucratic rationality. I argue that these practices have many undesirable 
educa tional implications. 
In the second part, I criticise foundationalist empiricist epistemology on the 
grounds that 'experience' cannot provide the foundations necessary to support 
the claim that scientific knowledge is 'objective' knowledge. I argue that the 
dominance of this epistemology for the practice of theorising about education, 
combined with the philosophical criticism that can be directed against it, gives 
rise to the idea that all educational theories might be as good as each other. 
In other words I argue that this epistemology gives rise either to the idea 
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that theories may be compared according to some permanent neutral framework 
of enquiry that functions as a foundation for all claims to knowledge 
(objectivism) or the idea that all theories are equally valid (relativism). 
I develop the opposition between relativism and objectivism throughout this 
study. A number of alternative forms of objectivism are considered and 
rejected for the reason that even if 'foundations' for all claims to knowledge 
could be specified, the process of relating any particular claim to knowledge 
with those 'foundations' would itself introduce a contingency, the elimination 
of which would generate a logically regressive chain of permanent neutral 
frameworks of enquiry. I also reject a number of forms of relativism including 
the form that suggests that educational theories may only be pragmatic 
responses to immediate practical problems and may not challenge the 
conceptual contexts within which particular problems are framed. 
Within education, the oppositions between the curricular notions of 
vocationalism and liberalism and the managerial notions of hierarchy and 
democratic participation may be seen to be subsets of the more general 
opposition between objectivism and relativism. However, in common with other 
writers such as R.J. Bernstein and R. Rorty, I argue that this opposition 
between objectivism and relativism is unhelpful in our attempts to theorise 
about a world that is radically contingent. We argue that any attempt to 
ground our claims to knowledge either through empiricist notions such as the 
correspondence theory of truth or through rationalist notions of fixed rules or 
final criteria for theory preference is bound to fail. Instead I follow Bernstein 
who suggests that we need 
a more historically situated, nonalgorithmic, flexible understanding of 
human rationality ... 'objectivism' as the basic conviction that there is or 
must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we 
can ultirnytely appeal in determining the nature of rationality ... is 
illusory. 
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And Rorty who suggests that we are coming to the end of 
the Kantian tradition that to be a philosopher is to have a 'theory of 
knowledge', and the Platonic tradition that action not based on knowledge 
of the truth of propositions is 'irrational' ... epistemology as the attempt 
to render all discourses commensurable by translating them into a 
preferred set of terms is unlikely to be a useful strategy. 8 
Recently as Bernstein notes, there has been a "convergence" of philosophical 
interest in the topics of objectivism and relativism. In this climate he suggests 
that 'hermeneutics' might offer a way out of the impasse suggested by the 
hold that objectivism and relativism have on our thinking. In the third part of 
this study I further the idea that 'hermeneutics' can offer us a way out of the 
impasse thrown up by notions of objectivism and relativism when theorising 
about education. An overview of my argument is given below. 
Trans-cultural judgements of rationality can be made in favour of 'scientific' 
societies rather than 'primitive' societies on the basis of the technological 
successes of the former that command the attention of the latter in a way 
that is not reciprocated. Within scientific societies, it is widely believed that 
natural scientific theories offer predictive and explanatory success that might 
well be achieved by other types of theorists if they were to emulate the 
procedures that natural scientists are assumed to follow. In the case of 
educational theorising, however, there seems to have been an attempt to 
emulate a so called "empirical" research procedure as if such a procedure 
were unquestionably responsible for the "success" of the natural sciences. 
In contrast to this notion, I hold that this research procedure is not 
responsible for the "success" of the natural sciences. Instead it is more 
plausible to attribute this "success" to the way in which natural scientists 
incorporate their interpretations of what each of them is doing within a 
developing network 0 f theory whose coherence is maximised according to the 
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common values that bind the natural scientific community together. Moreover a 
network of natural scientific theories cannot develop in isolation from 
networks of other types 0 f theory because the explanatory power of scientific 
terms is parasitic upon what we might call a "family resemblance" relation 
subsisting between scientific and non -scientific forms of discourse. Instead 
there is a "linguistic division of labour" 9 both within the natural scientific 
community and across to other communities of theorists. Hence I believe that 
educational theorists should emulate this 'hermeneutic' account of natural 
scientific research. 
Since the notion of interpretation takes on a central importance for my 
account of educational theory, I discuss this notion in connection with H.G. 
Gadamer's notion of "hermeneutics" and J. Habermas's extension of that notion. 
Both writers stress that theory has its moment of application in practice, that 
is to say tha t both writers stress that it is in the process of interpreting 
another theory that one's own practical orientation shifts. Yet they differ In 
their suggestions as to how far it is both possible and desirable to go towards 
objectivism in the choice of rival interpretations. I take a position somewhere 
between Gadamer's suggestion that ultimately we just act or decide in the 
same way as we might decide that we like a particular painting or decide 
what to do, on the spur of the moment, as it were, and Habermas's suggestion 
that, when we come to a decision, we are motivated by a concern that that 
decision would command a "consensus" in the "ideal" situation in which all 
interested persons are free to contribute to a discussion without the existence 
of any form 0 f domination or coercion. 
I adapt Habermas's notion of an "ideal consensus" in order to explain how 
theorising can be something other than a pragmatic response to immediate 
problems. I argue that the "ideal consensus" is a "regula ti ve ideal" that guides 
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every attempt to theorise and so every theorist is able to place in jeopardy 
not just those claims that are assumed by the framework within which the 
theorist IS working but also the framework itself. However I do not accept 
Habermas's idea that the "ideal consensus" is a notion that can be made 
theoretically explicit in order to function as a foundation for all forms 0 f 
interpretation; for this idea seems to me to be another form of objectivism 
that leads our educational thinking back to a concern to find that set of 
educational theories that form a set of exclusive guides to rational practice. 
My educational thesis may be seen to parallel Rorty's 10 philosophical thesis 
that traditional concerns with the nature of certainty stem from an 
unwarranted search for security in a contingent universe. Just as Rorty 
advocates a less ambitious but more valuable role for philosophy as a tool for 
cultural criticism in the service of the "ungrounded social hope" that human 
life can be improved, so too I attempt to a void what, on my argument, is a 
waste of effort in trying to mould educational practices according to the 
latest version of objectivism as it might be applied to educational practices, 
whether that version purports to be provided by criterion referenced 
assessment, performance criteria for curricular evaluation or the special 
training of managers who might be supposed to ensure the achievement of 
objectives set by those who have a distant concern with the practice of 
teaching. Instead I argue that we do better to approach the conditions under 
which an "ideal consensus" might be realised, sometimes by making those 
imaginative leaps that enable us to see the options that face us afresh and to 
act upon them with a confidence that is derived more from a feeling that we 
are acting "in solidar ity" with one another than from an impractical attempt 
to apply what purports to be the latest version of objectivism. 
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I conclude with a consideration of the present institutional arrangements for 
theorising about education. It seems to me that the search for coherence that 
governs the development of a network of theory should include the possibility 
that within all practices, "revolutionary" conceptual shifts may take place from 
time to time in a manner that is similar to the one that is supposed by Kuhn 
to take place in the case of natural science. Nevertheless I argue that it may 
be desirable to continue the present institutional separation of educational 
theorists from practitioners by drawing an analogy with current practice in 
Physics: just as it happens to be advantageous to distinguish between the sub-
communities of theoretical and experimental physicist, so too it might be 
advantageous to distinguish between the sub-communities of educational 
theorists and practitioners, not because such a distinction IS logically 
necessary, but because it may be efficacious for the help it might offer us In 
our attempts a t making progress in educational theory. To follow such an 
analogy would involve educational theorising having the characteristics of a 
practice with the additional characteristic of its being concerned with the 
coherence of a range of practices that make up the educational enterprise. 
That does not mean that educational theory should guide practice nor does it 
mean that educational theor ists should make educational policies - it simply 
means that those who happen to occupy the role of theorist are seen as 
conversational partners with whom those who occupy the role of practitioners 
find it helpful to talk in order to make progress in their own search for 
theoretic coherence. Even though this suggestion may appear to be closely 
related to the current institutional arrangements for theorising about 
education, I suggest that a hermeneutic conception of educational theory has 
radical implications - for the teacher education curriculum, for vocational 




NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1 Most publications concerned with teacher education refer to this debate. 
For example see Alexander R.J. et ~. Change in Teacher Education 1984. 
Also Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
2 The title of the. latest book from Barrow R. Giving Teaching back to 
Teachers 1984, IS a good example of this "move to practice". In this 
thesis, I discuss the recent work of Carr W., Evers C.W., Rizvi F., Walker 
J., all of whom may be seen to be involved with this "move". See the 
Bibliography for a list of some of their publications. 
3 For example Aspin D.N. refers to the need for "a much more detailed and 
elaborate account of the complex nature of theory and education than 
we at present have ... in which the logic of practical action and of 
intention w ill have to be gone into further;" p 16 in his review 
"Philosophy of Education" 1982. Also Peters R.S. "Philosophy of Education" 
(pp 30-61, Hirst P.H. ed, 1983,) in a reference to the theory-practice 
issue, writes: "philosophy of education should form a more integral part 
of educational theory ... Too 0 ften, I fear, we stand on the touch -line 
and jeer when the work is done instead of trying to become participants 
in it." (p 53) 
4 See Dearden R.F. Theory and Practice in Education 1984, whose first 
chapter contains details of some of the research into the complaints that 
teacher-trainees have levelled against what they see as the irrelevance 
of their theoretical studies to the practice of teaching. 
5 This move is illustrated by the Manpower Services Commission'S attempt 
to include "work experience" within some Technical and Vocational 
Educational Initiatives (TVEI), the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) and the 
Continuing Provision for Vocational Education (CPVE). See the Further 
Education Unit's publications: Vocational Preparation 1981, Supporting 
YTS 3rd edition 1985, CPVE in Action 1985, and chapter 3 of this thesis. 
6 The DES Circular no 3/84 states: "Initial teacher training courses should 
be planned as to allow for a substantial element of school experience 
and teaching practice which, taken together, should not be less than 15 
weeks in a postgraduate course." p 7. This is compared with 10 weeks in 
a typical postgaduate course in the 1960's. (Tuck J.P. "Alternative forms 
of training within the university" in TibbIe J.W. ed. The future of Teacher 
Education 1971, pp 111-133.) 
7 Bernstein R.J. Beyond Objectivism and Rela ti vism 1 985, P xi. 
8 Rorty R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 1980, p 356. 
9 This is the title of a thesis put forward by Putnam H. in "The Meaning of 
'Meaning'" in his Mind Language and Reality 1975, pp 215-271. 




DEBATE AeDur THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
This chapter is concerned with debate that has been generated by and arisen 
from the ideas of Hirst and O'Connor about the nature and scope of 
educational theory. In order to understand Hirst's contribution to the debate, I 
discuss Hirst's 'forms of knowledge' thesis and the method of Analytic 
Philosophy of Education (APE). At the end of the Chapter I set out some of 
the issues that can be drawn out of this debate and to which this thesis is 
addressed. 
A perusal of the publications in philosophy of education between about 1955 
and the present indicates a perennial and continuing concern with the 
relationship between theory and practice. Perhaps the most well-known debate 
about the nature and scope of this relationship has been that between 
D.J. O'Connor and P.H. Hirst. It began in 1957 after the publication of the 
former's Introduction to the Philosophy of Education 1. The position adopted by 
O'Connor in that publication was still seen by the latter as important enough 
to warrant extensive mention in his 1983 publication Educational Theory and 
its Foundation Disciplines 2 which was designed to follow up TibbIe's The Study 
of Education 3. Both books attempted to assess the contributions of the so-
called component disciplines to the theory of education. 
O'Connor's Account of Educational Theory 
The substance of the Hirst-O'Connor debate concerns the criteria against which 
'educational theory' is or should be judged. For O'Connor educational theory 
should be scientific in that it should be 
a logically inter-connected set of hypotheses confirmed by observation 4 
and which has the further property of being refutable and explanatory. 
Page 14 
By "explanatory" O'Connor means that educational theory should provide a way 
of classifying events, along with a way of describirog relationships between 
events from which particular predictions can be made against a background of 
fixed initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses. By "refutable" he means that 
educational theories should be judged by standards outside themselves; as for 
Popper 5 theories stand as tentative conjectures a wai ting falsification. The 
attractions of this view of educational theory were so great for O'Connor that 
he was prepared to assert in 1957 that 
what ~urrently counts as educational theory is generally a courtesy 
ti tIe. 
O'Connor here was both reacting against the 'Great Educators' approach to 
educa tional theory, where some well known philosopher's epistemological and 
ethical theses are treated as sources of educational implications which might 
serve to guide educational practitioners, and also lamenting the (then) present 
state of educational psychology and sociology. Even where there are "well 
established exper imental findings in psychology and sociology" 7, O'Connor 
maintains there is still a large logical gap between these findings and their 
applicability in educational practice. However he hopes that "the future 
development of the social sciences will narrow this gap." 8 
O'Connor sought to promote the View that only empirical research can provide 
educational theory and further that such research is best modelled on the 
natural sciences which he believed supply us with 'objective' knowledge 
uncontaminated by personal beliefs and prejudices. The assumption behind this 
view seems to be that there is a world external to us which we seek to 
describe with ever increasing accuracy; the better we describe this world then 
the better we can move around within it. However as numerous attempts to 
articulate and justify correspondence theories of truth have shown we do not 
have direct access to the way the world may be actually constructed and 
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divided up. Indeed we cannot make sense of the idea that the world is 
actually divided up in any way since whatever observation language we use 
presupposes its own way of di viding up the world. Furthermore the success of 
predictions in the natural sciences is bound up with the fact that all states of 
the system under investigation can be described by the same concepts in the 
future as in the past, usually values of the same var iables. However in the 
social sciences the very terms in which the future will have to be 
characterised are not available at present and so it is perhaps not surprtsmg 
that the sort of educational theory that O'Connor prescribed is not yet 
available. It is also worth noting that, while O'Connor was advocating that 
educational theory should be more like natural scientific theory, post-
empiricist philosophers of science were showing that the view of natural 
science with which O'Connor was working was not even an adequate conception 
of natural science, let alone of social science. I shall discuss this in greater 
detail in Chapter 4. 
Even if educational theory did supply empirical generalisations that enabled us 
to know how to do things, according to O'Connor educational theory would still 
not enable us to know what we ought to do. Theory would give us a guide to 
means but not ends. O'Connor considered that the selection of ends involves 
making value judgements for which there is no support emanating from his 
account of educational theory. The import of values into educational theory he 
considered to be "both unnecessary and logically disastrous." 9 It is logically 
disastrous because for O'Connor there is no logical relationship between values 
let alone between values and empirical theory; and it is unnecessary because 
if we do incorporate values into educational theory then we gain no advantage 
since our theory still only 'guides' our practice and we incur the penalty that 
our theory becomes an "intellectual salad" 10 which incurs "the logical odium 
of begging disputed questions that are central to moral philosophy." 11 
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There are three points that arise from this version of theory by O'Connor that 
are worth noting. First, there is his supposition that moral philosophy is 
completely devoid of logical reasoning - tha t either an argument conforms to 
the canons of deductive logic or else it is not logical at all. This seems highly 
contentious in that it seems to deny that there might be any point in in doing 
moral philosophy. Moreover it is logically disastrous for O'Connor to be 
advancing a meta-theoretical analysis designed to warn us not to take the 
vapor ising of evalua ti ve theor ists seriously, when such an analy sis is itself an 
attempt to promote the value of a particular type of reasoning. 
The mistake that I think that O'Connor makes is to assume that ~here is only 
one form of reasoning, empirical reasoning, that sets the criteria by which all 
other forms of reasoning can be judged. Since moral 'reasoning' so-called does 
not meet these criteria, O'Connor considers it to be outside logic. However as 
Mill wrote in connection with the idea that there might be moral proof. 
It is evident that there cannot be proof in the ordinary or popular 
meaning of t he term. Questions of ult ima te ends are not amenable to 
direct proof ... We are not, however, to infer that its accePfance or 
rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. 2 
O'Connor must presumably agree with this for, in putting forward a view of 
what educational theory should do, O'Connor is acquiescing in the idea that 
there is at least one way in which an argument for some desirable end can be 
formulated. 
The practical syllogism is another example of the way in which a normative 
argument might be presented. While a series of practical syllogisms seems to 
generate an infinite regress of normative premises, it is only when we are 
stuck, like O'Connor, with the idea that regresses must be stopped by secure 
foundations, that normative argument seems impossible. This is particularly the 
case for O'Connor who denied that normative statements can be derived from 
Page 17 
empirical theory. In any case O'Connor seemed to place too much faith in the 
supposition that empir ical theory forms a logically developing whole, bearing In 
mind the radical discontinuities that some post empiricist philosophers of 
science suggest occur. 13 
The second point to note is the idea that theory should guide practice In some 
way. O'Connor seemed to mean that just as physical theory provides "a 
guidance system for the applied physicist and engineer" 14 so psychological 
and sociological theory might be supposed to provide a guidance system for 
the teacher. However while there is undoubtedly some relationship between 
physical theory and engineering artefacts the logic of that relationship is not 
at all clear since the least applied research can often lead to a proliferation 
of unexpected artefacts, as in the case of Einstein's special theory of 
relativity 15. It depends therefore what O'Connor meant by "a guidance 
system". The weak sense of 'guidance' illustrated by the Physics-Engineering 
example is unhelpful to practitioners since it is the expected outcomes that 
are of interest to them. The alternative IS to adopt a strong sense of 
'guidance' that supposes that theory will consist of a series of conditional 
statements of the form "if such and such a state is desired then perform such 
and such a series of tasks". The problem with this sense of guidance is that it 
presupposes that both states and tasks can be precisely specified in advance 
of the situation to which they will apply. There is also the practical difficulty 
of knowing just how much detail and how many conditionals are required. 
O'Connor seemed to accept that neither sense of guidance IS satisfactory when 
he admitted that 
even if theories of education did meet these exacting standards (of 
scientific theory), it is doubtful if they would yield the same kind of 
practical advances that technol?gy, medicine and economic organisations 
owe to their respective bases. 
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He suggested that this is partly because 
effective education is quite possible without any of the theoretical 
background of the kind offered by psychology, sociology and the rest of 
the . rele~ant f7iences. And this is not the case with medicine and 
engineer mg. 
This statement reveals the way that O'Connor seemed to regard educational 
practice as something that exists independently of any educational theory, 
whereas he seemed to suppose that theor ies 0 f medicine and engineer ing serve 
to differentiate medical or engineering practice from some other and unrelated 
things like witchdoctoring or basic craft. O'Connor misses the point that we 
need some means 0 f identi fy ing when educational practice is taking place and 
neglects the account of theory that suggests that to have a theory is to have 
an idea of what does and what does not count as a practice. 
The third point to be noted is the assumed separation of means from ends with 
the claim that while decisions about ends are outside of logic, and hence for 
O'Connor rationality, means can be determined rationally on the basis of 
weighing up the scientific facts. This notion of means-ends rationality can be 
seen to be at work in much of what presently goes on in educational 
institutions by way of curriculum planning. First the desirable ends or 
objectives are determined. Presently this is often done by "analysing needs". 
That is to say that the satisfaction of the perceived needs of some client 
group become the objectives of the enterprise. The objectives are then made 
"operational" which means either that they are "reduced" to statements of 
behaviour or that they are "reduced" so that they are amenable to testing by 
questionnaire or structured interview. Second the methods and procedures are 
determined on the basis of the empirical evidence a vailable. Finally the 
effecti veness of the teaching or course or whatever is determined by the 
extent to which the objectives have been met and in the light of any 




This notion of means-ends curriculum planning has been discussed in most 
books on "Curriculum Development" 18 and is discussed more fully in my 
chapter 3. For the moment, it is worth noting that means-ends curriculum 
planning suffers from serious drawbacks, such as the adequacy of reductions of 
mental states to behavioural statements 19, the adequacy of experimental 
techniques such as questionnaires to measure complex educational objecti ves 
and the difficulty if not impossibility of detailing predicted future outcomes 
with conceptual tools subject to revision. 20 It IS considerations like these 
that prompt Barrow 21 for example, to suggest that time would be better 
spent thinking through the implications of a proposal prior to its 
implementation rather than going through this procedure of post evaluation. 
There is finally the difficulty that Rizvi 22 describes with the idea that 
evaluative discourse can be settled once and for all and combined with factual 
judgements, as if factual judgements were not made on the basis of normative 
criteria or evaluative discourse was not influenced by causal explanatory 
relations. 
Hirst's Account of Educational Theory 
In order to understand Hirst's account it IS necessary to recall his 'forms of 
knowledge' thesis and the role that philosophy takes within it. Hirst argues 
that knowledge consists of a limited number of quite distinct forms that can 
be distinguished logically on the basis of three criteria; 
1) the central concepts that are peculiar to the forms. 
2) the distinctive logical structure or relationship among concepts. 
) ., h l'd' 23 3 the cn tena for trut or va 1 1 ty. 
Hirst's account of the scientific form seems to agree roughly with O'Connor's 
account of science. However Hirst argues that not only science but also any 
combination of the forms can provide an educational theory which provides 
"rational principles for educational practice." 24 Thus educational theory is 
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concerned with both the formulation of ultimate educational ends as well as 
the discovery of efficient means. 
However it is not clear how forms that are supposed to be distinct can 
combine to form the practical theory that Hirst seeks. Hirst cannot have it 
both ways. Either the forms are logically distinct (which Hirst needs them to 
be in order to justify his idea of a liberal education) but at the price of 
render ing h is account 0 f educational theory implausible; or else the forms 0 f 
knowledge can be synthesised, in which case the argument for logical 
separation disappears and we are still left with an unsatisfactory account of 
educational theory. In either case we still have the empirical difficulty of 
finding an individual or group with a broad command of knowledge in all its 
forms to draw up the rational principles for practice that Hirst requires. 
As for O'Connor, the idea of "rational principles for practice" is problematic 
for it is not clear what form these are to take. If they are to take the form 
of conditional imperatives then there is the problem of detailing all the 
conditions that might obtain in a practical situation. If on the other hand they 
are to take the form of generalised prescr iptions for action then there is the 
di fficulty 0 f apply ing those prescr iptions. There seems to be a need for rules 
of application with the need for further rules to apply the rules and so on. 
Even if Hirst's account of educational theory were not subject to these 
difficulties there would still be the problem of distinguishing between good and 
bad theory. In other words there would still be a need to provide criteria for 
theory preference. Arguably there are plenty of educational theories about but 
unless we have some idea of how educational theories are evaluated and even 
how to describe theories in logically compatible terms then we have no guide 
to practice whatever. 
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In a recent publication Hirst admits to some of these difficulties. While being 
"unrepentant in seeing educational theory as primarily the domain which seeks 
to develop rational principles for educational practice" 25, he now seems to 
recognise the importance of practice and the significance of the tacit 
elements in all action. 26 Hirst goes on to recommend that familiarity with 
the work of Habermas might be important to those seeking to construct an 
adequate account of educational theory. 27 
Despite Hirst's admission that his account of educational theory is flawed, and 
the numerous objections that have been directed against his forms of 
knowledge thesis 28, his account of educational theory has generally been 
more widely accepted than that of O'Connor. Part of this acceptance has no 
doubt been due to the prominence 0 f the account of philosophical knowledge 
that Hirst, along with Peters, has articulated, that is meant to cohere with 
and to some extent underpin both the forms of knowledge thesis and Hirst's 
account of educational theory. According to Hirst and Peters philosophy is a 
form of knowledge that is concerned to find the "logically necessary conditions 
for the use of a word". 29 These conditions are to be identified via the 
process 0 f linguistic analy sis. Th is process results in what has been called 
Analytic Philosophy of Education (APE). According to some recent accounts, APE 
has been so influential that any research in philosophy of education that did 
not conform to APE's rhetorical norms and interests could be excluded. 30 
Analytic Philosophy of Education 
APE is alleged to arise out of Wittgenstein's later philosophy which 
paradoxically can be seen as an attack on the idea of a theory. 
If I were told that anything were a theory, I would say, No, No! That 
does not interest me - it would not be the exact thing I was looking 
for. ... 31 
For me the theory has no value. A theory gives me nothing. 
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This apparent anti-theoretic View can be traced back to Wittgenstein's 
challenge to us to find the essence of something. For example in the 
Philosophical Investigations 32 his imaginary inter locutor accuses him 0 f 
nowhere saying what the essence of a language game is. Wittgenstein replies 
and this is true - instead of producing something common to all that we 
call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in 
common which makes us use the same word for all, but that they are 
related to one another in many different ways. 
In Philosophical Investigations 19-23 Wittgenstein invites us to find what is 
common to the proceedings that we call games and suggests that there is no 
one thing that is "common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that". Later he characterises these similarities as "family 
resemblances" . 
This seems straightforward yet it seems to rule out as a valid method of 
philosophy that version of it that attempts to discover those properties which 
all members of a class may be deemed to possess. The denial of the validity 
of this form of what has been called essentialism goes against that tradition 
of philosophical theorizing which produces grand theories that attempt to 
simplify and maximise coherence. Instead Wittgenstein suggests that many so-
called philosophical problems simply disappear if the words that are used to 
pose the problem are returned to their natural base. 
When philosophers use a word - 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 
'proposition', 'name', - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in the language 
game which is its original home? - What we do is to bring words back 
from their metaphysical to their everyday use. 33 (original emphasis) 
This has been taken by some to mean that philosophers should act as a kind of 
"thought police" 34 who prevent people from wandering off the road of 
common sense which has special epistemic privilege. The function of such 
"thought police" is to analyse the ordinary use of words in order to find the 
"logically necessary conditions for the use of a word." 35 Thus Wittgenstein's 
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later philosophy may be seen to suggest a philosophical method which proceeds 
by way of analysis of everyday use in order to elucidate the 'correct' or 
'standard' use, though it is not at all clear that Wittgenstein intended to 
suggest a method of analysis that guaranteed the correct use of words. Instead 
there is some reason to suppose that Wittgenstein neither intended to suggest 
a philosophical method nor even any philosophical theses. 
The distinction between 'saying' and 'showing' which was made initially in the 
Tractatus 36 has been traced through to On Certainty 37. In the Tractatus, 
philosophical propositions were regarded as being amongst those that could 
only be shown not said. However since the Tractatus consists of philosophical 
propositions then it seems as if Wittgenstein is stating that which, by his own 
propositions, could only be shown. The metaphor of a ladder has been taken to 
be a device whereby Wittgenstein accounts for his own thesis. 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (~g must, so to speak, 
throwaway the ladder a fter he has climbed up it.) 
It seems that the Tractatus cannot on this logic consist of philosophical 
propositions. Rather it consists of metaphorical allusions to a philosophical 
thesis. In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, there is a similar insistence on the 
alleged unstatability of philosophy. The style of presentation is unusual and it 
is argued that this style was chosen in order not to appear to suggest a 
statement of philosophical theses. Rather it has been argued that the style 
was carefully chosen to have the most chance of changing the reader's way of 
seeing the world. 39 
If this is true then perhaps it is the lack of a suitable context for 
philosophical remarks that prompted Wittgenstein's pessimistic comments about 
being misunderstood. 
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I was obliged to learn tha t my results (which I had communicated in 
lectures, typescr ipts and discussions), var iously misu~derstood, more or 
less mangled or watered down, were in circulation. 0 
Furthermore it is possible to argue that Wittgenstein's later enigmatic and 
aphoristic style was designed to 'lock out' those who could not understand. 
This idea may be supported by reference to passages of Culture and Value 
where Wittgenstein 4-1 writes of forms of presentation including that of the 
Image of a lock to which only those with a key can get inside. Wittgenstein 
goes on to complain that Freud's theories are so easily unlocked that 
everybody has access to "fanciful pseudo explanations" 4-2 
If the style of Wittgenstein's writing IS designed to exclude those unable to 
understand it, and the difficulty in understanding is derived from the 
impossibility of stating the showable, then it looks as if only those 'on the 
inside', so to speak, will understand. This seems to suggest that an individual 
or group of individuals who have successfully studied and internalised 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy are in the privileged position of having access 
to the showable. In this way this privilege gives those individuals credentials 
for the membership of an elite and the possession of these credentials seems 
to absolve the members from the requirement of stating their theses clearly. 
Lakatos 4-3 is unsympathetic to this ;;-litist approach; he alleges that, in 
stressing the tacit, Wittgensteinians shift the problem of theory selection on to 
the problem of selection for membership of the ~lite. For Lakatos the 
advantages of demarcationism are that it is open to refutation in a democratic 
way, whereas ~litism involves a conservatism and closed society with the 
layman as spectator. 
It is not just Lakatos who is unsympathetic to an elitist approach to 
understanding. Gellner 4-4- has attempted to present Wittgenstein's later 
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philosophy in the form of four theories or, as Ge llner puts it, "pillars", in 
order to criticise followers of Wittgenstein who, Gellner alleges, are opposed 
to critical examination of their values and ideals. By stressing that 
Wittgenstein's philosophy cannot be stated in the form of theses and by 
stressing the tacit component of philosophy Wittgensteinians seem to be saying 
that criticism implies lack of understanding; understanding implies allegiance. 
The four theories isolated by Ge llner are as follows: (1) There is the argument 
from paradigm case which moves from the actual use of words to the solution 
or dissolution of philosophical problems. (2) The generalised version of the 
naturalistic fallacy gives ordinary use normative force. (3) The contrast theory 
of meaning states that for any term to be meaningful, something must not be 
covered by it. (4) Polymorphism is the theory that words can have a variety of 
meaning. Having isolated these theoretic pillars of Wittgensteinian philosophy 
Gellner proceeds to knock them down. Gellner'S main demolition effort is 
directed against the theory tha t ordinary use has norma ti ve force. He is able 
to give many examples where ordinary use is confused and where what common 
sense tells us turns out to be false. For example common sense tells us that 
the earth is flat and that sticks bend when partly immersed in water. 
Furthermore he argues that there is no reason why the truth should be 
presented to us as embodied in ordinary use. Instead Ge llner argues that we 
have a very powerful method of obtaining truth in science, part of whose 
method is the clear statement of theses followed by attempts at refutation. By 
refusing to state their theses clearly Wittgensteinians seem to be missing what 
for Gellner is our best method of getting knowledge. 
Despite the objections of Gellner, Lakatos and others and despite the pejorative 
use of the term ~lite, I do not wish to suggest a t the outset that the 
Wittgensteinian kind of ~litism is obviously untenable or irrelevant to the 
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problem of theory selection. I discuss elitism more fully in Chapter 5. Put 
briefly, the point at issue between ~litists and demarcationists is the extent to 
which demarcation criteria can be understood from 'the outside' of the 
language games to which they apply, for if demarcation criteria can only be 
understood by those who are on 'the inside' of the language games involved 
~ 
then it looks as though there IS still some form of elitism, as I call it, 
involved in demarcationism. 
There are further difficulties with Wittgenstein's later account of philosophy. 
When he wr i tes, 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language, it 
can In the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation 
either. It leaves everything as it is. 45 
he seems to suggest that there is no point in doing philosophy. However in the 
context of Wittgenstein's other writing, the phrase "it leaves everything as it 
is" occupies a different role from the language game of doing nothing. Instead 
it points to a role for the philosopher as 'shower', the maker of a selection of 
perspicuous representations that represent the world in a different way. 
G.E. Moore reported 
that what he, Wittgenstein, had at 'the back of his mind' was 'the idea 
tha t aesthetic discussions were like discussions in a court 0 f law' where 
one tries to 'clear up the circumstances of the action' which is being 
tried, hoping that in the end what one says will 'appeal to the judge'. 
And he said that the same sort gf 'reasons' were given, not only in 
Ethics, but also in Philosophy. 4 
However if Wittgenstein wrote in an enigmatic way in order to proffer a 
carefully chosen "key" to his thoughts, then there seems to be some 
impropriety in trying to reveal the postulated Wittgensteinian vision. Also in 
the attempt to apply this postulated vision to an area like education then 
there seems to arise the further problem of guaranteeing the correct 
application. By its concern with the attempt to find and state analytic theses 
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by analysis of ordinary talk about education, APE seeks to provide just such a 
link between philosophy and education. 
There seem to be two ways in which that link could be forged. First APE 
could have access to a sort of indubitably true metalanguage which can be 
correctly attached to educational claims. The problem with this is that there 
is a need for a meta-metalanguage which guarantees the correct application of 
the metalanguage. The second possibility is that philosophy is concerned to 
describe and redescribe "the conceptual schemes employed by educational 
psychologists and the types of procedures by means of which their assumptions 
can be tested." 47 This would not be problematic if philosophy were allowed 
to make statements about the world; but, conceived as what is called a second 
order activity by and within APE, it is prevented from doing this. 
The nature of this so-called "second order" activity has been characterised as 
stemming from the 'underlabourer' conception. This conception was introduced 
by Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding 48 in order to draw an 
analogy between the work of "master builders" and great scientists like 
Newton, Huyghens and Boyle. Locke argued that, just as the progress of master 
builders is enhanced when the ground is cleared for them by under labourers, so 
scientific progress would be enhanced if "under labourers" in the form of 
"philosophers" were to clear a way 
some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge [like] the learned 
but fr ivolous use 0 f uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms 49 
Within APE philosophy is widely viewed as a sort of ground clearing operation 
that takes place separately from any substantive theorising about education. 
But as Aspin remarks, this view has tended to lead to 
a dismissive attitude to the deliberations of philosophers who, it was 
felt, were contributing little if anything to the solution of the problems 
with which teachers in schools had daily to contend. 50 
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The problem for APE is that, in producing analytic truths by analysis of 
everyday use of language, it has to select what is going to count as everyday 
use. In order to identi fy the everyday use 0 f educational words APE needs 
some idea of what 'education' is. The question arises as to whether APE's idea 
of education is the same as anybody else's idea, and if it is not, then there is 
the problem of selecting the 'correct use'. Putting it more strongly it does not 
seem possible for APE to a void the charge tha t its method simply reinforces 
its prior commitment to certain values and norms and that this procedure is 
necessarily conservative in that it states and keeps the status quo, 
comfortable for its practitioners yet pointless and irrelevant to everyone else. 
Furthermore it has been argued that analysis does not take place in a vacuum 
with universal criteria of correctness. Instead analysis takes place at 
particular times, for particular purposes; and again as Aspin remarks 
the prime problem of analysis is ... the elucidation of the very 
theoretical foul1dations upon which a particular analysis or view of 
analysis rests. ) 1 
Some of these criticisms have recently been acknowledged by Peters. He not 
only makes nine recommendations for philosophers of education, which include 
the need "to loosen up the analytic approach ... to influence and be influenced 
by empirical work" 52 but also manages according to Carr to "conceal the 
extent to which he was himself the principal architect and exponent of the 
approach." 53 This concealment might not be so important if APE and the 
theoretical foundations on which it rests were not still influential but, as I go 
on to suggest, empiricist founda tionalist epistemology not only supports the 
continuance of APE as a very powerful paradigm for philosophy of education 
but also supports the 'logic' of much of what presently counts as educational 
theory and research. 
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Schenck's 54 exploration of the term 'curriculum' serves to illustrate this 
problem with analysis. Having given examples to show that the word 
'curriculum' performs a variety of functions dependent upon its context of use, 
Schenck argues that it is not always clear to which context the word 
'curr iculum' refers. In other words, he argues, 'curr iculum' features in a number 
of 'language games' and is shuffled from 'game' to 'game' without sufficient 
attention being paid to the diversity of meaning. Unfortunately Schenck is 
unable to provide any methodical framework for his selection of language 
games and so fails to account for his normative thesis on the basis of which 
he a ttempts to correct an apparent failure to appreciate polymorphism. He 
thus fails to account for the superiority of his language games about 
'curriculum' over and above the games that are presently played with it In 
education. 
Jonathan has proposed a solution to some of the difficulties with both Hirst 
and O'Connor's account of educational theory. 55 She suggests that educational 
theory should be the attempt to 
arrive at a more sophisticated and r~stematic understanding both of what 
does and of what ought to go on. 
She argues that this suggestion necessitates three strands to theory; normative, 
empirical and critical theory. Critical theory is supposed to mediate between 
normative and empirical theory so that "normative reasoning should be 
assimilated to empirical reasoning". 57 
She goes along with O'Connor to the extent that they both believe that 
empirical theory can supply educational facts. However Jonathan considers that 
O'Connor asks the wrong question about those facts. 
The question is not 'Is education, like medicine, derived from scientific 
theory, thus giving rise to an educational theory as reliable and 
comprehensive as that which we find in medicine ?' but rather 
'Are those areas of factual enquiry which we partially draw upon in 
making educational judgements as soundly based as the corresponding ones 
which we presently draw upon in making medical judgements ?' 58 
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Jona than considers that a practical acti vi ty like education involves the 
appraisal and justification of different courses of action and like O'Connor sees 
empirical theory as a sort of reference manual to be consulted when decisions 
and justifications are difficult. Unlike O'Connor however, Jonathan considers 
that there is such a thing as normative theory and that philosophers have a 
particular responsibility to produce it because of their familiarity with such 
theory and its limitations. 59 
Jona than is dissatisfied with what is regarded by the APE paradigm as the 
exclusively "second-order" role of the activity of doing philosophy and warns 
of its dangers. Since for Jonathan every action carries the logical, though not 
necessarily the empirical requirement of accountability every action makes 
explicit reference to theory. She therefore endorses Peters when he wr ites 
The question, therefore, is not whether a modern teacher indulges in 
philosophical reflection about what he is d~ing, it is rather whether he 
does it in a sloppy or a rigorous manner. 0 
and urges us to take theory seriously. 
When the dependence 0 f practice on theory is denied, because such 
dependence is una voidable, elements of theory tend to guide practice 
unconsciously and therefore uncr itically, so it is important that we 
explore what sort of theory guides practice. 61 
Philosophy of education according to Jonathan not only supplies normative 
theory but also contributes to the formulation of critical theory. Philosophy is 
supposed to combine with other disciplines to produce an all-embracing role 
for educational theory which, to use one of Jonathan's medical analogies, 
is the attempt to identify what counts as a wart, to specify what would 
count as a cure, and to investigate what woul~ b~ the most pr~2tically 
effective and morally acceptable means of achieving that end. 
While Jonathan appreciates some of the difficulties associated with the 
positi vist separation 0 f normative from empirical theory, her account of 
critical theory fails to show how normative and empirical theory can combine. 
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To some extent, perhaps she shares with Hirst the difficulty of trying to 
account for synthesis where none is needed. In other words, by accepting that 
there are different strands to theory, perhaps Jonathan has already taken the 
decisive step from which the only recovery is a synthesis that is logically 
opaque or impossible. 
Rizvi 63 argues specifically against the positivist separation of normative from 
empirical theory. By means of example he attempts to show that it is the 
context in which a statement is made that is most important in determining its 
evaluative or factual content. The fact-value problem thus "dissolves" 64 for 
Rizvi since there are no "essential" properties of propositions that serve to 
distinguish their evaluative or factual content once and for all. Consequently 
Rizvi feels able to give the following account of educational theory: 
Educa tional theory IS a practical theory which organises facts in such a 
way as to develop rationally defensible principles to guide educational 
practice. Most attempts at educational theorising may be seen as 
involving the process of practical deliberation in which solutions are 
sought for contextually specific problems which confront those who 
engage in the educational enterprise. 6) 
In other words Rizvi sees educational theory as the attempt to think about 
finding a solution to the practical problems that arise and he is prepared to 
allow that 'rational defensibility' should admit many different sorts of 
consideration much like "the model provided by our ordinary discourse". 66 He 
goes on 
we need to place less emphasis on the generality of our explanations 
Focussing on particularities and differences would mean paying more 
attention to the perspe~7ives of the members of an educational 
community themselves. 
Rizvi is here elevating ordinary discourse above the sort of broad 
generalisation that for him presently constitutes educational theory. 
However there is a paradox In Rizvi's thesis that he only partially 
acknowledges and for which he does not seem to account. He concludes: 
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It. may ?e thought that this account of the logic of educational theory IS 
dlstr~sslngly general. My reply must be that we are dealing with 
questions that always involve a plurality of valid and rival claims, a 
pluralit~ ?f cog~licting needs and interests and a plurality of perspectives 
and POSI tlOns. 
Concentration on the particular case, the particular 'question' is advocated 
using the paradigm of ordinary discourse, yet philosophical discourse is 
employed to provide "a distressingly general account". 
Rizvi needs the equivalent of Wittgenstein's metaphor of a ladder 69 to 
account for his own thesis. The paradox arises because the general-
particular distinction is so easily taken to provide the essence of the theory-
practice distinction. Perhaps Rizvi is only interested in those readers who will 
assume for themselves that general-particular, theory-practice are distinctions 
that are themselves context-specific and that Rizvi's own thesis is a particular 
solution to a particular problem that confronts educational theorists. However 
if a reader does make that assumption then he is left wondering how the 
problems for theoretical solution are to be selected. Is the reader to select 
the most particular pressing problem that confronts him? Or is the reader to 
follow Rizvi and select a problem whose solution will be "distressingly 
general"? I shall attempt to overcome this apparent paradox in a way that 
preserves Rizvi's insight into the primacy of the particular context in which an 
educational problem arises. 
Issues Ar ising 
From the above discussion a number of issues of different types and 
complexity arise. The two main issues are: 
A) What does educational theory presently do? 
B) What should educational theory do? 
I have phrased these issues in the form of questions about purpose rather than 
in the form of questions about nature so that I have the scope to get away 
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from the idea that a dissertation about the logic of theory presents the 
essence of theory which can then be related to particular instances of 
practice according to the motives and interests of practitioners, as if a meta-
theory could be presented once and for all within which particular interests 
might be accommodated. Instead I want to leave room for the view that a 
dissertation about theory is itself a particular instance where a substantive 
position is argued for. The idea that the particular/general distinction 
corresponds to a practice/theory distinction is unhelpful in that there IS no 
such thing as a complete description of every particular instance which relates 
to a general term. Instead every term may be regarded as general in some 
contexts, particular in others. For example the term 'electron' is a particular 
example of an atomic particle and can be assumed under general atomic 
theory, but we also have electronic theory which for some purposes assumes 
a tomic theory within it. 
Arising out of question A is the subsidiary question of what if anything might 
be wrong with conceptions regarding the present purpose of educational 
theory. I shall attempt to answer question A and this subsidiary question In 
the next two chapters. Question B raises the subsidiary questions: 
1) Since scientific theory is supposed to provide the paradigmatic 
example of theory, should educational theory be more like scientific 
theory and if so, how? 
2) Since educational theory IS supposed to be connected with the 
rationality of educational practice, what is the nature of this 
connection? 
I attempt to answer question 1 in Chapter 4 and question 2 in Chapter 5. In 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 I attempt to work out an alternative way of elucidating 
the logic 0 f educational theory. 
___ ,000' __ _ 
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EMPIRICIST FOUNDATIONALIST EPISTEMOLOGY 
{\ND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
In Chapter I I suggested that the popularity of Hirst's account of educational 
theory could be attributed partly to its interrelationship with the influential 
'forms of knowledge' thesis and the method of Analytic Philosophy of Education 
(APE). In this chapter I suggest that, as APE has come under increasing attack, 
it has retreated into the role of modest supporter of the task of producing a 
conceptualisation of a research problem prior to empirical research taking 
place. I argue that, while Hirst and O'Connor's v iews of educational theory 
seem opposed, they can in fact be seen to reinforce each other within a 
common epistemology - that of foundational empiricism. Within this 
epistemology both Hirst and O'Connor seem to suggest that value-free 
knowledge about education is possible. In the case of O'Connor educational 
'facts' are supposedly ascertained by following the methods claimed by 
positivists to be those characteristic of natural science. In the case of Hirst, 
analysis of educational language is supposed to guarantee the 'correct' or 
'standard' application of words, supposedly by following the later philosophy of 
Wi ttgenstein. 
I go on to argue that both Vlews of educational theory offer the possibility of 
enhanced status to the purveyors of 'facts' or analytic 'correctness', for if 
rational action depends upon knowledge of the 'facts' or analytic 'correctness' 
then educational theorists seem to be the putative guardians of educational 
rationality. I suggest that the legacy of Hirst and O'Connor is so entrenched In 
much current educational theorising that it sets the parameters within which 
much research, curriculum design and evaluation take place. In particular we 
seem to be left with the isolation of educational policy from both theory and 
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practice which IS reflected in the institutional arrangements within which each 
is carried out. I conclude the chapter with an example of a recent curriculum 
initiative in an attempt to illustrate some of the implications of the particular 
epistemological position that I am concerned to criticise. 
Empiricist Foundationalist Epistemology 
The idea that know ledge could be based on secure foundations can in modern 
times be traced back at least as far as Descartes' search for some indubitable 
premise secure enough to hold the weight of all other premises that can be 
logically deduced from it. I Much of our present idea of the relationship 
between knowledge, certainty and doubt can be traced back to this 
"foundationalist" idea. 
While we may believe that something is the case, many philosophers - for 
example Woozley, Ayer, Scheffler - hold that we can only be said to know it 
if we can justify our belief against rational doubt by giving a series of 
reasons that can be traced back to something (a foundation or a stop) which 
is held to be certain. If we cannot do this we end up with an infinite regress 
of reasons and are in the disastrous position of having to know an infinite 
number of things before anything can be known. 
The regress is usually halted In one of two ways. Empiricists see the regress 
halting at the level of sense data whereas rationalists see the regress halting 
at their postulate of some sort of innate knowledge. The problem for 
empiricists is that our senses sometimes deceive us. Descartes' solution to this 
problem was to posit a benevolent God who would ensure that our senses were 
not invariably deceived. 2 
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A more recent solution is to de th l"d" 
ny e va 1 lty of foundationalism and with it 
to deny the coherence of universal doubt by arguing that doubt only makes 
sense against a background of certainty. In other words if most things were 
not certain then it would not be possible to have a concept of doubt. Since 
ordinary language seems to presuppose that most things are certain then an 
acceptance of the epistemic authority of ordinary language seems to suggest 
that universal doubt is incoherent. However this argument relies upon our 
acceptance that ordinary language has epistemic authority, and while this may 
be true for medium-sized physical objects as Wittgenstein argues In 
On Certainty, 3 it is not necessarily universally true unless with Wittgenstein 
we accept that science forms the basis of a "system of belief" and agree in 
turn that the existence of medium-sized physical objects forms the basis of 
our science. The difficulty with Wittgenstein's argument is that it seems to 
lead to relativism in that truth seems to be relative to a "system of belief". 
The phenomenalist answer to the problem of finding a foundation for 
knowledge (as in empiricism) suffers from the difficulty that a sense datum is 
neither true nor false and so cannot function as a foundation. Sense data need 
to be recorded as propositions but the gap between proposition and datum is 
sufficient to allow doubt to creep back in. We seem either to have to accept 
that individual introspection is always reliable though, as well as being 
implausible, this position is also incomprehensible if we follow Wittgenstein's 
discussion regarding sensations - his "Sensation S" 4. Alternatively we have to 
appeal to science to justify our perceptual exper ience but this involves us in 
appealing to science to justify science and this circularity gets us no further 
with making sense of foundational empiricism. 
It is worth noting the irony in AFE's accepting the foundational empiricist 
framework with its attendant conceptual-empirical distinction while at the 
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same time being der i ved from Wi ttgenstein's later philosophy, one of whose 
maIn thrusts is to deny the very framework which APE accepts. Nevertheless 
the idea of man alone in the world picking up sense data, organising the data 
to produce knowledge of the wor ld and making decisions about what to do In 
the world on the basis of that knowledge is a very powerful idea. On the 
other hand, as Holland has argued, empiricism tends to lead to "stunted 
epistemology and no philosophy of education worth mentioning". 5 This is 
because the empiricist need only be exposed to the world, not to other people 
wi th whom the indi vidual might interact, in order to understand. In other 
words empiricism seems to leave language as something that will take care of 
itself. 
Perhaps another reason apart from the perceived absence of an alternative, for 
the continued acceptance of foundational empIriCISm by some educational 
theorists, is the recent interest shown in cybernetic models of learning and 
"informa tion technology". The possibility a fforded by technological advance that 
much more information could be made more easily accessible to more people 
has tended to reinforce empiricist accounts of rationality. This is because the 
empiricist idea that rational decision-making depends upon taking into account 
all the relevant 'facts' was always damaged by the empirical impossibility of 
actually getting hold of all of the facts. The advent of the "information 
technology revolution" seems to have turned this impossibility into a mere 
technical difficulty. 
In addition recent developments in Artificial Intelligence have suggested to 
some psychologists 6 that the system whereby a computer inputs information, 
processes it according to a program and outputs a signal which is translated 
by robotics into action, could provide a useful and informative contrast to the 
way a human being might input information using the senses, process it 
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according to "cognitive structure", and output signals neurophysiologically to 
muscles in order to act. 
On this VIew educational theory may well be concerned with refining the 
models of learning we operate with, as is for example the case with Papert's 7 
concern with the elimination of "bugs" in thinking. Papert suggests that the 
computer programmer's concept of "bug" is a "powerful idea" that enables us 
to think more confidently and effectively. Alternatively educational theory can 
be regarded as concerned with the elaboration of the material conditions 
assumed by the model. Interestingly it is the construction and production of 
hardware and software necessary for efficient speech recognition and 
translation systems that seem to be the most difficult set of material 
conditions to elaborate. 8 Perhaps this difficulty is parallelled by the problem 
that the ideas that human meaning poses for social scientists and perhaps this 
is why some educational theorists have accepted the shortcut that APE seems 
to offer. 
I want to suggest that, while the VIews of O'Connor and Hirst on educational 
theory are often believed to be contradictory, their positions can also be seen 
mutually to reinforce a prevalent view of educational research that likens 
educa tional research to empiricist versions of physical scienti fic research, with 
APE taking on the task of hypostatising meaning. 
Just as physical scientific research is supposed to proceed by isolating 
variables, varying experimental conditions, making causal connections and 
drawing conclusions between var iables that can be acted upon, so too 
educa tional research is supposed to proceed in the same way. However 
educational researchers are faced with special difficulties when attempting to 
isolate the variables: first there is the difficulty of accounting for extraneous 
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variables; second there is the difficulty with accounting for the difference In 
meaning that the var iables have for researchers and researched, what 
Giddens calls the "double hermeneutic". 9 That is to say that the variables not 
only relate to the conversation between observer and observed community but 
also to the conversation of the observed community itself. The third and 
perhaps the most serious difficulty concerns the application 0 f the research, 
since the very terms in which the future will have to be characterised are not 
yet necessarily all available to the researcher at the time at which he 
completes his research. I suggest that APE, seen as the activity of 'ground 
clearing' that takes place prior to and separate from the actual empirical 
research, has been widely regarded as capable of fulfilling the equivalent of 
the 'isolation of variables' stage of the empiricist research procedure. By 
offering the possibility of hypostatising meaning, APE has been supposed to 
guarantee that the assignation of the variables could be held constant 
throughout the research and its application so that the researchers could 
proceed according to models apotheosized by a commitment to empiricist 
epistemology and procedure. 
APE can thus be seen to purport to offer the theoretical foundations for what 
is often referred to as "the conceptualisation of a research problem". There 
remains the idea that analysis of language can enable the educational 
researcher to overcome the sort of problems that seem to trouble some other 
social scientists, such as the issue of causality, the importance of taking into 
account intention and purpose, and the importance of sometimes going beyond 
an actor's own account of his intentions. The articulation of the AF£ research 
programme can thus be seen to support and reinforce empiricist epistemology. 
Furthermore just as physical scientific research is supposed to provide 
knowledge or theory which guides practice, (for example: isolate the variables 
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pressure and depth, measure pressure and depth under various conditions 
, 
discover a relationship, conclude that pressure increases linearly with depth. 
Therefore when diving wear a pressure suit.} so too educational theory is 
supposed to guide practice. However the auxiliary hypotheses, the procedures 
of manufacture, the agreed methods of testing that characterise the diving 
suit example, seem to be missing in the educational case and so even if the 
empiricist research procedure were itself adequate there would still be no 
practical guidance of the type sought. The frequent requests for greater 
relevance of educational research and theory 10 and frequent complaints about 
the value of studying much of what counts as theory in some Colleges and 
Departments of Education 11 might be related to these deficiencies in 
empiricist epistemology and research procedures. 
I am argUIng that while AF£ is supposedly derived from Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy, much of which is directed against foundational empiricism, APE can 
in fact be viewed as a sort of lifebuoy which has kept empiricist educational 
research a float. This can be illustrated by reference to J. Wilson's Philosophy 
and Educational Research 12. Wilson argues that educational research in 1972 
was in a mess and that "a good deal of the work of research in Education will 
have to be done from scratch." 13 Despite this prescription and the passing of 
fourteen or so years, there is reason to suppose that Wilson would argue and 
prescribe in the same way today. Indeed much of his output is still concerned 
to correct what he sees is the lamentable state of educational theory and 
research 14. While Wilson accepts the importance of empirical research, he 
argues that researchers spend too little time thinking about what the 
parameters of their research might mean and too little time listening to what 
philosophers were telling them about the importance of "conceptual clarity". 
Apparently empirical research is all right as long as it is remembered that it 
involves conceptual matters which are philosophical concerns. Implicit In 
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Wilson's work is the commitment to the still accepted tenet of the necessary 
conceptual-empirical distinction and with it the necessity of a shared 
responsibility in educational research between psychologists, sociologists and 
philosophers. 
The Professionalisa tion 0 f Educational Theory 
I ear lier argued that APE sought to establish a connection between ordinary 
language and the professional practice of philosophical analysis of ordinary 
language. Walker summar ises this connection as follows, 
a) The criteria for the correct use of a commonsense concept are 
discovered by analysing the use of the corresponding ordinary language 
word(s); 
b) The structures of commonsense conceptual systems are discovered by 
analysing the use of the corresponding ordinary language words; 
c) Or dinary language is conceptually reliable; 
d) Linguistic relations are to be used as e vidence for conceptual relations 
such as 'logical necessity' and 'conceptual connection'; 
e) Conceptual relations can be shown, for example by transcendental 
arguments" to have normative implications for theoretical and social 
practice. 15 
Walker puts his summary in this way in order to emphasise that there is a 
theory at work here, a theory of the relations between ordinary language and 
philosophy. This theory sets the parameters for both the identification of 
ordinary language and the theoretical output that APE extracts from it. The 
point for Walker is that a theory needs to be tested by criteria that go 
beyond the theory itself, whereas APE's seem to assume that a theory can be 
tested by reference to criteria that are within the theory. According to 
Walker APE's seem not to see t his as a problem 16. By neglecting one major 
area of mainstream philosophy, the philosophy of sCience, APE theorists are 
claimed by Walker to miss critical implications of work which 
teems with implications for the way philosophy of educati077might be 
done, and therefore for the pursuit of educational theory. 
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This neglect can be illustrated by reference to the 'forms of knowledge' thesis. 
Hirst argues that logically distinct forms of knowledge are necessary to the 
d 1 t f t' l' 18 ' eve opmen 0 a ra lona mind. Leaving for one moment Hirst's admission 
that 
it is not at all clear ~hat is meant by synthesising knowledge qchieved 
through the use of logically quite distinct conceptual schemes. 1 \) 
we may wonder how we are to argue against Hirst, for he is always able to 
retort that any criticism of the forms of knowledge thesis is like 
aski% for a justification for any development of the rational mind at 
all. 
The objector to the forms thesis seems either to lack a rational mind or lacks 
a sufficient grasp of the forms. In either case it looks as if there is no 
choice in the matter of whether to accept the forms thesis. By accepting the 
self reference of the Aft paradigm of which the forms thesis is a part, the 
objector has already taken the decisive step. Once forced to accept the forms 
of knowledge thesis then the objector has also accepted that one of the forms 
can have epistemic authority over the others. That is to say that philosophy 
has authority in determining what the other forms might be and what limits 
might be placed upon them. 
Since within APE educational theory is regarded as a synthesis of the forms 
which guides practice, then APE appears to be the touchstone for everything 
that might count as education - and philosophers appear to warrant enhanced 
status above that of other theorists and above that of practitioners when it 
comes to affecting what goes on in educational institutions. Moreover the 
perspective offered by APE's appears to require the sort of institutional 
arrangements that reflect this enhanced status. 
When the 'forms' thesis is combined with the thesis of education as initiation 
which Peters advanced 21 then there is a logical necessity to maintain a set 
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of masters of the forms so that others can be educated. The net effect of 
accepting the self reference 0 f the APE paradigm is to accept the idea that 
logical theses, transcendental arguments and correct analyses can be provided 
by professionally privileged theorists in order to guide educational practice. As 
a result all prospective educational practitioners would seem to need to pass 
through the philosopher's and any other theor ist's tutelage that the perspective 
warranted. The idea that an 'immersion' in psychological, sociological and 
philosophical theory with perhaps a touch of history might help practitioners 
was institutionalised in the Colleges and Departments of Education of the 
1960's and early 70's. 
As APE started to decline (perhaps because people became bored with endless 
analyses of terms like education, indoctrination and autonomy 22, perhaps also 
because people came to question the relevance of these analyses and to 
expose some of the inconsistencies wi thin APE), APE may be seen to have 
retreated from its more substantive theses of liberalism and rationalism to the 
more modest role 0 f 'under labourer' to empirical research. There is more than 
a small change in the division of labour at stake here. The weakening of APE 
led to the resurrection of something like O'Connor's version of the nature of 
educational theory with the 'analysis of language' thesis supporting it. 
"Educational theory" became knowledge about the most efficient method of 
carrying out some predetermined and self-referential policy. The institutional 
arrangements that were partly legitimated by APE's claim to supply 
'transcendental' arguments, 'logical' requirements and 'correct' analyses were 
now helpful in reinforcing the claim of empirical research to supply 'objective' 
knowledge about educational methods that might provide temporary foundations 
upon which to rest justificatory claims about educational practice. 
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As a result theory may now be seen to be in the middle of a three way spli t 
of policy, theory and practice with policy-makers . assumlng exclusive 
responsibility for the formulation of educational aims and with theorists 
attempting to work out the most efficient means of achieving those aims. The 
institutional arrangements that previously were set up to reflect the theorist's 
position as the supplier of foundations for practice may now be seen to 
support the idea that educational policy should be self-referential. More 
precisely theoretical institutions may now be seen to legitimise whatever 
educational policy is proposed by those who happen to have the power to 
enforce their policy. 
As long as educational theory and research are viewed from within an 
empir icist foundationalist framework, then it might be reasonably claimed that 
the institutional arrangements within which much educational theorising and all 
teacher training takes place, should continue. Furthermore as long as these 
institutional arrangements are assumed by policy makers and required by their 
policy then the 'logic' behind those arrangements is likely to reflect the idea 
that policy guides theory which guides practice. In such a situation it is 
hardly surprising that some teachers as practitioners should view theory as an 
unnecessary appendage in a chain of instrumental reasoning in which they seem 
to be the final link. 
Many of those who now work within the Colleges and Departments of 
Educa tion and who might be expected to be concerned with educational theory, 
have been left with some combination of the old 'immersing teachers in theory' 
vIew of their task or alternatively have assumed the instrumental task of 
explaining curriculum initiatives to teachers or have devised curriculum support 
materials for teachers to use. As a result some Colleges and Departments have 
been "strung along" by the latest curriculum initiative and the latest attempt 
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to find some new form of discourse that l'S gOIng to act as a standard for all 
others - for example, the introductl'o f " n 0 computIng mto the curriculum or 
increasing the 'relevance' of the curriculum or preparing children for work or 
whatever. 
The problems with this instrumental view of educational theory are basically 
those that I advanced against O'Connor: first, there is the dubious validity of 
the supposition that there could never be a consensus about educational policy. 
It is supposed by the proponents of this latest version of instrumentalism that 
the formulation of policy is outside of logical reasoning. Furthermore, 
educational policy for such people is not concerned with any empirical testing 
since empirical testing is supposed by them to be a theoretical matter 
confined to the measurement of efficiency of method. On this view educational 
policy is immune from any referents outside itself. It simply directs 
educational practice and its directives cannot be challenged. 
As a result the idea that theory should guide practice IS supplemented with 
the idea that policy guides practice. The modest role for theory as supplier of 
curriculum support materials can only be sustained if it is assumed that 
curriculum support materials are best produced in isolation from their context 
of use. However there seems to be little to support this assumption and plenty 
to go against it. For example it is not clear how curriculum materials could be 
devised without regard to the circumstances in which they might be used. 
Furthermore the testing of such materials seems only to be possible in 
circumstances that best resemble the circumstances in which they will be used. 
It looks then as if theory drops out of the equation altogether. We might ask 
what role theoretical institutions, m the form of Colleges and Departments of 
Education, are to play other than to legitimise educational policy and perhaps 
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to insulate educational policy-makers from the complaints of teachers who 
might feel that "things weren't working out too well." 
Second, the problem with this strong sense 0 f 'policy guiding practice' is that 
it presupposes that both objectives and methods can be precisely specified in 
advance of the situation to which they will apply. There is also the practical 
difficulty of knowing just how much detail is required in a policy statement. 
There is some evidence from attempts at 'centre-periphery' curriculum planning 
to suggest that policy statements are not a particularly effective way of 
getting teachers to change their practices 23. Instead I suggest in advance of 
a discussion in Chapter 8 that teachers need to 'make a policy their own' in 
the sense that their discourse incorporates the evaluative discourse of the 
policy. That is not to say that whether an utterance is evaluative or 
descriptive can be decided once and for all. Rather it is to say that the way 
that teachers use descriptive propositions is in accordance with the way they 
interpret the evaluative discourse of a policy statement and vice-versa. As 
Rizvi 24 has argued, the separation of evaluative from descriptive utterances 
assumed by the proponents of both the policy directing practice view and 
means-ends curriculum planning as if utterances could be clearly separated 
into evaluative or descriptive categories, is a view that we should reject. 
16-18s In Scotland; an Action Plan 
Let us now examine a recent (1983) curriculum initiative in order to examine 
the ways in which this initiative embodies many of the implications for 
educational theory that arise out of the dominance of empiricist 
foundationalism as the epistemological framework within which much theory IS 
currently located. 
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The initiative was announced as follows: 
An innovative new educational system is now available in Scottish 
colleges of further education and the senior levels of secondary schools. 
A fr.amework of new course~ based on modules or short units of study, 
leading to the a ward of a smgle new National Certificate Jl1akes 
available wider opportunities for students and employers. ~) 
This "innovative new educational system" is the result of a process that 
started with a consultative paper on the first two years of post compulsory 
education 26 published by the Scottish Education Department (SED) in 1979. 
Apparently there was a "disturbingly large proportion of young people" 27 who 
do not continue to attend an educational institution after they reach the age 
of 16 and the participation rate in Further Education compared unfavourably 
with that of many other industrial countries. 28 
While the author of the Consultative Document suggests that we should be 
alarmed by this low participation rate, there is no mention of why we should 
find this alarming. The un-named author goes on to suggest that the 
arrangements existing in 1 979 "have been criticised as being too complex and 
fragmented" 29 though the critic(s) and their arguments are not named. 
Furthermore there was apparently "a lack of coherence caused by the 
separation of school education from further education and the separation of 
further education from training" 30 causing us to question "the adequacy of 
the preparation for working life." 31 
According to the consultative document non-vocational education takes place 
in Schools and vocational education is supposed to take place in Colleges of 
Further Education 32. In a brief reference to the place of "general studies" m 
further education, the document expresses concern that both employer's and 
student's time for these studies is being misused. 33 This criticism is supported 
with the contention that "educational experiences should prepare young people 
for their role as workers" 34. "General studies" not apparently being about 
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such preparation, IS therefore seen to be a mIsuse of time. Similarly it is 
suggested that the school curriculum is ineffective because young people are 
not interested in it, with the corollary that if the school curriculum were 
more vocational then more young people would be motivated to learn. 35 There 
is no mention here of other possible causes of lack of motivation, such as a 
dissatisfaction with the society and its institutions which students are supposed 
to be prepared to join, a realistic appraisal of the employment opportunities in 
Scotland, or a feeling that there is something gravely mistaken about such a 
view of education anyway. 
The Consultative Document concludes with a section on the organisational 
changes that might be necessitated by a change in the 16 plus curriculum. This 
seems odd since we would expect that there were some questions prior to 
organisational questions which a consultative document might address, such as 
what problems might arise if people chose to return to educational institutions 
at some time after they reach 16? Does a non-vocational education necessarily 
lead to lack of motivation? Do we know what is the nature of the work for 
which young people are to be prepared or even if there is any such work? We 
might also find it odd that a consultative document should reconmend that 
schools and colleges could be grouped as consortia so a voiding low numbers of 
students in classes at individual institutions. 36 
My point here is not to expose some of the inconsistencies and question-
begging statements undoubtedly contained in this document. Nor is it to 
reinforce the sociological point that Humes makes in his The Leadership Class 
in Scottish Education 37 concerning the rela ti ve isolation of the Directorate 
from others involved in Scottish Education. Rather my point is to show that 
this (1979) document is only a 'consultation' in a very limited sense, that sense 








What can be done to induce more young people to participate In 
post-compulsory education and training? 
How can the education service help to improve the prospects of 
young people on the employment market? 
What changes are needed in the range of courses offered in the first 
two years of post-compulsory education? 
What can be done to achieve closer collaboration between schools 
and colleges of further education? 
Is there scope for the development 0 f new types of institutions such 
as tertiary colleges, or for a measure of specialisation among 
secondary schools? 
What other changes are required in the organisation and structure of 
the edus~ tion service to resolve the issues discussed in this 
paper? 
These SIX questions already point the way forward. The consultation is not 
meant to generate debate about whether the aims of post-compulsory 
educa tion should be primarily vocational. Nor is the consultation meant to 
generate debate about whether more young people should participate in post-
compulsory education and whether their employment prospects can be improved 
by the education service. The SED seems to expect that every potential 
respondent to their Consultative Document simply accepts that unemployment 
results from an educational deficiency in the unemployed person rather than 
from a general shortage 0 f jobs on offer. By limiting the enquiry in this way, 
the framework for policy making has already been set. A respondent either 
reinforces the framework or gives answers deemed irrelevant. The framework 
for policy making is self-referential. 
It was therefore no surpr Ise In I 983 when the SED reported in Action Plan 39 
that "all bodies in education see a clear need for reform" 40, this reform 
having been presupposed by question 3 of the consultative paper. The Action 
Plan presents "the plan of action which the Government intend to follow" and 
while the plan is "not prescr iptive neither is it simply part of a further 
consultation process." 41 The author of the Action Plan detects two major 
influences on the curriculum: first the rate of change of society and second 
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the debate surrounding what appears to be a reference to something like a 
'forms of knowledge' thesis. 
Knowledge required by contemporary society can be classified into 
several fo.rms of learning, and a youIlg person's learning is deficient if it 
does not Include all of the forms. 42 
However this brief reference to that theory IS speedily dismissed and no 
further reference to any normative educational theory is made. Furthermore 
since "there is no consensus on such key matters as course descriptors, 
assessment and . f' . ,,43 h certl lcatlon t e author proceeds to prescribe the form 
that these should take. Such prescription is commensurate with a view of 
educational policy-making that has no place for the notion of normative 
educational theory, thus reinforcing my argument that Action Plan is a 
curricular innovation that is conceived within the epistemic framework of 
founda tiona list empiricism. 
The proposed remedy for the ills suggested in the consultative document is 
that courses should be divided into 40 hour modules which will be internally 
assessed by teachers on whose recommendations the Scottish Vocational 
Educational Council (SCOTVEC) will certify the attainment of the learning 
outcomes which are to be listed on each module. Students can be counselled 
to determine their needs and these needs can be matched with the learning 
outcomes from one thousand or so modules to create a programme of study. 
The advantages of this remedy are supposed by the SED to be that programmes 
of study can be flexible to meet students' and employers' needs. Second, since 
students choose their own programmes of study their motivation is supposed to 
increase. Finally increased flexibility is supposed to enable Education 
Authorities to plan their provision more cost-effectively by only offering some 
modules in certain locations. The difficulty with teaching the classes that 
might consist of students of widely differing abilities is to be met by 
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producing packages of learning material that students can work through at 
their own pace. Moreover it is envisaged that further cost effectiveness could 
be achieved if industrial establishments could certify attainment of certain 
learning outcomes while students were on placements or on Y.T.S. mode A 
schemes or actually in full time employment 44. Industrial liaison generally IS 
to be encouraged since "schools In general are open to the criticism that they 
have paid insufficient attention to the world of industry and commerce". 45 It 
is interesting to note that the Action Plan does not involve those students who 
take Scottish "Highers" prior to going on to University. It appears that for the 
moment anyway, an academic education is on offer to the minority of Scottish 
students aged 16 and over, while for the majority, a pre-vocational education 
is deemed appropr ia teo 
In the next chapter I argue that many of the assumptions behind Action Plan 
are common to some other recent curriculum initiatives and that these 
assumptions embody a type of thinking that I earlier characterised as 
"objectivistic". For the moment it is worth noting how Action Plan development 
continues to follow what I ear lier described as the centralist strategy of 
'policy guiding practice' with theoreticians being left only two possible roles. 
Ei ther theory is concerned with the devising and coordination of curriculum 
support materials. The announcement that the SED were to set up a 
"Curriculum Advice and Support Team" (CAST) in a College of Education 46 IS 
evidence of the limited role for theory within foundationalist empiricist 
epistemology. 
Alternatively theoreticians simply legitimise the curriculum initiative itself by 
explaining it to practitioners during In-Service training sessions or by doing 
curriculum development work under the guise of research. In a letter titled 
"SED Funded Research - 1985/86 and Beyond" 47 the SED invite interested 
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parties to submit outline proposals for research into "Articulation" and 
"Assessment". The guidelines for the research into "Articulation" are given as 
follows: 
It is an objec~ive of the 16+ Development Programme that articulation 
should be aCh~e;ed betwe~n the modul.ar provision, the SCE (at both 
~tandard and H grade), hIgher educatIon and experiential learning chiefly 
In the work/industrial training context, .•. 48 
The letter goes on to pose nine questions which 
it is intended that the investigation will address49 
and the answers to which 
will indicate the extent to which policy is matched by practice and help 
to identify areas requiring further development. 50 
Clear ly the research is not meant to question the 16+ policy itself. The 
research IS seen as part of the development process. Even if the SED were to 
set up a curriculum evaluation project, the present way that evaluation is 
conceived within the foundationalist, empiricist framework would preclude an 
examination of the assumptions behind the policy on the grounds that such 
assumptions are the foundations 0 f the policy. The question about agreement 
over the foundations does not arise. 
Finally this example illustrates the way that the allocation of resources IS 
central to an educational initiative and how the allocation of resources IS 
presently considered to be separate from any theoretical consideration. Now if 
educational theory is to be concerned even minimally with what is to be done 
in educational institutions then resource allocation would seem to have to be 
included within theoretical concerns. Consequently any rejection of foundational 
empiricism might involve greater integration of resource allocation with theory. 
I have tried to show VIa this example of the Action Plan that the present 
dominance 0 f the foundationalist empiricist theoretical framework within 
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educa tion leads to the diminution of the role of theory to the extent that it 
is simply accepted that policy matters can never be justified with arguments 
that go beyond appeals to economic considerations, to major ity public interest 
or to political/social/moral norms. As a result consultations about policy are 
necessarily limited. We do not have the theoretical apparatus necessary to 
know how a variety of contributions from a variety of perspectives might 
combine or be settled if they conflict. In the absence of educational theory 
we seem to be left with the idea that unexamined assumptions behind policy 
statements must go unchallenged and that is one danger with an anti-theoretic 
view. 
The dominance of foundationalist empiricist epistemology within education may 
be seen to leave us with a possibly relativistic determination of educational 
ends in abstraction from a supposedly objectivistic determination of educational 
means. However, as I argue in chapter 4, the so-called "empirical" research 
procedure cannot enable us to meet the criterion of objectivity assumed within 
the epistemic framework of foundationalist empiricism. In the next chapter I 
further the idea that this framework underpins much current thinking about 
and within some educational practices to their detriment. 
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ffiJECTIVI§.M AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FO~ EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 
The prevIous chapter was concerned to claim that APE and O'Connor's account 
of educational theory reinforce each other within a common epistemology 
that of foundationalist empiricism - and how that epistemology can be seen to 
underpin the presently common view that educational theorists should be 
concerned with maximising the efficiency of means to the exclusion of debate 
about those ends and values to which the means are supposed to be directed. 
In this chapter I argue that an adherence to this epistemology also lies behind 
those attitudes and values that have structured and directed some recent 
curricular and administrative recommendations. I go on to claim that some of 
these recommendations are educationally undesirable. 
Such a ttitudes and values may be characterised by what Oakeshott calls the 
"rationalist disposition" I or by what I call "objectivism". I use the term 
'objectivist' to denote a hypothetical character who might be supposed to 
support the kind of recommendations against which I shall strongly inveigh. 
Foundationalist epistemologies of both rationalist and empiricist kinds underpin 
objectivism through the idea that beliefs can be justified by a chain of reasons 
that end in a foundation of certainty and the further idea that researchers 
may elucidate this chain of reasons in order to substantiate claims to 
knowledge. 
As I argued in chapter I, the attractions of foundationalist empIriCISm seem to 
result from its being perceived by many educational theorists as the framework 
within which natural scientists work. It is commonly accepted that the natural 
sciences are responsible for an increase in the material well-being of those 
societies that support scientific endeavour. Some social scientists argue that 
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this material well-being could be increased further if the social sciences were 
able to emulate the natural sciences and if members of a society were to give 
up something of their sense of community and free-will in favour of their 
being willing to be regarded as 'objects' to which causal generalisations would 
be appropriate. For example Gellner suggests that members of a society might 
agree to run their public institutions on instrumental lines in order to have 
increased private freedom. He advocates 
a ~l~ralist affluent society, in which people are free, economically and 
polttically, to pursue their romantic fulfilment at home while in the 
public sphere good instrumental institutions prevent tyr~nny and watch 
over the overall economic performance ..• What on earth is wrong with 
having one's expression at home (paperback classics, hi-fi) and leaving 
the public sphere to soulless pragmatism? 2 
The educational consequence of this compromise may be seen to be reflected 
in the dichotomy between vocational and academic education, about which 
some British industrialists and businessman complain. It is as if vocational 
educa tion should be concerned with preparing people for a purely instrumental 
role at work whereas an academic education should be concerned with the 
development of people's ability to express themselves "at home". O'Connor puts 
forward a variant of this view when he argues that 
What is needed, both at school level and in higher education is a large-
scale switch to the study of natural science and mathematics .... (As for 
the humanities) for those with a natural affinity for them, a minimal 
amount of eleme~tary schooling will put them in a position to enjoy them 
if they w ish to. 
In line with the compromise suggested by Gellner, O'Connor bases his argument 
on a distinction between an 
essential body of basic knowledge and techniq~es which are n~cessary 
the efficient running of society .•. and .•• a Wider body of skIlls and 
a tti tudes which encompass ..• what journalists would call 'the cultural 
heritage of mankind' 4 
Recently the present British Government presented an economiC argument 
. ·1 f large-scale switch to vocational studies. This making a Simi ar case or a 
for 
Page 60 
argument has become so dominant in current educational debate that much 
curriculum development is presently concerned with the making and 
implementation of such a switch. 5 Jonathan refers to "the manpower serVIce 
model of Educa tion" 6 as the model upon which many modern curr icular 
developments are based. It is worth quoting the list of assumptions she sees 
underlying this model. 
A. Society and the Good Life 
1. The future is broadly predictable in principle, and education 
should prepare children for it. 
2. Technologists can/should specify the requirements for the future 
in terms of knowledge, skills and capacities. 
3. Where there are choices to be made, the criteria for evaluation 
are economic. 
4. Value is to be instrumentally assessed. 



















The education system is clearly failing, and must be radically 
changed. 
Educational change should be consumer-led. The consumers are 
industrialists, employers and the state. 
Education may/should be conflated with training, since we all 
agree it should be relevant and useful. 
Relevance and usefulness can be empirically established. 
role of educators 
Since education is a political matter, it is too important to be 
left in the hands of teachers. They must be "accountable". 
Educa tors should function as technicians responding to the 
"needs" of society, as identified by the consumers. 
Social and Moral Status of the Learner 
Preparing pupils for life is identified with preparation for their 
economic role. 
Educational benefit is to be assessed in social not individual 
terms. 
Collecti ve welfare implies the adaption of the individual to 
social circumstance. 
Nature and Function of Knowledge 
The process of learning matters more than the con~ent learnt. 
Obsolescence of specific skills implies the devaluatIon of 
informa tional learning. 
Generic "skills", independent of context, exist and are 
identifiable and transferable. 
Subject boundaries are unhelpful and arbitr.ary.. . 
Know ledge is infinitely subdivisible into "bIts": epIstemologIcally, 
the whole is simply the sum 0 f its parts. . 
The "bits" to be acquired are determined by the use to whIch 
they .w.ill b) put, so that sk ill obsolescence implies radical 
retraInIng. 
Page 61 
In the remainder of this chapter I attempt to extract from these assumptions 
those features I see as related to and underpI'nned by , , , 
empIriCIst foundationalist 
epistemology. 
Objectivism and the 'Market' 
The central difficulty with this epistemology for the objectivist is that it 
seems to leave the determination of desirable ends either to the vagaries of 
public interest or to political, social or moral norms that are impossible to 
quantify. However the idea that educational value can be instrumentally 
assessed according to economic criteria seems to offer the possibility of an 
objective determination of educational aims. I follow an argument of Gellner In 
order to explain how this possibility might have arisen. 
Gellner argues that western European countries in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries may be character ised by the way in which a minority has exploited a 
large majority with no means of sustaining that exploitation other than through 
the idea of a "Danegeld state" which guarantees 
a steady spread of affluence, and the expectation - for the first time In 
history - of continuous improvement ••. The expansion was oiled by a 
gradual inflation of the currency ..• egalitarianism in education, and so 
forth. A regular and expected growth in income, social security and 
governmental responsibility for employment, constitute a permanent and 
growing bribe by means of which the system could purchaseg acquiescence 
from those who were not its most privileged beneficiaries. (original 
emphasis) 
However in the 1970's the supply of Danegeld started to dry up. Armed with 
neither carrot nor stick, what Gellner calls "the system" had to look to other 
things to sustain itself. Three elements seem to me to be implied in this 
search. First the success of a political appeal to the conservatism of the 
working class; second attempts to suggest that one or other aspect of the 
welfare s ta te is pr imar ily responsible for the present lack of "Danegeld". 
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Public education seems to be an ideal candidate for such a charge. For if it is 
assumed that public education forms the closed system necessary to support a 
utilitarian idea of maximising efficiency, then it becomes easy to blame the 
public education system for its inability to produce the sort and number of 
citizens needed to maintain the supply of Danegeld which keeps the system 
running. Moreover the state education system itself requires a considerable 
amount of Danegeld to sustain it, thus reducing the amount available for 
everything else. Hence the state education system is seen to be worthy of 
censure on two counts. The third element is the various attempts to distribute 
the small amount of Danegeld that there is more fairly and thus to gain some 
sort of moral currency through a "legitimacy of distribution". According to 
Gellner 9 there are two possible ways that an industrial society may 
legitimately distribute the benefits at its disposal: either the so-called "free 
market" or Marxism. Gellner speedily dismisses the Marxist option and 
concentrates on the idea of a 'market'. As he puts it. 
men have needs and desires, and work so as to satisfy these. Their 
productivity grows immensely through the division of labour and 
specialisation. This in turn raises the question of the terms on which 
mutually complementary producers exchange their products. A 'free 
market' is best: it stimulates further endeavour into production of those 
goods which 'at the margin' still give most satisfaction. The market price, 
if not warped by interference, is not merely the one leading to the brBt 
utilisation of effort, but also constitutes a fair and legitimate price. 
Plainly the idea of a 'market' is the dominant model for such a distribution in 
Britain in the 1980's. As Gellner notes, the idea of a 'market' appears to offer 
the final foundation for empiricism in tha t this idea places 
the burden of decision to something empirical, testalble, observable -
namely observable preferences, demand and supply. 
The 'market' acts as a kind of neutral arbiter between competing interests that 
can be used to settle matters in a way that meets the objectivist's criterion 
for quantification of value according to how much people are prepared to 
spend to get what they want. However there are at least four difficulties with 
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the notion of distribution according to the 'market': first the 'market' only 
gi ves its verdict in an institutional and cultural context that is made and 
manipulated by men. Second industrial production is inseparable from an infra-
structure the depth and extent of which makes it absurd to suppose that the 
contributions of individuals can be separated out. Third wants are not the 
same as needs and it is neither unreasonable nor improper that government 
should intervene in order to secure some longer term objectives against those 
which might be dictated by some of the short-term demands of the 'market'. 
Finally and most importantly, if government has to intervene, then the fruits 
of its intervention, far from presenting fresh challenges and opportunities, 
merely present opportunities for early exploitation of government decisions. 
Tha t is to say, those who h ave early information about possible or likely 
consequences are most likely to do well out of a decision. This has been 
apparent most recently in the case of decisions to deregulate buses and to sell 
off nationalised industries but also becomes apparent in the case of decisions 
to close schools and to increase government support for the "assisted places 
scheme". For example if a decision is taken to close what is widely regarded 
as a good school on the grounds that its catchment area is too small and if it 
is proposed that pupils should be sen t to what is widely regarded as a poor 
school, then however valid those e valua tions might be, a parent who receIves 
ear ly information about the closure plans would be likely to benefit by movmg 
home before a glut of property appears on the housing market due to 
increased numbers of parents in search of another good school. 
The real difficulty with adopting the idea of a 'free-market' as neutral arbiter, 
is that people come to see through what might in reality be an illusion and 
the attempt to legitimate distribution is lost. Hence not only does self-interest 
become channelled to subvert the system but also "ideal conviction" is set to 
join forces with it. Gellner suggests that while the market might be an 
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excellent way of carrying out mmor adjustments to the patt f d" "b " ern 0 Istn utIon, 
there is no substitute for political responsibility in the overall economic 
sphere. Recent government debates about "educational vouchers" and action to 
privatise the further education sector and to switch funding from institution-
led courses to consumer-led courses (where the Manpower Services Commission 
is assumed to represent the consumer) seem to support the view that the 
present government in the U.K. operates on the model of dictating the 
patterns of direction and growth in education via market forces. 
If the market is to be the final arbiter 0 f educational worth, then logically 
there needs to be a commodity which can be marketed. In education this 
'commodity' appears to be knowledge. Now empiricist epistemology supports the 
idea that knowledge consists in bundles of statements that somehow match the 
world; on this model educational institutions can offer the learner the 
opportunity to get hold of different combinations of these bundles of 
statements in the form of 'units of study' or 'modules'. It is not hard to find 
evidence to support the view that the 1970's and 1980's have seen a great 
increase in the numbers of courses, modules and units conceived along these 
"1 12 " lines that have been produced across the educationa spectrum suggestIng a 
kind of 'assembly -line' notion of knowledge. 
However we might wonder on what basis the learner IS to make the choice 
between or among such units. Very often the answer appears to be on the 
basis of the jobs that are thought to be likely to be on offer. In other words, 
the supposed availability of certain types of job appears to be the ultimate 
arbiter in the choice of what is worth studying. Now no one would blame 
parents for considering that this is a useful way of v iewing what some 
educa tiona 1 provision should be about. Few parents now want to see their 
offspr ing spending their post-school years unemployed? However such an 
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overall VIew of the functl"on and utl"ll"ty f d " o e uca tIona 1 institutions IS open to 
question on at least three counts. 
First we can often only have a vague idea about what jobs in future, if any, 
there might be; it seems to make little sense to direct our whole educational 
effort towards preparing for people for jobs that can only be speculatively 
envisaged. Since educational output can never match employment demand 
precisely, there might always be some residual disappointment of expectation. 
At worst a vocational bias can amount to little more than a crude form of 
social engineering that may well be likely to fail. Furthermore the problem 
with a conception of learning that relies upon precise specifications of input 
and output is that there is little scope for encompassing the idea of the 
learner's being able to continue with something on his own and moreover to be 
able to do more than just one set of things - namely those skills etc. 
described or looked for in a job specification. 
Second, failure to achieve vocational targets could easily lead to the opposite 
reaction, that is towards the idea that education should be directed at 
wha tever children were interested in, as if children were somehow apart from 
the society which they are supposed to join. In other words when the 
curriculum is based on objectivist presuppositions regarding what might be 
called "pre-vocationalism" - and when "pre-vocationalism" is seen to fail, 
there is the possibility 0 f a lurching towards the opposite idea 0 f an extreme 
form of liberalism. (It may be that the present move towards "pre-
vocationalism" is itself the result of a lurching in the opposite direction away 
from the liberal curricular ideas of the 1960's) However people not only want 
to earn their Ii ving but also want to play some part in determining the way a 
society might develop; and that seems for us to mean our being able to 
criticise existing institutions while still contributing to them. We need to 
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rebuild our boat while still remaining afloat, to I 
use an ana ogy borrowed from 
Neurath. No one can totally iPttison the socl"ety f h" h 
,- 0 W lC they are a part, any 
more than anyone can totally shape the society which they want to join. 
Third, the idea of the market as ultimate arbiter ignores the fact that people 
also care about what they do and how they do it, not just the material 
rewards that their work brings. Were everybody to be totally concerned with 
material reward and were the utilitarian separation of work from leisure to be 
accepted, then we should end up having to apportion wealth on the basis of 
misery endured at work; and while there may be some need to reward people 
for doing unpleasant or dangerous work, that is no reason to suppose that such 
an apportionment could ever form the basis of an equitable incomes policy or 
fair basis for any kind of distribution of social goods or wealth. If it did, then 
there would be a tendency for people to make their particular occupation 
appear far more miserable than it actually was! 
Even if these difficulties with instrumental assessments of value are ignored, 
the objectivist still faces the problem of devising the most efficient ways of 
acquiring knowledge and assessing how effectively it has been acquired. As I 
argued in chapter 2, these tasks might appear to the objectivist to be the 
preserve of the Colleges and Departments of Education who might be assigned 
the task of devising curricular experiments, the aim of which would be to 
produce curriculum support materials that maximise 'efficiency' where 
efficiency is defined as the inverse of the cost of each student taking a unit 
I "" b 13 of study. The so-called "Information Technology" revo utl0n IS seen y many 
to offer great possibilities here, for, if it is assumed that knowledge is readily 
available "at the touch of a button" as it were, then educationalists can 
concentrate on the technical matter of getting the appropriate equipment into 
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the right places and In a format suitable for people with differing levels of 
abilities. 
The economic advantages of such a system arise out of the assumed reduction 
in the number of teachers and in the remuneration that is paid to them, for if 
some sort of elite group of educationalists could devise the software to run on 
such equipment, educational institutions could be staffed by technicians 
(perhaps called teachers). The claim that educational technicians should, In 
such a system, be paid substantially more than other types of technician could 
hardly be substantiated. Furthermore such a system would seem to offer the 
possibility of measuring teacher effectiveness, for if input and output can be 
measured and curricular method is assumed to be standardised, then any failure 
to achieve targets of cost efficiency can only be attributable to the 
inefficiency 0 f the teacher. 
While this scenario may be bleak and while few teachers might wish to 
contemplate its implementation, it is a perfect replica of the "manpower 
service model of education" described earlier and may be seen as the logical 
conclusion to objectivistic ideas about education that are underpinned by 
foundationalist empiricist epistemology. We may summarise these ideas as 
follows: educational values are supposed to be determined by appeals to the 
amount of money that people are prepared to spend to achieve them and can 
thus be determined mathematically, as can the selection of educational means 
by equating cost per "bit" of knowledge acquired - with efficiency. 
The proximity of objectivism to mathematical positivism is readily apparent 
here. For example "Systems Theory" and "Operational Research" depend upon 
the notion that rational decision making is "concerned with resolution of 
ambiguity and is synonymous with mathematical decidability." 14 The idea that 
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claims to know might be settled by appeal to a form of discourse within which 
disagreements are rare, is an idea that has much attraction for the objectivist. 
Mathematics seems to be just such a form of discourse. A b' " n 0 Jectl Vlst might 
argue that the physical sciences are successful because claims about the way 
the wor ld is can be settled by linking those claims with a mathematical 
equation whose solution is determinate. The objectivity of those claims is 
ensured because disputes rarely break out over the solution to an equation. 
The attractions of this argument are such that many economists operate within 
what Hahn and Hollis call "orthodox Positivist tenets" 15; it is therefore not 
surpr ising that economic positivism should supply the theoretical scaffolding 
which helps to support the "manpower service model of education". 16 
Further Education and Vocationalism 
In the previous chapter I argued that teacher education is largely constituted 
within the Colleges and Departments of Education according to what I 
described as the empiricist idea that 'theory guides practice'. That is to say, 
trainees are prepared for their future role as teachers by some sort of 
structured immersion into those things that the Colleges and Departments deem 
as appropriate guides to the practice of teaching. In this section I argue that 
the same empiricist idea lies behind both the way In which vocational further 
education is institutionalised and the attitudes and values of those experts who 
presently design much of the vocational further education curriculum. 
Vocational further education has recently been given much prominence through 
the incursion of the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) into the realm that 
was previously reserved for the Department of Education and Science and the 
Scottish Education Department. 17 Schemes like the Technical and Vocational 
Educational Initiative (TVE!), the Continuing Provision of Vocational Education 
(CPVE), the extension of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS), the Action Plan and 
Page 69 
the recent Review of Vocational Qualifications (RVQ) embody some of the 
recent moves towards what I call vocationalism in education. 
The Colleges of Further Education have never been in much doubt about their 
central role as providers of vocational education. 18 Paradoxically however, 
the further education sector has expanded as employment opportunities have 
decreased. Throughout this expansion, vocational further education may be seen 
to have been concerned with the set of theories that are supposed to guide 
vocational practice whether their client group was predominantly unemployed 
or employed. 19 Yet it might be reasonably maintained that, even in the hey-
day of low unemployment, the instruction given in Colleges of Further 
Education was largely divorced from the realities of industrial life. For 
example Gleeson and Mardle write 
For the apprentice-student, the shop floor represents the real basis of 
his material existence. College represents an escape route, a ladder to 
potential promotion and higher '28ges. It is also seen to be a 'perk', a 
day off from industrial reality. 
Research on the role and concept of Further Education is not extensive, but 
the plethora of curriculum initiatives with which further education has had to 
grapple over the past thirty years or so 21 might be taken to support the 
contention of Gleeson and Mardle that the sort of instruction which young 
workers get in their colleges does not match industrial reality, - and merely 
serves as a sort of hurdle which workers must overcome in order to gain 
promotion. 
Oakeshott's work might be used to explain the lack of relevance of the 
instruction offered in institutions of further education. Oakeshott points out 
that technical knowledge - which he defines as knowledge of technique that 
can be formulated in rules - gets its moment of application in practical 
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knowledge - which he defines as traditional knowledge that exists only in use. 
For example, to become a joiner involves much more than learning a series of 
techniques in abstraction from their actual applications in the sort of work 
that joiners do. Hence Oakeshott mourns the advance of the idea that 
technical knowledge could be taught in abstraction from the community of 
practitioners who sustain the practical discourse with which an apprentice was 
supposed to become familiar. As he puts it 
Apprenticeship, the pupil working alongside the master who in teaching a 
technique. also imparts th~ s~rt of knowledge that cannot be taught has 
not yet dIsappeared; but It IS obsolescent, and its place is being taken 
by technical schools. 22 
Consequently, for Oakeshott, the move supposedly to maXImise efficiency of 
learning by teaching technical knowledge in colleges in abstraction from and 
as a preparation for work, could never replace the sort of learning that comes 
with working alongside someone with the aim of being inducted into a 
practice. For Oakeshott direct experience is everything in this kind of 
learning. 
As unemployment began to rise, the dominance of empiricist meta-theory that 
lay behind some of the a ttitudes and values of those who designed the further 
education curriculum might be seen to be responsible for the lack of debate 
about whether people could be prepared for particular types of work. The 
assumption continued tha t Colleges of Further Education should attend to the 
development of vocational preparation curricula. For example, it is argued on 
behalf of the Manpower Services Commission 23 that unemployment may be 
partly a ttr ibutable to a mismatch between the competences that the 
unemployed presently have and the competences that the unemployed would 
need to have in order to do those jobs that are available. Hence the M.S.C. 
encourages the Colleges of Further Education to provide short vocational 
preparation "update" 24 courses in order to satisfy the supply side of the 
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unemployment equation. The difficulty for the Colleges comes when deciding 
what the content of such courses should be. 
The Colleges of Further Education may be seen to have been founded on the 
empiricist idea that theory guides rational practice but as they became 
sensitive to the possibility that such theory did not appear to be readily 
available, the emphasis shifted and the key idea now seems to have become 
practical knowledge guiding practice through the notion of "transferable 
skills". 25 Now part of the reasoning behind this shift may well have been due 
to the belief that people who did not appear to be good at writing or 
'academic' study 0 ften seemed good at doing practical things. Some curriculum 
designers may not have taken into account that this might be a case of wants 
(in the sense tha t learners are often prompted by the desire for some success) 
replacing needs (and these may have been shown up by failure to 'cotton on' 
at the first attempt). These designers began to downgrade technical knowledge 
and proclaimed technical and vocational skills and competences to be the new 
foundations for rational practice. 
The paradox is that empiricist foundationalist epistemology provides the 
rationale for this move by suggesting that all investigation should begin anew 
and that knowledge is only obtained when the mind is continually being 
cleared of 'prejudice' 26 - to the extent that subject knowledge is said to 
become outdated so quickly that the learning of content does not matter so 
much as the learning of processes. At that point curricular experts of the 
empir icist persuasion started looking a t what they claimed to be the basic 
processes of learning. It was argued that since subject knowledge becomes 
outdated so quickly, it is preferable to teach the process whereby knowledge 
is obtained. Unfortunately these experts fail to see that they are involved In a 
regress here. Logically the regress can only be a voided by denying the 
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empiricist meta-theory tha t lies behind the experts' attitudes and values. In 
other words this regress is only generated b . . y an empIricist epistemology that 
has no place for the notions of teaching and learning through conversation. 
However as a matter of fact these experts attempt to halt this regress 
through the notion of a learning process. For example if it is agreed that 
there is no value in someone's concern to learn to know that p, because 'facts' 
can be obtained from a computerised data-base, then it will seem to make 
sense to teach people to use a computerised data-base; to use a computerised 
data-base can be learnt by consulting a manual, so it makes more sense to 
know how to get hold of and to interpret a manual; this in turn leads to _ 
and so on. The problem that faces the expert is to decide the exact point at 
which to break in to the regress. A variety of suggestions have been tried but 
the current emphasis is on the idea of an "occupational training family" (OTF) 
of var ious skills and competences. 
Let us unravel these terms as they apply to the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). 
The designers of this scheme claim that it is possible to describe 103 "skills" 
that are generic and transferable and which in various combinations can be 
mastered in order to prepare people, not just for one job, but for a range of 
jobs. 27 There is no room here to examine what might be meant by "life-
skills", "social skills", "sur vi val skills" and "coping skills" or to elucidate the 
differences between them. 28 Suffice to say that the designers of such 
curricular recommendations feel able to group these and other skills into 
eleven occupational training families (OTF) of skills and competences that are 
supposed to prepare people for jobs within those families 29 
However the designers 0 f YTS schemes go further than this in proposmg that 
there should be "transfer learning objectives" (TLO) 30 set for YTS trainees, 
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the achievement of which is supposed to enable them to find work in another 
OTF should that prove necessary. Hence while trainees are supposed to be 
mastering those skills and competences appropriate to a particular OTF, they 
are also supposed to be achieving some TLO's in order to be flexible enough to 
meet future demands of the labour market. However essentially the function of 
the TLO seems to involve closing up a division that was only opened by the 
eleven- fold classification 0 f occupations into OTF's. 
For example, the occupations of cobbler, electrician, garage mechanic and 
window cleaner are grouped within OTF4 (Installation, Maintenance and Repair 
occupations). Now it is difficult to see what common features there are 
between the skills and competences involved in doing the work of a cobbler 
and a window-cleaner over and above those that might relate to a cobbler and 
a vending machine operator (to take an example from OTF8). It is difficult to 
support the idea that skills, competences, and even knowledge float free of 
their moment of application in the concrete tasks and in the particular 
vocational contexts in which cobblers, vending machine operatives and others 
operate. 31 
It is not SUrpriSIng that those concerned with the design and policy of the YTS 
should leave the matter of the content of YTS programmes to the work of 
individual sponsors and training agencies, aided by publications from bodies 
such as the F.E.U. 32 that suggest how the notions of context free 
competences might be achieved. The problem with the implementation of these 
suggestions, as Jonathan 33 notes, is that the trainee might end up stocking 
supermarket shelves while the trainer ticks off the competences supposedly 
"overcome" on a checklist - competences such as "plan the order of 
activities", "decide which category something belongs in". These competences 
"b h "" I" f they represented something new and valuable to mIght e wort acquIrIng 
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the trainee; however, when applied to stocking supermarket shelves, it is likely 
that the trainee will have achieved as much in the way of h'b't' 
ex 1 1 mg mastery 
of such examples of those competences in the course of travelling to the 
supermarket in the morning. Of course stocking supermarket shelves is an 
extremely useful activity. What is dangerous is the elevation of such an 
activity to the status of something that is regarded as having the power 
somehow to prepare the trainee for a range of occupations, should supermarket 
jobs not materialise, and moreover that pretends that such an activity is 
necessarily educational in character. 
Perhaps the move to OTPs and competences is as far as the empiricist 'theory 
guiding practice' idea w ill get; perhaps the thrust into vocationalism may be 
seen to result from the fragmentation of practical discourse into elements that 
seemed able to provide a political rationale for learning but did little to offer 
a different kind of educational value for the lives of those who were deemed 
to have become competent in OTPs and TLO's. It may well be the case that a 
short preparation for specific vocations within colleges of Further Education 
suits both employers and trainees. However if the above argument is correct, 
this cannot just be assumed nor especially can it be assumed that a general 
vocational preparation is either possible or desirable. 
The Management of Educational Insti tution~ 
It has recently been suggested in the Report into the Pay and Conditions of 
Service of School Teachers in Scotland 34 tha t the lack of good management 
in educational institutions is responsible for many of the deficiencies in the 
state education system. In that document it is suggested that education IS 
something that can be "managed", in the sense that the overall aims of 
education can be determined by appeals to 'market demands' and that these 
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alms can broken down into objectives that specify t . 
arget outputs In relatIon to 
inputs and for which "managers" can be responsible. 
I have argued that many objectivists of the empiricist persuasion ultimately 
appeal to the market in order to determine what educational institutions 
should aspire to achieve. However the market - and especially that for 
education - does not give its verdict in a way that makes it obvious what 
individual practitioners should do in order to contribute to the satisfaction of 
'market demands'. Instead there is a need to interpret the market and to 
subdi vide tha t in terpretation into objectives that practitioners should aspire to 
achieve. These objectives may then be operationalised and, through a chain or 
"line" structure, the market is supposed to be satisfied by various line 
managers achieving their targets predicated upon those objectives and their 
operationalisations. 
However the success of line management procedures - quite apart from the 
logical question of their appropriateness as models for education - depends 
upon effective motivation. There appear to be three motivational methods 
available and used. First there is extrinsic motivation such as is provided by 
some combination of the 'carrot and stick' method, second there is intrinsic 
motivation tha t depends upon the coincidence of target objectives with those 
things that the manager or workforce value for their own sake, rather than 
for the sake of some perceived external benefit. Third there is an ultimate 
appeal to the idea that the corrmon good can be satisfied if individual desires 
are suspended in favour of externally set targets which are determined 
ultima tely by an appeal to the market. 
There is no room here to debate at length whether the 'common good' can be 
sa tisfied in this way. I have already indica ted some 0 f the logical inadequacies 
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with the thesis that educational alms can be determined l' 1 b exc USlve y y an 
appeal to what consumers want. It is worth, however, supplementing my ear lier 
argument here by pointing out that it is by no means clear who the consumers 
of education are. Students, parents, industrialists and others all may claim to 
use the education service but may make differing demands upon it. It is also 
not clear that an untrammelled appeal to what might be called "consumerism" 
in education is compatible with the orderly administration of the education 
system. Nor is it clear that such an appeal can avoid giving rise to what 
would widely be regarded as an unacceptable difference between the quality 
of the educational provision demanded by one set of articulate and vocal 
consumers and the quality of the educational provision demanded by or perhaps 
provided for their less articulate counterparts. On the other hand it has to be 
recognised that the present system whereby teachers and individual local 
education authorities decide much of what goes on in those parts of the 
educa tion system over which they exercise some control, is no longer 
acceptable to many people. 
We have here an opposition between two views that might be called 
"consumerism" and "professionalism" with apparently no way to settle matters 
other than to appeal to whatever norms are politically acceptable. For the 
moment that means "consumerism", as is shown by the present Government's 
endorsement of the Report mentioned above. The industrial action that 
followed publication of that Report, however, may be taken as an indication 
that many teachers do not believe that the 'common good' will be satisfied by 
instituting a consumer-related view of education administered by a system of 
"line managers". Whether teachers are correct in this belief is irrelevant to my 
argument. It is relevant, however, that only intrinsic and extrinsic motivational 
methods appear to be available to encourage teachers to accept the 
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strengthening of line management In schools so that the alms of education, as 
set by the "consumers", might be realised. 
In the case of teaching, poten tially at any rate, intrinsic moti va tion seems 
high as a logical justification. However recently, as for example in the Report 
mentioned above, there has been a move to increase the element of extrinsic 
motivation for teachers, 35 perhaps as a compensation for the loss of intrinsic 
motivation that is often quoted as having occurred. 36 It can be argued, 
however, that recent moves towards instituting a line-management system or 
structure of procedures in educational institutions emanate not only as 
responses to the demand for "accountability" to "consumers" but also from an 
attempt to increase the number of means of motivating teachers extrinsically. 
I shall argue that such a notion of a "management structure" is manipulative 
because the idea of objectivity assumed within the structure is bogus. The 
imposition of a line-management structure not only gives rise to the dubious 
proposition tha t teachers can be rewarded according to the extent to which 
they achieve target objectives but also to the fiction that there IS such a 
thing as managerial expertise - either generally or in education. In short I 
shall argue that the idea of line-management is inappropriate in an educational 
context. 
For extrinsic motivation to be effective in the case of teachers, at least two 
conditions must be met. First there must be some way of fairly rewarding 
teachers for their performance; this seems to mean that performance must be 
measured in terms of 'output' over 'input' for that part of the educational 
system for which the teacher is responsible. Second the individual teacher'S 
effort needs to be isolated from other influences. There are good reasons to 
suppose that neither condition can be met. 
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In the first case students are remarkably variable, such that we do not have 
any reliable means of measuring their capabilities External . t' h 
• examma lons ave 
often been regarded as the most appropriate or even the best psychometric 
device for such purposes, but they are unreliable and have notoriously low 
predicti ve validity. In the second case it is doubtful whether an individual 
teacher's effort can be isolated from all other factors. Not only do some 
decisions have to be taken collectively within a school - things like room 
changes and disciplinary matters - but also some decisions that radically 
affect a teacher's performance depend upon the decisions of those who are 
paid to manage him; an example would refer to things like timetabling, 
provision of resources, class sizes and so on. Moreover the total educational 
experience is not isolable from other influences on people's lives, - television, 
magazines and so on. In short a hard empiricist's conditions for objective 
measurement of teacher performance cannot be met. 
Just as an objectivist might suggest that sense-data can function as 
foundations for the edifice of theory construction about efficiency of means, 
so an objectivist might also suggest that the manager's interpretation of the 
market provides the permanent foundations for evaluative theory. In order to 
justify that interpretation, managers have to make it look as if their 
judgements were based on some impersonal criterion also. Yet such a criterion 
must be a fiction, for apart from the market, there is no other appeal to 
objectivity. For the objectivist of this persuasion, judgemental criteria come 
from the market-place or not at all. 
This is the import of one of MacIntyre's arguments in After virtue 37 
According to MacIntyre, means-ends rationality necessarily embodies the idea 
of manipulative social relations in which moral argument consists of veiled 
expressions of preference. This is termed "emotivism" by MacIntyre and is said 
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to lead to "the obliteration of any genul'ne d' , Istmction between manipulative 
and non-manipulative social relations." 38 
The only way that managers might a void this conclusion is to base their 
decisions on those observations that can be intersubjectively validated. 
However this move shifts the emphasis over to those things that are indirectly 
concerned with student learning, for example curriculum development and 
administration. The danger is that these observable parts of a teacher's 
responsibility become the sole measure of the extent to which teachers should 
be rewarded. This is particularly the case when schools have to face a steady 
barrage of curriculum initiatives that need to be interpreted, resources that 
need to be prepared and a plethora of administrative tasks that need to be 
carried out, in order to demonstrate that such initiatives are being 
implemented according to some other set of management objectives externally 
imposed upon them. 
The pressure on managers is to reward those who most contribute to such 
public observable identifiable outcomes at the expense of those who only 
concentrate on their own teaching. However the latter group might not merely 
feel discontent because of a downgrading of what they perceive to be the 
most important part of their job but their discontent might be increased when 
they realise that their expertise is not such a significant factor when it comes 
to the way in which managers apportion the rewards accruing to the 
institution by means of promotions and so on. 
However if classroom teaching commands such a low status that the only hope 
for a career teacher of gaining rewards is to be promoted out of the 
classroom and out of the way of implementing curricular developments that 
I to prepare people for a future that none of us can seem to invo ve attempts 
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predict with any great accuracy, it IS paradoxical that the most likely 
mot iva tion for teachers ser iously working on such developments is the 
possibility of promotion as a reward for involvement in them. 
It should be noted that this argument against the idea of a "line management" 
structure in educational institutions does not carry with it the implication that 
a structure of promoted posts is inappropriate in an educational context, 
merely that such a structure cannot be straight-forwardly assumed to be 
appropria te for education on the basis of its alleged or supposed applicability 
in other contexts in which more sense can be made of the idea of 
intersubjectively verifiable target outputs. Instead some other justification is 
required. 
However if arguments articulated by Rizvi 39 are correct, then the 
introduction of a structure of promoted posts may necessarily negate any 
attempt to achieve non-coercive decision-making within educational 
institutions. He argues that the contemporary tools which we use to analyse 
educational administration are invariably informed by the assumptions of 
bureaucratic rationality 
and that unless we recognise this form of rationality to be fundamentally 
mistaken, we will continue to be thwarted in our efforts to achieve 
"d "d" I 40 genuIne emocracy In e ucationa governance. 
Rizvi notes that bureaucratic rationality eschews considerations of ends within 
educational institutions and leads to human relationships that are essentially 
manipula ti ve in that people are treated as means to the ends of others. 
Bureaucratic rationality leads to the idea that hierarchical authority is 
indispensable to educational organisations and to the idea that, in merely 
undertaking our administrative tasks, we are not morally implicated. Rizvi 
" h "d H suggests that we contest and alter our values argues agaInst t ese 1 ease e 
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10 the same way as we falsify and reVIse our scientific theories, 41 a claim 
incidentally which Evers makes in another context (and which leads Evers to 
different conclusions) 42. Rizvi concludes that 
forms of social organisation dominated by the ideas of hierarchy, absolute 
division of labour and administrative expertise amount to nothing more 
that an ideology which prevents the re~~isation of human potential for a 
caring, collective and democratic life. 
However in chapter 6, I argue that it may be possible to institute a structure 
of promoted posts within educational institutions without entailing some of the 
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roST EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
FROM FOUNDATIONALISM TO COHERENCE 
The prevIous three chapters have been concerned with the present state of 
educational theory and practice. I have argued that much current educational 
theory and practice is underpinned by a reliance upon a foundationalist 
empiricist epistemology and its attendant research procedures. The attraction 
of tying educational theory in with a procedure that is commonly assumed to 
produce our most useful and reliable theory - natural scientific theory - is 
clear enough. However, as I hope to show in this chapter, empiricist accounts 
of theory production do not provide an adequate account of how natural 
scientists arrive at what is widely regarded as the most prestigious type of 
theory, let alone whether, and if so how, educational theorists might emulate 
tha t procedure. 
I rehearse some theories of Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend and Quine in order to 
argue that the utility and reliability of natural scientific theories cannot be 
underpinned by a reliance upon a foundationalist empiricist epistemology and 
its attendant research procedure. Instead of the empiricist idea that reliable 
theory is based on the secure foundations of supposedly theory-neutral 
observation statements, I argue that observation statements themselves are 
theoretically partisan and hence tha t theories are compared against each 
other. The philosophers mentioned above offer different solutions to the 
common problem of identifying those theories that form the standards against 
which others should be compared. I present their solutions in the form of a 
progressive argument that moves away from empiricist inductivism towards 
holistic coherence. 
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I conclude that the holistic idea of maximising the cohere f' k 
nce 0 a networ ' of 
theory is of most interest to my developing account of educational theory. I 
offer a critique both of Quine's development of this idea and of the use that 
the Australian scholars Walker and Evers make of Quine's work in the 
development of a philosophy of education that they call "materialist 
pragmatism". While I argue against some of the conclusions that Walker and 
Evers draw, I suggest that their work opens up a fruitful line of enquiry into 
the nature and purpose 0 f educational theory. 
The Quinean idea of a network of theory which includes philosophical, 
scientific and ethical theories offers the possibility of moving away from the 
view that educational theorists might emulate the so-called "empiricist" 
research procedure on the grounds that that procedure is responsible for the 
explanatory and predicti ve success commonly a ttr ibuted to natural science - as 
if educational matters were static and simply waiting to be investigated, 
administered and evaluated in abstraction from the interests of educational 
practitioners. Instead the possibility opens up of a range of educational 
theories in competition against one another, each offering different 
prescriptions for action in the dynamic contexts in which educational matters 
are practised. 
Empiricist Research 
The central thesis behind empiricist research is that the world can be 
investigated by looking for regularities in its structure. These regularities may 
then be generalised into statements about what we know that are supposed to 
correspond with the way the world actually is. As a result we are supposed to 
be able to act and move in the world with increased efficacy. 
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However there are at least two major difficulties with this thesis. First, there 
is a difficulty with the notion that there can be a 'linking' of statements to 
the wor ld, for we can never either in fact or in principle get beyond words to 
the wor ld. Whatever we do we seem always to end up with a matching of 
statements to statements, since we have no access to the way the wor ld 
actually is other than via the statements we use to describe the way that we 
actually percei ve the wor ld to be. 
Second, the move postulated in empiriCist inductivism from the particular to 
the general is logically inadequate as a guarantee of truth, because of the so 
called problem of induction. No matter how many times something is seen to 
take place, that is no guarantee that that occurrence will always take place. 
Furthermore since there are many occasions when the principle of induction 
has been deficient then, by itself, the principle of induction will always be 
deficient. Finally, in inductivism there is no case of induction where the 
principle of induction itself is not presupposed: it rests therefore on a blatant 
petitio principii. 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery I Popper claims he can overcome the 
problem of induction by pointing out that while no amount of careful 
observation of events can ever guarantee the truth of a statement that takes 
the form "all X's are Y", one observation of an X that is not a Y enables us 
to assert with logical security that "not all X's are Y". 
This deceptively simple point reorients the scientific enterprise for Popper. 
Instead of scientists looking for confirming instances of a general statement or 
theory, Popper advocates that scientists start by making bold conjectures about 
an assumed generality and then set about trying to find a falsify ing instance 
of that generality, so that they can be certain that they were wrong. 
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Successive bold conjectures are made with the knowledge that some theories 
are false and so by a sort of negative implication conjectures asymptotically 
approach the truth though they never reach it. 
Popper 2 likens truth to the summit of a mountain in that a climber or a 
truth-seeker may not know how near he is to the summit or indeed if he has 
even got there, yet his climbing implies that he recognises that there IS a 
summit. Now while the climber may not know whether he has reached the 
summit he can certainly check whether he has not yet reached it by attempts 
at falsification. Truth thus becomes in Popper's account of science a regulative 
principle towards which scientific progress evolves asymptotically. However it 
is not just any truth to which Popper aspires; it is the search for "interesting" 
truth tha t IS important. For example 
We are not content with 'twice two equals four', even tho~gh it is true 
... what we are looking for are answers to our problems. (original 
emphasis) 
So for Popper content IS also important; it is for this reason he introduces the 
notion of "verisimilitude" 4 as the difference between the truth content of a 
theory and its falsity content. In other words maximum "verisimilitude" would 
only be obtained by a theory that was not only true but comprehensively true. 
While pragmatic considerations may guide the kind of conjectures that 
scientists make, for Popper the truth of those conjectures is unrelated to such 
"subjective" considerations. Instead Popper subscribes to Tarski's semantic 
theory of truth. 5 Tarski 6 separates an object language ("snow is white") from 
a semantical metalanguage. In the metalanguage (it is true that 'snow is 
white') we can speak about an object language but not about the facts to 
which it refers. This simple dev ice enables Popper to keep the idea of 
correspondence, for if, as he 7 suggests, we take truth to be synonymous with 
"correspondence to the facts" then we can preserve truth by recognising that 
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we must use a metalanguage within which we not only make a statement but 
also speak about the facts to which a statement refers. Tarski's theory also 
enables us to overcome the paradox of the liar, in that we are able to 
separate object and metalanguage. 
However Tarski's theory makes truth a property of sentences, whereas it seems 
to be statements not sentences that are true or false. This latter is essentially 
Strawson's criticism of 'redundancy' theories of truth, 8 for what appears to be 
missing from Tarski's theory is any reference to a context of use. We may 
confirm or appraise for a whole variety of reasons; yet, Strawson argues, we 
want to go beyond this in a theory of truth, not just because we confirm and 
appraise statements for other reasons than their truth but also because we 
look to a theory of truth to explain how a statement must conform to 
standards of objectivity beyond itself and beyond the person who made the 
statement. 9 
Moreover the notion of 'verisimilitude' may be criticised on the grounds that it 
too is 'theory-laden'. That is to say 'verisimilitude' seems to involve the 
recognition of a common framework within which to view not only matters of 
increased content but also to recognise falsifications when they occur. In 
terms of the mountain-climber analogy, we have to be sure that we are 
climbing the same mountain or at least mountains in the same group and that 
is something of which we cannot be sure since our framework only allows us 
to view our own mountain face and one mountain face may look much like 
another. 
Popper accepts that 
at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework 
••• but we are prisoners in a Pi~kwicfban sense. If we try 
out of our frameworks at any tIme. 
of our theor ies 
we can break 
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Popper goes on to assert that, while the difficulty of dl'S ' b CUSSl0n etween 
people brought up in different frameworks is to be admitted, that difficulty 
does not make communication an impossibility; he does not think that much of 
scientific interest can be discovered by worrying what might be meant by "in 
a Pickwickian sense". It seems that for Popper, as long as we take care to 
state our theses as clearly as possible, we do not have to worry too much 
about language. 11 The idea tha t meaning might be relative to a framework IS 
for Popper a bulwark of relativism. 
The problem with this VIew IS that many people do worry about language and 
for good reason. They see tha t the 'theory -dependence of observation 
statements' is really a problem about which part of a system of theories IS to 
be modified and on what grounds, the solution to which is central to our 
coming to be able to give an account of scientific progress. The central 
difficulty with Popper's account of the logic of scientific discovery is that we 
have no access to a neutral observation language with which to test theory. 
Instead observation is itself dependent upon the adoption of many auxiliary 
theories that serve to determine what might count as a valid observation. 
Popper is aware of this difficulty and attempts to solve it by suggesting that 
indi vidual scientists or groups of scientists just accept certain observation 
statements as unproblematic "background knowledge", 12 though Popper adds 
that this background knowledge can itself be challenged. 13 
However this proposed solution does not really overcome the difficulty. Apart 
from the fact that an attempt to outline the logic of scientific discovery is 
somewhat weakened by a direct appeal to subjectivity of judgement, a new 
and highly innovative theory would never get started if it had to satisfy the 
same observational procedures that supported its predecessor. The idea that 
scientists would reject a well-established group of theories on the basis of one 
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contradiction or what would be assumed to be fl" 
one a slfymg counter-instance 
is simply unbelievable, as Kuhn 14 has h s own, not only because scientists do 
not happen to behave in that way but also because some of the best examples 
of scientific theory would on that basis have been rejected in their infancy. In 
effect if Popper's account of falsification were accepted then scientific 
progress would seem to be impossible, - experimental work would never 'get 
off the ground', so to speak. 
Imre Lakatos attempted to account for a different preference in scientific 
theory by moving the emphasis from simple falsification of single theories 
towards the idea of the evolving changes and progression of groups of 
theories. Lakatos accepted that theories are compared with one another, not 
with an objective reality, but he attempted to account for the theory-
dependence of observation statements by suggesting that scientists take a 
methodological decision to treat some theories as unproblematic while a new 
theory is under test. 
This looks remarkably similar to Popper's proposed solution to the problem of 
the theory -dependence of observation statements. However instead of treating 
theories in isolation Lakatos suggested that we look at a "research 
programme" 15 which consists, he says of a series of theories that share the 
same "hard core" of supposedly unproblematic content (axioms, basic postulates, 
central concepts, etc.), but which differ in their contributions to a "protective 
belt" of content (auxiliary hypotheses etc.) which needs to be altered 
progressively. As long as each modification of the protective belt enables us 
to predict new facts, some of which are corroborated by experiment, then the 
"research programme" is considered to be "progressing" and is supported by the 
scientific community. In this way Lakatos claims he has elucidated the proper 
method for accounting for theory formation and progression and he suggests 
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that this method is suitable for other types of theory as well as natural 
o Of ° h 16 I d 0 
sCIent I IC t eory. n an e ucatlonal context this suggestion has been taken 
up by Harris 17 and Matthews 18 who have attempted to use Lakatos's account 
of theoretic progression and change to prove the superiority of what they call 
a "historical materialist research programme" in education. The extent to which 
these attempts are successful is contentious. 19 
However, as Feyerabend 20 has pointed out, Lakatos's methodology of scientific 
research programmes is deficient in at least two major respects. First, just as 
theories can only be judged relative to other theories, so research programmes 
can only be judged relative to other research programmes. Unlike theory-
comparison, time is needed in order to compare and evaluate research 
programmes. Lakatos admits that research programmes may degenerate for a 
while and then progress, so that time is needed before a research programme 
can be pronounced "dead" or progressing. Indeed all research programmes would 
be "still-born" unless time was allowed for their progression. The question 
arises as to how much time should be allowed? It seems it is only with the 
benefit of hindsight that Lakatos'S methodology can be regarded as an 
adequate account for evaluating research programmes, in that at any instant it 
is not obvious whether a research programme is about to progress or continue 
to degenerate. 
Lakatos's 21 immediate solution of withholding money and publication facilities 
as long as research programmes appear to be degenerating is hardly helpful, 
since money and publication facilities may be essential in order to determine 
whether or not a research programme is degenerating. Again one may question 
how long a research programme is to be "nursed". 
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For Feyerabend the only method that allows the sort of ' progressIon In science 
which he believes Lakatos wants is the principle of "anything goes". 22 
Feyerabend insists that Lakatos outlines "the most advanced d h" d 
an sop Istlcate 
methodology in existence today" 23 but since 
even this methodology is held by 
Feyerabend to be inadequate, for the reasons advanced above, then he 
advocates the proliferation of theories so that there may be more 
opportunities for theory compar ison. For Feyerabend theoretical pluralism aids 
theoretical progression and it matters Ii ttle whether mystics, magicians, 
theologians or scientists supply the theor ies that command our attention. 
Feyerabend argues that science is just 
one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and 
~ot necessar ily ~he best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is 
Inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of 
a certain ideology, or who have accepted it without having ever 
examined its advantages and its limits. 24 
The ideology to which Feyerabend refers includes the idea of universal reason 
based on science but this too is suspect: 
Gi ven science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be 
excluded. This feature 0 f science calls for an anarchistic epistemology. 
The realisation that science is not sacrosanct, and that the debate 
between science and myth has ceased without hav~ng been won by either 
side, further strengthens the case for anarchism. 5 
We might ask what Feyerabend might mean when he refers to a debate being 
won? If "anything goes", and we have no reason to accept or reject anything 
finally other than our "taste", 26 Feyerabend is left with an extreme form of 
relativism in which all theories, research programmes and ideologies (conceived 
as sorts of super-research programmes) are incommensurable. The difficulty for 
such extreme relativism is not simply that we seem to have nothing at our 
disposal with which to appraise any account of anything (including the claimed 
superiority of Feyerabend's methodology over Lakatos's methodology of 
scientific research programmes) but also that all accounts become 
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incomprehensible unless there is at least some comme bOlo b 
nsura 1 tty etween 
27 
them. For example, we would not understand Feyerabend when he describes 
the Galileo - Bellarmine confrontation unless there were som bOlO e commensura 1 lty 
between the ways in which Galileo, Bellarmine, Feyerabend and ourselves use 
the term "faith". 28 If Feyerabend is correct in arguing that previous 
scientific progress has been achieved precisely because the accounts of Galileo 
and Bellarmine were incommensurable, then we should not be able to 
understand Feyerabend's thesis. As it is however, Feyerabend's thesis is 
comprehensible and must therefore be mistaken. 
The idea of Coherence within a Network of Theory 
We have seen that the central problem that informs the work of these post-
empiricist philosophers of science concerns the theory-dependence of 
observation statements and the lack of an external 'touchstone' against which 
theories might be 'objectively' compared. We have seen also that the solution 
tha t has been descr ibed as "the most advanced and sophisticated in existence 
today" fails to account for the way in which scientific theories are compared 
against each other and leads to the opposite suggestion that all theories are 
as valid as each other. The above discussion has led us back to an impossible 
choice between objectivism and relativism. I turn now to consider the work of 
W. V.O. Quine for I believe that his work opens up a new line of enquiry into 
the nature of scientific theory which may enable us to see how to avoid 
confronting this impossible choice. 
Rather than a ttempting to solve the problem of the theory dependence of 
observation statements, Quine attempts to dissolve this problem by 
incorporating both theories and observation statements within the same 
epistemological network. Using a metaphor that closely resembles Wittgenstein's 
metaphor of "fibres criss crossing" 29, Quine suggests that knowledge forms a 
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"seamless web" 30 a netw k fbi" 
- or 0 e lef, which forms a continuous whole , 
with theory which is less amenable to revision by observation at the centre 
and observation statements at the outside. The web continuously develops as 
new pieces of evidence are incorporated i"nto "t Cl " d I. aim an counter-claim are 
part of the total body of theory and all theory is theory extension. 
According to this account, children are born with some innate dispositions, 
namely guidance by sensory stimuli, a taste for simplicity and a taste for 
conservation 31 that guide their learning of language. Language learning is 
what Evers has called the "entering wedge" 32 into the process of scientific 
theory formation and subsequent theory extension takes place by the accretion 
of the data occurring from sensory stimuli. For Quine, "we are working up our 
science from infancy onward." 33 However there is an infinite number of ways 
that these data can be incorporated within a developing network of theory -
sense data may cause perturbations across the network. (One might imagine a 
billiard ball of observation str iking a 'pack' of theory which is initially 
complicated before it rearranges itself into the simplest formation that most 
resembles the original configuration.) 
Science is successful at modifying and extending our theory because it groups 
stimuli according to innately chosen similarities, which makes for successful 
inductions and fulfilled expectations. As Quine remarks 
creatures inveterately wrong in their inductio~s hav~ a path)tic but 
praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducmg their kmd • 
.J 
The importance of inductions for Quine is that they function as the entering 
point for the learning of language - and - theory and the anchor for 
subsequent development of language - and - theory. Learning thus takes place 
by the operation of a series of stimuli which are reinforced or extinguished 
according to whether they fulfil our expectations. According to this account 
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ethical theories are equi valent to scientific theories. The 'ethical' problem of 
what to learn is considered to be 1 . 11 . oglca y equIvalent to the 'scientific' 
problem of how to learn. 35 In both cases the guiding principle is the 
maximisation of coherence of the developing network of theory. 
However we may question how theories that vary both in their semantics and 
in their ontological commitments may be situated within the same 
epistemological network. Quine's answer to this question comes in three parts: 
first he argues against the notion of truth by virtue of meaning which he calls 
"analyticity". 36 Second he argues that the coherence of our network of 
theories is maximised when our theories are translated into the canonical 
notation of first order predicate calculus. 37 Third he argues in favour of 
something he calls the "scientific method". 38 I discuss each part in turn. 
Quine essays the notion that analyticity is logically equivalent to synonymy by 
considering the role of a lexicographer which he concludes to be 
to inc~~ate understanding of expressions, that is, to teach us how to use 
them. 
He also tries out the idea that analyticity is connected with explication and 
concludes that explication IS just the selection of certain contexts as being 
particular ly perspicuous. 40 
Quine's most concerted attack on the notion of analyticity comes in his 
. . 41 h' h' 1 h' . th 
"Indeterminacy of Radical TranslatIon ThesIs". w lC !nvo ves 1m In e 
view that no reliable translations may exist between different languages. Quine 
argues that the reference of a general term in a remote language is 
objectively inscrutable because it depends on how one decides to translate a 
cluster of interrelated grammatical particles and constructions, plural 
endings, pronouns, numerals, the 'is' of identity and the adaptations 'since' 
and 'other'. 42 
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To take an example, we have no reason for deciding that the utterance 
"ga vagai" in an alien nati ve language refers b to r a bits, undetached rabbit parts 
or rabbit stages or whatever. The only way Quine suggests we can determine 
which use is involved is by paying a ttention to the use of the word In 
sentences. This seems uncontroversial but Quine extends referential 
inscrutability into our own home language. 
We can systematically reconstrue our neighbour's apparent references to 
rabbits as really references to rabbit stages and his apparent references 
to formulas as really references to Godel numbers and vice versa. We can 
reconcile all this with our neighbour's verbal behaviour by cunningly 
readjusting our translations of his various connecting predicates so as to 
compensate for the s witch in ontology. 43 
Quine concludes that we can only question the reference of terms in a 
language by having recourse to some background language. But any attempt to 
justify our background language leads us to a regress which we can only stop 
by just accepting our mother tongue and taking its words at face value. 
However if ordinary language forms the basis of our translations, then it seems 
as if we have might have to accept ordinary language as telling us all that 
we need to know. But Quine's thesis 44 challenges this. As Romanos puts it: 
Our confident and e ffecti ve utilisation 0 f our most familiar, all -
inclusive ordinary l.angu~~e testifies ... to the ultimate meaninglessness of 
... conceptual enquiry. 
Not only is there no one way the world really is but, for Quine, it no longer 
makes sense to say that there is a way we can really say it is. Quine would 
therefore be unimpressed by G.E. Moore'S argument in "Proof of an External 
World" 46 . For Quine, Moore touches neither the issue of absolute ontology 
nor absolute semantics. 
This argument against analyticity puts an end to the idea that something that 
we call "meaning" is preserved when we translate between languages. For 
Quine, a scheme of translation is simply another theory that is tested 
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according to whether it IS the simplest way of reconciling the behaviour of 
those who speak in a different language with our own. This argument also puts 
an end to one of the central tenets of APE - that something is gained when 
the meaning of an educational term is analysed. For Quine such analysis can 
have no explanatory significance; just because we happen to be familiar with a 
particular way of speaking IS no reason to suppose that that way has any 
epistemic privileges. 
For these reasons and others Quine dispenses with the notion of meaning and 
mentalistic semantics that rely on the notion of intention. Instead Quine 
suggests that the coherence of our developing conceptual scheme is maximised 
when the ontological commitments of our theories are made explicit by 
transla ting all theories into the canonical notation of first order predicate 
calculus. Not only is this suggestion designed to show up contradictions within 
a theory, as happens for example when 
we find philosophers allowing themselves not only abstract terms but 
pretty unmistakable quantification over abstract objects .•. and still 
blandly disavowing, within the paragraph, that there are such objects, 47; 
but also this suggestion is supposed to allow us to translate all theories into 
the same canonical notation. 
Rather than the "seamless web" being made up of theories that rely to varymg 
degrees on intentional semantics and that are presented in a variety of 
notations, this suggestion allows Quine to have a "seamless web" made up of 
theories that rely exclusively on extensional semantics and that are presented 
in the "canonical notation", thus enabling him to give a determinate sense to 
the idea of maximising coherence through the use of the term "systematic 
48 
virtue". The literature tha t surrounds this term is vast and highly technical. 
However in summary, "systematic virtue" is increased if the theory is simpler 
and does not involve logical contradiction. These two guiding principles are 
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supposed to provide Quine with a way out of the regress of re . h asons In erent 
in foundationalist accounts of knowledge. It is the overall coherence of the 
theory to which we appeal rather than any purportedly epistemologically 
secure foundation. 
It is important to notice tha t Quine does not suggest that the "canonical 
notation" underpins our developing network of theory. Rather Quine suggests 
that we use the "canonical notation" because it is a simplifying device with 
the same status as any other part of our network: 
the quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is 
not to be distinguished from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of 
the most general traits of reality. Nor let it be retorted that such 
constructions are conventional affairs not dictated by reality; for may 
not the same be said of a physical theory? True, such is the nature of 
reality that one physical theory will get us around better than another, 
but similarly for canonical notations. -q. 9 
For Quine, neither the meanIngs embodied In ordinary language, logical form 
nor theory -neutral observation statements serve as external touchstones with 
which to compare our network of theories. Now it looks as if Quine is 
suggesting that all modifications of our network of theories might be as good 
as each other. However he attempts to avoid this relativistic conclusion 
through the notion 0 f "scientific method". 
Ha ve we .•• so far lowered our sights as to settle for a rela ti vistic 
theory of truth ••. brooking no higher criticism? Not so. The sav~ng 
consideration is that we continue to take seriously our own partIcular 
aggregate science ••• whatever it may be .•. until by w.foat is vaguely 
called scientific method we change •.. for the better. 
Quine presents us with the striking idea that just as the infant's initial 
learning of language evolves into the adult's development of a network of 
theories, so this network also evolves from one generation to the next. 
Olr patterns of thought •.• have been evolving ... since the dawn of langua~1; and ..• we may confidently look forward to more of the 
same. 
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In other words Quine simply assumes that our science IS 
e vol ving satisfactorily 
and relies upon what Gellner calls "a pragmatic cheerfulness" 52 about the 
"scientific method" guiding both the infant's learning of language and the 
conceptual inheritance of mankind. Presently for Quine the paradigm of 
"scientific method" is provided by theoretical physics because theoretical 
physics is extensional and has been successful at satisfying his simplicity and 
conservation requirements. 53 
However, as Rorty notes, no-one seriously expects that all true nomological 
statements can be derived from the laws of physics and so we have good 
reason to wonder why 
'believes in .•• ' and 'translates as •.. ' owe more to the necessItIes of 
practice than 'is the same electron as .•• ' and 'is the same set as ... '? 
What is it that sets them apart, given that we no longer think of any 
sort of statement having a privileged epistemological status, but of all 
statements as working together for the good of the race in that process 
of gradual holistic adjustment made famous by 'Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism'? 54 
The answer to this question may well be that Quine is interested in the idea 
tha t the wor ld has a logical structure that may be mapped by a system of 
propositions formulated in the correct notation. For example, the fundamental 
particles 0 f physics may be equivalent for Quine to the "objects" that 
" Ph "I h" 55 D " t h " Wittgenstein describes in the Tractatus LOgICO- 1 osoe lCUS. espl e IS 
arguments to the con trary, Quine may well want 'logical form' to replace 
foundationalist empiricism as the supplier of a new 'grounding' for our theories. 
Yet if Quine's holism were to lead him to the VIew that there are many 
different vocabularies available for coping with or describing "reality" rather 
than the view that an extensional language sets the pace for all others, then 
he would be able to find a role for philosophy as a supplier of those 
1 h we understand it, does not seem to have a vocabularies. As it is phi osop y, as 
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role for Quine. However, a ware of the paradox involved when a philosopher 
denies philosophy a role, Quine suggests that philosophers formulate theories 
about scientific theories - in other words philosophers make explicit in theory 
that which is implicit in (scientific) practice by making its theoretical 
commitments explicit and employing the canonical notation of extensional logic 
to do so. 
Materialist Pragmatism 
As a result of their accepting Quinean coherentist epistemology, Walker and 
Evers believe, the account of educational theorising they advance and which 
they call Materialist Pragmatism (MP) is superior to APE. For example Evers 56 
attempts to translate Hirst's forms of knowledge thesis into canonical notation 
and then to show that there are logical contradictions within Hirst's thesis 
that contravene the requirement for material implication. However it is hardly 
surprising that a theory which embraces epistemic holism can find no room for 
the idea that know ledge is partitioned into discrete sets. Nor is it surprising 
tha t a theory which embraces extensional logic should find no room for the 
notions of intentionality and meaning. 
The central tenet of Materialist Pragmatism is an unreserved acceptance of 
Quinean pragmatism and epistemic holism, leading to the idea that educational 
theory develops as a response to the practical problems that arise in 
educational contexts. This idea is fused with a notion of egalitarianism In 
which there is a deliberate breaking down of professional hierarchies in order 
to facilitate access to problem-solving. Walker assumes that there is a variety 
of viewpoints/theories that compete to determine the orientation of 
educational policies and institutions and that these viewpoints, or theories as 
he prefers to call them, 
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vary considerably in level of sophistication scope of t' 
d d I, b'l' ,prac Ice encompasse an app Ica I tty of content as well a ' d f 
b 'l' , , , , S In egrees 0 commensura I Ity or pOSSIbIlIty for rational comparison and evaluation. 57 
Despite this var iation Walker asserts that h th ' eac eory wIll have something in 
common with other theories. This area of overlap he terms, following Lakatos, 
"touchstone" 58. Walker uses this term in order to stress that two theories 
may only be compared when their proponents can recognise common standards 
such as common theoretical claims and methodologies and findings produced by 
the application of such methodologies - "evidence". According to Walker, at 
present we do not have - but most urgently need - some "touchstone" for 
educational problems and their solution. In other words we urgently need some 
agreed methodological criteria for settling what is and what is not to count as 
overlap between competing criteria and theories. Walker suggests "logic, 
semantics and epistemology" 59 as starting points for getting the procedure of 
theory-comparison going. When we have some 'touchstone' we can set about 
the task of proposing theories along with the task of agreeing the further 
'touchstone' that might be used to settle disputes between competing 
alternative educational theories. 
The coherence of an overall conceptual scheme is the guiding principle for 
such a Quinean programme for philosophy of education. By this canon such a 
programme is supposed to cohere better than APE in the sense that our 
developing network of theory is simpler and our educational problems are more 
easily solved if MP is substituted for APE. In the same way as the positing of 
molecules simplifies the description of material objects, molecules are 
incorporated into the scheme having the same status as ethical judgements and 
systems 0 f canonical notation and anything else that helps us to "get us 
around better". 60 The much-discussed problem of educational theories 
involving means and ends and the supposed distinction between science and 
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ethics is dissolved in Quine's semantic web since b th 
o are amenable to 
scientific investigation. 
There are however problems with MP which Evers acknowl d F I e ges. or examp e 
your conceptual scheme and mine may not be identical since we have been 
subject to different stimuli. How are our differences to be reconciled? 
According to Evers, we firstly maximise the "systematic virtue" of our schemes 
by being persuaded of the value of putting everything into canonical notation. 
This may reveal logical inconsistencies. If it does not then we reduce our 
values into methods and substance amenable to scientific investigation. While 
Quine is pessimistic that there will always be some residual value-conflict 
unresolved, Evers suggests tha t we can always ask 
Does this udfimately valued state of affairs aid in the solution of 
problems? 
Since good science reqUIres that we value problem-solving, we gIve priority to 
problem-solving in educational theorising. This apparently can be used to settle 
the value-conflict but someone may protest for example that our best 
scientific theory may change what we ordinarily mean by good and bad. This IS 
highly desirable for Evers, because at least our best theory may have 
"winnowed the chaff of superstition and nonsense." 62 Indeed, for Evers, what 
we ordinarily mean by good and bad is their role in our best theory. Ordinary 
use is use within a theory. For example, language and theory are equivalent 
for Evers and so one or the other can drop out of use. Just as intentions are 
equivalent to physical states, so one or the other can drop out of use unless 
it serves as a sort of useful shorthand. 
There is also the objection that Evers' position may be regarded as relativist. 
Evers accepts that in the end we just "fight it out" 63. We cannot claim 
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any higher truth than the truth that we are claim"n " " 
we continue to tinker from our system of the wor 1ldg ~trh?SpIIrflng to as 
f "I b "" WI In. ours were one 0 two r Iva est theories, It would be our place to" "t h h  lnSIS on t e 
trut 0 ours and the falsIty of the other theory where it conflicts. 64 
This may not seem to be a relativist position. We ml"ght 
remember however 
that the notion of meanIng is empty for Evers and that h 
w en a final statement 
of disagreement is reached there are no means of gaining further insight into 
the subject of the disagreement, in as much as appeals to science and 
behavioural evidence have been exhausted. 
This seems to be a debilitating criticism of MP, for the notion of meaning at 
least allows us to account for understanding with disagreement. The idea of 
'touchstone' theory mentioned earlier is only helpful if we can recognise and 
apply 'touchstone' to other parts of our conceptual scheme in order to solve 
our problems. If we recognise and apply 'touchstone' by even more 'touchstone' 
then we seem again to be involved in a regress similar to that that takes 
place in foundationalism. MP may be based on the idea of coherence but 
crucial to it seems to be the parallel foundation of mutual commitment to 
finding and consistently holding to touchstone theory while a problem is solved 
and the sands of overall theory have shifted. It IS true that we can only 
tinker with our wor ld from within but, in order to make progress with that 
tinker ing, we must elevate some theory, whether it be the touchstone theory 
of rationality, logical form or whatever above all others, at least until a 
problem is solved. 
This elevation may appear to be a very modest tilt in the direction of 
foundationalism since, within MP, the 'foundations' may be replaced in the same 
way that any part of a conceptual scheme may be replaced. However without 
some idea of what would count as a solution to a problem it is hard to see 
how commitment to a particular touchstone theory is to be sustained. At what 
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point are we to abandon one account of 'touchsto ,. f 
ne In avour of another? 
Furthermore how are problems to be recognised, selected and tackled? Within 
MP, any problem tha t is extensional is a practical problem but if material 
constraints are sufficient to decide the order of problem-solving then it seems 
hard for MP to avoid the conclusion that material constraints function as at 
least one sort of foundation upon which edifices of conceptual coherence may 
be built. 
I detect a difference in the approaches of Walker and Evers to this Issue. For 
example Walker suggests 
tha t ser ious consideration be given to a totally (social) relationist theory 
of the in~i v.idual, in which skills, habits, traits and other personal 
characteristIcs are stated purely as social relations. 65 
In this Walker seems to be more of a pragmatist than Evers and to a void the 
reductionist epistemology of Quine who proposes that 
causal explanations of psychology are to be sought in physiology, of 
physiology in biology, of biology in chgmistry, and of chemistry in physics 
- in the elementary physical states. 6 
In contrast Evers considers that the notion of intention may in time be 
identified materialistically as a series of physical causes 67 and so it might if 
Quine's programme of conceptual revision were to be carried out prior to any 
empirical investigation - thus eliminating the dualist metaphysics inherent in 
ordinary language by regimenting it into the canonical notation. However as 
Malcolm notes: 
the admission ••. that some reVISIon of language is required in order to 
establish the identity conjecture as true is an admission that it is not a 
logical possibility that the conjecture should be established as 
contingently true or as contingently false. 68 
The point is that the move to a canonical notation is presupposed in Evers' 
consideration and far from this being the kind of neutral simplifying device 
that Evers, Walker and Quine seem to suppose it to be, in fact their use of it 
Page 105 
has already decided In favour of particular t f' 
sor s 0 Investigation. However 
there appears to be no more logical reason to adopt the conceptual revision of 
ordinary language into canonical notation than there is to adopt the 
conceptual reVlSlon within ordinary language that can lead to statements like 
"tables lay eggs or [that] eggs lay tables" 69 
My criticism of MP has been directed against the Quinean idea of a network 
of theory that is supposed to develop in an evolutionary way as "problems" are 
solved by applying something called the "scientific method" that turns out to 
have reached its best formulation in theoretical physics. However Quine's work 
opens new lines of enquiry into the nature of educational theory. It may be 
possible to extend Quine's metaphor of a "seamless web" to the elucidation of 
the logic of educational theory without imagining that the fibres of the web 
are all of the same kind, namely strands in a logical calculus. Furthermore 
such a possibility might allow us to account for the way in which parts of the 
"web" can function as "assumptions" on which other parts of the "web" are 
based - as key threads in the overall fabric. 
In other words the metaphor of a theoretic 'network' might be accepted whilst 
MP's claim to have found the method of theoretical comparison in an 
educational context might be abandoned. A remark of Sellars 70 might be 
paraphrased to point the way forward: educational theorising is rational not 
because it has a foundation of a fixed methodology or a fixed commitment to 
the inscrutability of certain types of theoretical predicates but because it is a 
self-correcting enterprise that can put any claim in jeopardy though not all 
claims at the same time and not always in the same way. What is needed is 
an account of the way in which terms from a variety of discourses can come 
to function as inter-discursive touchstones of rationality. 
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It might now be helpful to discuss how the conclusions reached' th' h 
In IS C apter 
have a bearing on my developing account of educational theory. We have 
moved a way from foundationalist empiricism on the grounds that natural 
science is not underpinned by foundationalist empiricist epistemology and that 
the empiricist account of theory -production does not properly characterise the 
activity of natural scientists. We have seen also how the 'objectivism' implied 
in Lakatos'S "methodology of scientific research programmes" leads Feyerabend 
to out and out relativism. Instead we have considered some aspects of Quine's 
philosophy and the use that Walker and Evers make of it within "materialist 
pragmatism" on the grounds that this approach overcomes the 'theory-Iadenness' 
problem and presents a synthesis of different types of theory within the same 
network, thus offering the possibility of a non-foundationalist and non-
objectivist account of theory-comparison. 
However I argued that there is a tension within Quine's work between the idea 
that 'logical form' functions as a kind of 'foundation' for the edifice of 
theoretic coherence and the idea that there are no theory-neutral devices that 
can serve as foundations for theory -extension within a theoretic network. I 
went on to argue that this tension is brought into prominence when 
consideration is given to the particular form of pragmatism adopted by the 
proponents of Materialist Pragmatism which suggests that our theories develop 
as as a response to the problems that we face. 
As I pointed out, problems are framed according to the theories that are likely 
to be relevant to their solution. However the adoption of Quine's conservation 
and simplicity requirements leads to the VIew that it is impossible to frame a 
problem that questions the very cri ter ia for what might count as a solution. 
Yet it can be argued tha t it is precisely this kind of problem that yields the 
most fruitful theoretic advances. For example, periods of what Kuhn calls 
Page 107 
"revolutionary science" 71 characterise periods of" "" . . ' .. 
crISIS wIthin the SCIentifIC 
community in which a number of theoretical frameworks or "paradigms" 
compete to determine what might count as a problem. 72 To take another 
example, the Enlightenment is seen by Gellner 73 to embody a radical break 
with tradition, that leads to a clear distinction between developed and 
underdeveloped societies - with clear advantages for the former. In contrast 
Quine seems to place too much emphasis on the idea that continuous scientific 
evolution can be assumed. His conservation and simplicity requirements seem to 
be biased in favour of the solution of problems whose form is immediately 
apparent, for these requirements seem to militate against any theoretical 
extravagance however useful such extravagance might turn out to be in the 
long term. 
If our educational theories are to be responses to immediate practical 
problems, then we seem compelled to give up the kind of work in which 
Walker and Evers are engaged. For it would be hard to convince harassed 
teachers that "materialist pragmatism" was a response to their problems, 
however theoretically supportive of the their predicament the work of that 
approach might be - we should simply never get to the point when the full 
implications of tha t work were explored as such exploration would be 
considered "theoretically extravagant". In other words, unless the simplification 
criterion adopted by Walker and Evers as part of their Quinean programme for 
philosophy of education is relaxed in some way, then educational theorising, as 
we understand it, is impossible. 
In the next chapter I intend to substantiate the claim that educational, natural 
scientific and other types of theory form a network that is neither bound 
using the "canonical notation" nor bound according to the posits of theoretical 
physics. Instead I argue in favour of an account of natural science due to T.S. 
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Kuhn who explains discontinuity in theory extension by invoking the notions of 
interpretation and shared commitment within the natural scientific community. 
Rather than the boundaries of natural science being sharply drawn, I argue 
that the interpretation of scientific terms depends upon a 'family resemblance' 
between natural scientific and other linguistic practices within a scientific 
'form of life'. Such a 'form of life' is more rational than a primitive 'form of 
life' because the former exhibits a technological control which the latter must 
recognise. I conclude that there are good reasons to adopt the metaphor of a 
theoretic network which includes all types of theory and to adopt a Kuhnian 
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In the prevIous chapter I argued that foundationalist empiricism should be 
rejected in favour of holistic coherence as an epistemological underpinning of 
natural science on the grounds that the latter provides the means of offering 
the better solution to the problem of the theory-dependence of observation 
statements. However that rejection might seem to have involved the 
acceptance of a form of pragmatism that failed to account for discontinuities 
that are apparent in the growth of natural scientific theory. Foundationalist 
empiricism was meant to provide a position of "cosmic exile", 1 to use Quine's 
phrase, from which to appraise theoretical developments. Without such an 
eternal vantage point it appears as if theories may only be conceived as 
responses to immediate problems and cannot be conceived as attempts to 
elucidate and explain, when the very criteria for what might count as a 
problem are uncertain. 
However there are types of foundationalism based on rationalism, that may be 
seen as alternative attempts to provide the "cosmic exile" that Quine eschews. 
For example, the suggestion made in the previous chapter that either the 
notion of 'logical form' or 'demarcation criteria' function as a foundation for a 
developing network of theory may be seen as a rationalist attempt to provide 
'foundations' for natural scientific theory. 
At the beginning of this chapter I pursue, without success, the idea that 
demarcation criteria can be set out in advance of the problem to which they 
will be applied so that they may serve as 'foundations' for rational behaviour. 
I go on to argue tha t both rationalism and empiricism are united in a common 
d . , d that the rationalist is quest for certainty through the idea of 'foun ations an 
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no more successful than the empiricist in finding them. Instead I argue in 
favour of a version of something that Lakatos terms "e"ll'tl'sm" 
, that is to say 
the v iew that 
there is, and there can be, no statute law to s 
. I" ( erve as an explicl' t 
universa CriterIon or finite set of norms) for ' progress or degeneration. 2 
I do not accept Lakatos's argument that 'elitism' presupposes the notion that 
theories can only be judged by case law and that the only judges of progress 
and degeneration are theorists themselves, for this presupposition leads back 
to a form of pragmatism in which, as Lakatos notes, 3 it is only those 
'research programmes' that reinforce the 'authorised' paradigm of enquiry that 
are judged to be progressing. As I argued ear lier, Wi ttgenstein's later 
philosophy because of its stress on the importance of the particular context In 
which an utterance is made, seems to involve the existence of an elite, in the 
sense defined by Lakatos, in that it is only those who are 'on the inside' of a 
community of discourse who can warrant the assertability and intelligibility of 
utterances purported to be articula table within it. 
The importance of these arguments for my developing account of educational 
theory is illustrated by a discussion of the ways in which educational decisions 
might be made: it might be imagined that teachers are the only people 
qualified to make such decisions since it is only they who are 'on the inside' 
of educational forms of discourse. This would be an 'elitist' view which 
presupposes the pragmatic idea that problems may only be solved in the 
particular contexts in which those problems arise and the relativistic idea that 
the solutions offered vary according to the particular membership of the group 
of teachers concerned. Plainly this view would be unacceptable to those 
parents whose children were affected by the proposed solutions. Those parents 
might, with some justification, come to consider that their children'S future 
was being determined according to the "prejudices" of a group of teachers. 
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Alternatively it might be imagined that teachers should be obliged to specify 
and work to a list of criteria that are made available to all interested 
parties. This would be a 'demarca tionist' view that presupposes the desirability 
of a "statute book to guide the outsider's judgement" 4 which functions 
both as a 'foundation' for teaching practice and as an aid to its 'objective' 
appraisal. 
It is not difficult to see the opposition between objectivism and relativism 
lurking behind the opposition between demarcationism and elitism. The topics 
of rationality and theory -preference are fused in the idea that rational action 
is secured on the basis of the best account of the way the world actually is, 
as opposed to acting in accordance with our private impulses or any body 
else's desires. It is this idea that lies behind objectivism and leads us to be 
suspicious of a version of relitism' which suggests that theories are to be 
preferred on the basis of criteria that are internal to an investigative 
community. However I shall argue that we need to give up the way of looking 
at theory appraisal that leads us towards an impossible choice between either 
criteria that are supposed to exist apart from any community or a community 
tha t is supposed to encompass internal or 'tacit' cr iter ia that do not impinge 
in any way upon other communi ties. 
Why Objectivism is Impossible 
We have already seen that the notions of 'experience' and 'logical form' cannot 
enable us to achieve a position of permanent "cosmic exile" from which to 
VIew a developing network 0 f theory 'objectively'. Here I argue against another 
attempt to outline a form of objectivism through the idea that criteria for 
rationality are uni versally applicable. This argument is meant to be conclusive 
against any form of objectivism. 
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Let us first examine some of the specific clal'ms that have been made 
concerning the existence of criteria of rationality: 5 
a) Consistency 
Winch 6 considers the possibility of the independent existence of what he calls 
"inter-forms of life" touchstones or criteria of rationality, such as the 
criterion that rationality should involve consistency. This criterion can be 
dismissed by pointing out that the recognition of consistency depends upon a 
shared theoretical background that enables us to recognise an inconsistency: 
for example, to recognise that there is an inconsistency in my unlocking the 
front door whilst saying that I am s wi tch ing on the light depends upon a 
shared background of assumptions regarding switches, wiring, locks, doors and 
so on. 
A further reason to reject this criterion is that rationality is not a concept 
that can be applied to individual acts. We are tolerant of individual 
inconsistencies: others may sometimes be inconsistent, but we do not always 
dismiss them as irrational. Even if someone were to be consistent in being 
inconsistent, we should be unable to know how to apply a criterion of 
consistency without some further appraisal of their behaviour. 
b) Logical Contradiction 
While logical contradictions may be recognised within one form of discourse, 
(the paradigm being in Boolean algebra) the need to translate other forms of 
discourse into a form where contradictions might be recognised always leaves 
open the possibility tha t the translation scheme introduces its own logical 
inconsistencies. This conclusion also follows from Quine's "Indeterminacy of 
8 " 
Radical Translation" thesis". 7 However, as Putnam has pointed out, QUIne s 
thesis would only be plausible in the hypothetical case of an alien culture 
Page 115 
with no interests common to our own As it is ho ' 
. wever, QUine's thesis is 
implausible because human beings do share common ' t 
In erests. In the next 
chapter I argue tha t while it may not be possible to provl'de 
universal 'logical' 
criteria for rationality, common interests between translator and translated are 
sufficient to make translation more determinate than Quine suggests is possible 
and to make some 'logical' criteria for rationality appropriate in particular 
contexts. 
c) Falsehood 
The recognition of a falsehood seems to be similarly context-dependent. For 
example in a scientific context a statement asserting the truth of the doctrine 
of transubstantiation is false: in a religious context a statement about 
transubstantiation may be held to be true. Now both rationalists and 
empiricists have traditionally searched for the one form of enquiry that acts 
as a 'final court of appeal' for all others and is able to settle matters such as 
this; for without a 'final court of appeal' truth seems to be equivalent to 
contextually specific consensus. I shall argue that this is indeed the case but 
that there are good reasons for preferring certain contexts over others for the 
purpose of evaluating claims to truth. In this I shall hold Habermas's 9 
consensus theory of truth to be important. 
d) Nonsense 
Ascertaining the sense of a statement seems to be prior to and hence 
irrelevant to the determination of its rationality. Claims to rationality may 
only be decided for statements that make some sense. That is not to say that 
there has to be no doubt about the sense of an expression before its claim to 
rationality can be decided. There will always be the possibility of doubt. 
Rather it is to say tha t those who judge claims to rationality must have a 
prior idea of the sense of the statement(s) concerned. 
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e) Coh erence 
The problem with this criterion is that it may only be applied intra-
theoretically. Any a ttempt to establish this criterI" . " 
on as an Inter-theoretIcal 
criterion generates a regress. This is because all statements and actions 
appear 
free-floating and apparently random until they are viewed from some 
particular theoretical perspective. There is thus a need for a further theory to 
allow coherence to get a purchase as an inter-theoretical criterion. This 
further theory, however, itself requires a further theory in order to establish 
its own coherence and so on. My ear lier discussion of Quine's work is relevant 
here: I argued tha t the notion of coherence cannot function as an inter-
theoretical criterion of rationality without a position of at least temporary 
'cosmic exile' being assumed by the theorist. 
f) Teleology 
The adjectives 'rational' and 'irrational' only apply to those things over which 
people have some control. As Habermas puts it: 
We can call men and women, children and adults, minIsters and bus 
conductors "rational", but not animals or lilac bushes, mountains streets 
or chairs. We can call apologies, delays, surgical interventions, 
declarations of war, repairs, construction plans or conference decisions 10 
"irrational", but not a storm, an accident, a lottery win, or an illness. 
It is always possible to ascribe intentionality retrospectively to what we see 
as rational and irrational thoughts, words and deeds. In that case, 'teleology' 
becomes a criterion in all cases and therefore ceases to have any particular 
explanatory power as a criterion for rationality generally, except at the very 
lowest level as a characteristic feature of all human actions. 
g) Adequacy 0 f reason 
This criterion seems to start an infinite regress of criteria. In order to apply 
it there is a need for a criterion for adequacy that in turn may only be 
applied according to a further criterion for adequacy and so on into a regress 
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that is halted when someone simply acts. For example within educational 
institutions there is a variety of viewpoints that 
compete to determine what 
shall be done in the name of education, not just those of individual teachers 
who might not be expected to justify every decision that they make as part of 
their professional practice, but also those of parents, political parties, 
religious denominational groups and so on who might express views, the 
contentiousness of which places educational policy-makers in the position of 
having to provide justificatory arguments to support their decisions. It seems 
to me tha t there are five such types of argument that might be mounted In 
such a case. I outline these below, along with a brief critique of their 
adequacy when considered in isolation from one another and from the context 
in which a particular decision is to be justified. 
In setting educational policies, we might rely on such appeals as these:-
I We appeal to the personal authority of someone with a record of sound 
judgement and experience. The problem with this step is that we need 
some means of agreeing on our recognition of such a person and on the 
limits we wish to set to their authority. 
2 We appeal to the authority of some group of individuals with similar 
record and experience. Again we have a difficulty in agreeing on our 
recognition of such individuals and recognising when their claim to 
authority should be limited or overturned, particularly when that involves 
our querying and rejecting of our own right to pronounce as in the case 
of an appeal to a group of which we are members. 
3 We appeal to the desirable consequences that we believe might follow 
from the adoption of a particular course of action. The problem here is 
tha t we do not seem to be successful at prediction in the social sphere. 
II h " . I That is why Popper advocates "piecemeal approac es to SOCIa 




problem with Popper's suggestion IS th t d 
a we 0 not know how often such 
reassessments should be made As Lakatos 13 " 
• pomts out, time is needed 
before a development can be regarded as havl"ng 
come to fruition. 
We appeal to a concern that all groups interested in a particular problem 
might be thought or said to share and attempt to show how one course 
of action is more in accord with that concern than others. This is 
roughly the procedure advocated by the proponents of MP that was 
discussed and criticised in the previous chapter. 
We assemble all possible accounts of data and phenomena bearing on our 
decision, layout all the relevant features and attempt to assign 
weightings to each in the hope that mathematical decidability can be 
invoked as a means of ensuring objectivity of judgement. However this 
step involves a criterion of completeness that cannot be satisfactorily 
applied. For example, it is doubtful whether we can ever know that we 
have assembled all the relevant alternatives and what basis can be given 
for weighting other than that of interests, which may already be said to 
presuppose a preference for one particular course of action. 
From the above discussion we may conclude that even though these criteria of 
rationality may be applicable in specific contexts, their application always 
introduces a contingency that negates their claim to universality. Let us now 
examine whether this contingency can be eliminated by setting out rules of 
procedure that govern their own application as well as the application of 
criteria: Wittgenstein's use of the term "language-game" draws our attention to 
the importance of the interweaving 0 f actions and words within language. If it 
were the case that rules exist prior to anyone's engaging in a language-game 
and serve to define every move in the subsequent game, then it is difficult to 
see how children could ever begin to learn their native language or how 
anyone could speak in an unfamiliar situation without learning such a set of 
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'anterior' rules first. (But how could they do that 
without already h av ing 
learned language? - a reductio ~ adsurdum) 
While there are formal rules like grammatical rules and th [. ] 
e wn tten rules of 
a game, these by no means govern the game or define its limits. For example 
people can still be playing tennis after considerable modification of the rules 
and this modi fica tion can take place while they are playing. As Rizvi points 
out: 
while learn.ing a game may entail explicitly learning its rules, it need 
not; one mIght learn them by observation and practice. But crucially 
rules ~ann~t bel !earn.t .or made explicitly in an abstraction, in a context-
free sItuatIon. (onginal emphasis) 
This context-dependence suggests a paradox, to which Wittgenstein refers: 
This was our paradox! no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
becaur~ every course of action can be made out to accord with the 
rule. 
Kr ipke 17 interprets Wittgenstein's "private language argument" 18 in a way 
that is helpful in our a ttempts to understand this paradox in Wittgenstein's 
idea of following a rule. He draws attention to the fact that our grasping of 
a rule comes from a definite number of cases yet the rule we grasp and the 
way we understand it is going to govern its application in an infinite number 
of cases in the future. For example, how do I know that when I recognise a 
tower that that recognition is in accord with my past recognition of towers? 
To this sceptical problem, Wittgenstein suggests a sceptical solution. The 
assertion "Jones means tower by 'tower'" cannot mean anything for an 
indi vidual. Our naive intuition that we know what we mean is undermined by 
the sceptical solution. It follows that, in order to follow a rule, it must be 
possible to check whether a rule is being followed and that presupposes a 
communal form of discourse within which rules evolve as the form of discourse 
develops. Hence it is not possible to set out rules once and for all that 
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remaIn ossified within a "statute book" divorced f h . 
rom t e practIcal forms of 
discourse In which they are supposed to be applied. 
This impossibility is debilitating to all forms of objectivism, whether these 
depend upon the existence 0 f one permanent neutral framework of enquiry, 
form of discourse or set of criteria to which we can ultimately appeal in 
order to determine the nature 0 f rationality. In each case, their application In 
context is interwoven with, and as important as their formulation. Any attempt 
to 'objectify' tha t application always generates a logically regressive chain of 
frameworks, forms of discourse or sets of criteria, all purporting to 'objectify' 
the application of their predecessors in the chain. 
Practical Kn ow ledge and Rela ti vism 
I suggested in chapters 1 and 2 that recent re-examinations of the question of 
the nature and scope of educational theory can be seen as a manifestation of 
disquiet about the dominance of foundational empiricist epistemology in 
previous approaches to that question. The idea that theory should guide 
educa tional practice has led to the assumption that theory is somehow prior to 
practice so tha t it has been assumed that if only we could get the theory of 
education 'right', appropriate, efficient and suitable practice would follow. 
However recent difficulties encountered in attempts to give an account of 
educa tional theory have been set in contraposition to the idea, that while 
theory is important, it is somehow a der ivati ve 0 f practice. Instead of 
concentrating on the nature and scope of theory, some philosophers of 
education have begun to look at the question of the nature and scope of 
practice. 19 
Ryle had already severely criticised notions of 'theory directing practice' 
before philosophers of education began to be interested in the question of the 
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nature of practice. In The Concept of Mind 20 Ryle a tt k -----.-I~-.:.::....:.;:.:.:.:.~- ac s the not i on t hat 
decisions about what to do necessarily precede action _ 
as if rationality IS 
always secured when a series of deliberations about the application of 
universal criteria precedes a series of actions Thl's t' h 
. no IOn e terms the 
"intellectualist legend" and traces this "legend" at least as far back as 
Descartes' "myth" of a d l' f' d ua Ism 0 min and body. He caricatures this legend as 
involving a "ghost in the machine" 'philosophy', according to which it IS 
believed tha t successful practice requires to be 'rehearsed' in the mind prior 
to an "intelligent performance" of it. Ryle gives examples of people's doing 
things, of which it makes little sense to say that their practice is somehow 
guided by a theory rehearsed in the mind: for instance, riding a bicycle and 
playing the part 0 f a clown. 21 
Oakeshott 22 makes the same kind of point when he distinguishes between 
"technical" know ledge that can be formulated in propositions and "practical" 
knowledge that exists only In use. This distinction has been recently adopted 
by Hirst as a means to provide us with a way of elucidating the nature of 
educational theory. Hirst 23 believes that progress can be made towards giving 
an improved account of educational theory if 'practical' or 'tacit' kinds of 
knowledge are made explicit. By giving an account of the 'logic' of practical 
24 discourse through empirical research of "operationally effective" current 
practice, Hirst supposes that "rationally defensible principles" 25 will be 
elicited or emerge, against which future practice may be judged. Hirst points 
to two passages from part of McCarthy's 26 exposition of Habermas's work that 
seem to Hirst to indicate (that) Habermas is attempting to articulate the basic 
presuppositions of speech acts. These presuppositions are supposed by Hirst to 
. d' . d sus" 27 
"set out certain normative conditions for ratIOnal eClSlons an consen • 
However as I argue in chapter 7, there is something contradictory about an 
attempt to provide a 'logic' of practical discourse through empirical research. 
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It is not difficult to see the attractions that Habermas's kI'nd of delineation of 
rational practice has for Hirst and others. If' , It IS accepted that practical 
knowledge is an unformalisable, yet essential f part 0 any practice, then it 
looks as if there can never be any objective way of evaluating practices 
against one another unless practical knowledge can be made explicit and hence 
amenable to rational argument. Paradoxically then empiricism and rationalism 
can be seen to be united In a common quest for certainty which manifests 
itself in certain attitudes towards the nature of any investigation. 
Let us consider those things which empiricism and this type of rationalism 28 
may be thought to have in common. In both there is a concern for 
independence of mind uninhibited by concern for authority, free from the 
influences or effects of prejudice and tradition. In both there is an attempt to 
discover the wor ld anew by finding generalisations to be subsumed under a 
covering law. As Bacon puts it in connection with empiricism: 
there remains but one course for the recovery of a sound and healthy 
condition - namely, that the entire work of understanding be commenced 
afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its 
own course, but guided at every step. 29 
This guidance is supposed to be provided by a set of rules, a set of directions 
which can be learnt by heart and whose application is purely mechanical and 
follows from the rules themselves. 30 
Hence it IS possible to see that Bacon's programme for empiricism IS similar to 
the type of rationalism that I earlier characterised as 'demarcationism' in that 
it leans towards the establishment of a set of technical rules of enquiry. This 
similar ity allows the objectivist two attempts to secure certainty. If the theory 
of correspondence between sense data and the wor ld cannot validly function as 
a foundation for an empiricist programme, perhaps the rationalist idea of 
explicit criteria governing technique could. Natural scientists have been 
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regarded as so successful in the predictive validity of their theories that even 
if correspondence has fallen into disrepute as a theory of truth, the idea that 
criteria can be made explicit and "d proVl e a method of objective enquiry can 
replace it acceptably. 
However as I have argued, the predictive validity of natural scientific theories 
cannot be attributable to the constant application of a formalisable technique, 
as Bacon seems to suppose. The illusion of the sovereignty of pre-given 
techniques arises because when scientists step outside the realm of natural 
science, they often carry with them nothing but their technique. As Oakeshott 
puts it: 
the great prestige of the natural sciences has, in fact, been used to 
fasten the rationalist disposition of mind more firmly upon us, but that 
this is the work, not of the genuine scientist as such, but of the 
scientist who is a Rationalist in spite of his science. 31 
In other words there is a danger that when some natural scientists or their 
sympathisers try to adapt what they assume to be natural scientific practice 
to other practices, they imagine that all parts of the practices that they 
investigate should be formalisable. For example current educational practice IS 
much influenced by the idea that objectivity is ensured by the constant 
application of a set of criteria or algorithms; hence there is a proliferation of 
policy statements all purporting to supply a "statute book" of criteria. The 
trend towards criterion-referenced assessment may be seen as a special case 
of this proliferation: it is widely assumed that the performance of a task can 
be matched with a statement of competence, and believed that such a 
procedure is more 'objective' than the procedure whereby an accomplished 
practi tioner observes an apprentice and 0 ffers to report on h is progress. 
Page 124 
The reservation that such ass . 
essment crIteria might be subject to some 
indeterminacy of interpretation seems not to deter f h 
some 0 t e proponents of 
criterion referenced assessment. These proponents do not se t . 
em 0 questiOn 
whether, and if so how, the availability of a list of performance criteria 32 
necessarily secures or promotes the 'objectivity' of the assessment. On their 
Vlew objectivity is ensured by the matching of actions with impersonal criteria, 
both of which may be supposed to exist apart from the conventions and norms 
operating in any community of practitioners who might be thought to have an 
interest in the assessment and thus to be the ones to determine what counts 
as 'objective' within it. 
These recent moves towards this form of "rationalism" in educational practice 
may be the result of a misunderstanding of the nature of natural science on 
the part of these "rationalists" who miss the point that within natural science, 
both practical and technical knowledge are important. They may be deluded In 
thinking that practical knowledge can be formalised in order to make 
educational practices objectively precise and their delusion may lead them to 
formalise procedures which, when operationalised, have the effect of 
suggesting that deba te about the best course of action in a practical context 
is otiose unless it is concerned with the application of a set of technical 
rules. However, as we have seen, the outcome of such a debate cannot be to 
determine the best course of action objectively. Instead the net effect of 
unduly restricting practical discourse in this way may be to lead practitioners 
to a sense of hopelessness that their practices are after all, relative to the 
particular set of rules to which they are supposed to work and in whose 
formulation they have played little part. 
In the next chapter I attempt to substantiate this hypothesis. I turn now to 
consider T.S. Kuhn's account of natural science for I believe that his account 
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offers the starting-point for providing an account of natural science as a 
practice that moves us beyond objectivism and relativism. I go on to argue 
that there are sufficient similarities between practices for all practitioners to 
share a general sense of "community" that could enable them rationally to 
establish their priorities if the grip that the notions of objectivism and 
relativism have on their thinking were to be slackened. 
T.S. Kuhn's Account of Natural Science 
Kuhn has produced two major publications, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions 33 and later The Essential Tension, 34, in which he supplements and 
modifies his ear lier work. The early Kuhn is often considered to be advocating 
a similar thesis to that of Feyerabend, in that both writers refer to 
incommensurability and pluralism and are consequently often accused of 
advocating relativism. In Kuhn's case this accusation arises because of his 
insistence that it is only the scientific community which is in a position to 
decide which theories and normal working practices are to be adopted. In 
", 
other words Kuhn adopts an 'elitist' solution to the problem of appraising and 
evaluating scientific theories. 
The notion of a "paradigm" is central to Kuhn's work. However for Kuhn the 
term "paradigm" takes on a number of different meanings 35, of which three 
are central. Paradigm (sense 1) refers to those theories that the scientific 
community take to be unproblematic and against which other theories are 
tested. Paradigm (sense 2) refers to those practices which the scientific 
community takes to be unproblematic, for example basic measurement 
( 3) f to the common training and socialisation techniques. Paradigm sense re ers 
so as to bind scientists into a tightly processes that Kuhn believes operate 
knit community or communities with strong consensual norms. 
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As Masterman 36 points out, Kuhn often conflates these different meanings In 
his writing, so that "paradigm" becomes a multi-purpose term roughly relating 
overall to the idea of a 'framework within which scientists are supposed to 
work'. Scientific training for Kuhn is supposed to involve the dogmatic 
initiation of trainee scientists into the "normal science paradigm" in that they 
need to use textbooks which rarely if ever dwell upon the problematic nature 
of much scientific discovery, the personality of the discoverer and the social 
and political context in which the discovery is made. Instead trainee scientists 
are led to believe that scientific progress is a-historic, a-personal and 
cumulative, each new discovery adding to the previously obtained body of 
knowledge. Socialisation within the scientific community merely reinforces this 
view. As Kuhn points out, the scientific community could not function unless 
"scientists fail to reject paradigms when faced with anomalies or counter-
instances." 37 
Paradigm (sense 3) referred to above is supposed by Kuhn to lead trainee 
scientists to become familiar with paradigms (senses 1 and 2) so that they may 
contribute to the reworking and refining of paradigms, an activity to which 
Kuhn refers as "puzzle solving" 38 and on which he alleges scientists spend 
much of their time. All this is much to the disgust of Popper 39 who likes to 
think of scientists as "problem solvers" 40 who can and do spend much of 
their time breaking out of their paradigms (senses 1 and 2), although as I 
noted earlier Popper has no way of showing how this 'break out' might be 
achieved. 
It looks as if Kuhn is suggesting tha t scientific progress is made pragmatically 
by developing theories as responses to minor anomalies that show up from time 
h th t scientific progress is to time. However, rather than its being t e case a 
h h· t of science is full of continuous, Kuhn is able to point out that t e IS ory 
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examples of long periods of "normal science" br k b ' 
o en Y occasIOnal periods of 
"revolutionary science" that arise when scientist d' , 
s ISCover many anomalIes 
within the normal science paradigm (sense 1) Whil 't' 1 ' 
. ellS a ways pOSSIble to 
accommodate an anomalous observation by slightly mod'f' h' , 1 ymg t e main paradIgm 
(sense 1) (as I noted in my ear lier discussion of Quine's work) and while it is 
also always possible to discredit or ignore the individual scientist who made 
the observation, (as Kuhn shows 41) there are occasions when the number of 
occurrences of anomalies is so great that scientists start to feel under 
increasing psychological pressure and eventually attempt a "mass break out" 
from the "normal science paradigm". 
During these periods of "revolutionary science", a number of alternative 
paradigms (1) and (2) is considered, each supported by various groups within 
the scientific community. Eventually a successor as chief paradigm (1) emerges 
from the competing paradigms and a new period of "normal science" begins. 
Kuhn maintains that the new and old paradigms are now radically 
'incommensurable' in the sense that the same words in each of them are used 
in a completely different way a fter a per iod 0 f "revolutionary science". He 
writes: "after a revolution, scientists work in a different world." 42 This 
argument makes it look as if scientific progress is dependent upon the 
psychology of individual scientists; in this way Kuhn's work may be regarded as 
a kind of sociology of the scientific community rather than an account of the 
logic 0 f scientific discourse. Furthermore the same argument is circular since 
two particular sciences (psychology and sociology) are supposed to hold the 
key to the way that all sciences function. 
In The Essential Tension 43 Kuhn attempts to takes account of some of the 
, , . f h' I' k by I'ncorporating some demarcation criteria within CritICIsms 0 IS ear Ier wor 
his elitist philosophy of science. Kuhn now agrees with his critics that such 
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standard criteria as accuracy simplicity . 
, , consIstency, breadth and predictive 
power "provide the shared basis for theory ch' " 44 Oice . Nevertheless, for Kuhn, 
these criteria can never determine theor h' Y c Oice nor can they ever be 
explicitly stated and applied because of th . d . 
, e In etermlnacy of interpreting 
these or any other criteria. Instead Kuhn suggests th at such criteria function 
as values that guide scientific communities. 
For Kuhn, there will always be debate about the ways In which particular 
theories should be judged but that does not make theory preference a matter 
of "taste". Instead K h . h u n recognIses tat, in so far as theories can be said to 
exist, theories exist in use. That is to say, theories are put forward, justified 
and compared by members of a community who are guided by certain values 
and who agree on particular ways of describing the wor ld that are assumed by 
those theories. That is not to say that such agreement is uniform. Rather it is 
to say that there are over lapping ways of using scientific terms that make it 
possible for the proponents of rival scientific theories to interpret what each 
other is doing. 
Hence, for Kuhn, theory choice becomes a matter of translation of ideas and 
statements between the proponents of different theories. Their shared 
commitment to the previously mentioned values is sufficient to ensure that the 
effort of translation is worthwhile. 
However incomprehensible the new theory may be to the proponents of 
tradition, the exhibit of impressive concrete results will persuade at least 
a few 0 f them that they must discover how such results are achieved. 
For that purpose they must learn to translate, perhaps by treatin~ 
already published papers as a Rosetta stone or, often more effectIve, by 
visiting the innovator, talking with him, watching him and his students at 
work. Those exposures may not result in the adoption of the t~eory; some 
advoca tes of the tradition may return home and attempt to adjust ~he old 
theory to produce equivalent results. But others if the ne~ theory IS to 
survive, will find that at some point in the language-learning process 
they have ceased to translate and begun instead to speak the language 
like a native. No process quite like choi3e has occurred, but they are practising the new theory nonetheless. 4 
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This argument may be extended to explain both th ' 
e attractIOn and the failure 
of recent attempts made by some educational theorists to emulate natural 
scientific methodology. These educational theorists may be seen to be 
attracted to what they assume to be natural scientific methodology for the 
reason that they too are a ttracted by the "exhibit of impressive concrete 
results". However, by characterising natural science as from within the 
paradigm of foundationalist empiricism, these educational theorists have been 
attempting to emulate the activities of those who use procedures that are not 
part of natural scientific methodology and hence are not likely to exhibit the 
"impressive concrete results" that are commonly assumed to be produced by 
na tural scientists. 
This argument may also be extended to explain why 'scientific' societies may 
be considered to be more rational than primitive societies. I refer to the 
literature concerned with the issue of the 'rationality' of the Azande. 46 In 
the course of a discussion on this Winch 47 criticises Evans-Pritchard for 
holding that 'his' standard of rationality can enable him to deem Zande belief 
in witches to be irrational. However Winch points out that Evans-Pritchard 
speaks from 
a culture whose conception of rationality is deeply affected by the 
achievements and methods of the sciences and one which treats such 
things as a belief in magic or the pr~~tice of consulting oracles as 
almost a paradigm of the irrational. 
Consequently Winch holds that Zande beliefs and actions may only be appraised 
, d 'f f I' f' In thl'S some may see an elitist account agamst and within Zan e orm Ole. 
of rationality resting upon ethnocentric preconceptions. 
Other writers, by contrast, argue that Western European 'forms of life' are 
more rational than those of the Azande and that this is because of the 
achievements of the natural sciences. For example Gellner writes 
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The imp~rtan,ce of .•• the scientific industrial 'f . , . 
global diffusIon is the main event of our t' ~rm of ~lfe whose rapId 
. h l' Ime, IS that It does pro 'd WIt a so ution to the problem of relativism Th ' . VI e us 
technological superiority of one form of 11' fe .:. e co?nltive and 
, h' l' , IS so manIfest and so 1 d d WIt Imp Ications .•• that it simply cannot be questioned. 49 oa e 
Taylor 50 too argues that trans-cultural judgements of rationality can be made 
on the basis of the supposed superiority of a theoretical culture over an a-
theoretical one because the former effectively lays out the way the world is 
with a perspicuity tha t commands the attention of the latter both 
intellectually and by way of its technological applications. 
Taylor does not suggest that the Azande are less rational because they believe 
in magic or consult oracles. He accepts that such beliefs and practices are 
incommensurable with Western European ideas, the post-Enlightenment origins 
of which have tended to separate the notions of "understanding" and 
"attunement" through the ideal of scientific disinterest. Instead Taylor suggests 
that the Azande are able to recognise the technological advances that result 
from the theoretical progress that the natural sciences have made. For 
example, the Azande may not understand the theory of vaccination but they 
certainly recognise the process of someone recovering from a fatal illness. To 
take another example, they may not understand the principle of the internal 
combustion engine but they certainly recognise the advantages that transport 
might afford them. 
The argument may be put simply as follows: rationality depends upon 
theoretical understanding. Western European 'forms of life' support the 
enterprise of natural science. Natural science leads to technological control 
which commands the attention of non-scientific 'forms of life'. Therefore 
Western European 'forms of life' are more rational than non-scientific 'forms of 
life'. Notice that this argument does not suggest that 'technological control' 
functions as a universal criterion of rationality that both Western Europeans 
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and the Azande recognise. Nor does this argument 
suggest that the concept of 
rationality is completely circumscribed by theories b h 
a out t e natural world. It 
may be that in time certain features of Zande 'forms f I' f ' Ole may come to 
outweigh 'technological' considerations to bias J'udgements f t' I' o ra lOna lty In 
favour of the Zande. However despite radical incommensurabilties between 
'scientific' and 'primitive' forms of life, trans-cultural judgements of rationality 
may be made in favour of the former because presently the former's 
technological control commands the a ttention of the latter in a way that 
outweighs any claims that the latter may make to command the attention of 
the former. 
If Kuhn is correct in concluding that scientific theory preference can be 
explained by referring to the common values that bind the scientific 
community together and make it possible for scientists to interpret what each 
other is doing, then it follows that any group of theorists who share those 
values may also come to prefer some theories over others on the basis of 
their interpretations of what each other is doing. Just as natural scientists 
may interpret each other'S work fruitfully so too other types of theorists may 
benefit by interpreting the work of natural scientists. Their interest might not 
quite coincide with the interest of the natural scientist, nevertheless there 
will be sufficient over lap to make interpretation possible. In other words 
Kuhn's account of scientific theory preference may well be applied to any type 
of theory if it can be shown that forms 0 f discourse are commensurable - that 
is to say tha t the use of a term in one form of discourse is related to the 
use of a term in another. 
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Commensurabili ty 
First let us examine the notion of commensurability as l't may be applied 
within natural science. The early Kuhn and Feyerabend's attack on 
commensurabili ty lead to the idea that during periods of what Kuhn calls 
"revolutionary science" the same words are used in completely different ways. 
However Putnam 51 argues against this idea. He argues that while the uses of 
scientific terms are con tinually changing, not all of their uses change at the 
same time. For example Bohr's (1904) electron had a negative charge just as 
our present-day electron does, even though other properties may have changed. 
In this way Putnam seems to adopt a 'cluster' theory of reference in which the 
elements of a cluster are related by something like a 'family resemblance'. We 
can refer to Bohr's electron because we apply the "principle of charity" 52. 
We say in effect that there are sufficient common properties between the two 
'electrons' to justify our calling them the same. 
In order to use a scientific term intelligibly a speaker needs a standard 
minimum amount of information, something that Putnam calls a stereotype. 
Additionally a speaker needs some examples of extensions of the term. For 
example speakers understand the term 'electron' if they have a stereotype 
which may consist of 'negative charge, small, part of an atom etc.', and some 
extensions of the term like 'Beta particle, present when current flows etc.' 
Speakers do not need, nor could they have, all the extensions of a term 
" h ' 53. Putnam uses this phrase because of the "linguistic division of labour t eSlS 
to draw attention to the social nature of language and the way in which the 
extensions of a term are divided among a community of speakers. Putnam puts 
it this way: 
, t least some terms whose 
Every linguist~c c.ommunlty ••. possesses a b of the speakers who 
associated 'criteria' are known only to a su hset eakers depends upon a 
acquire the terms, and whose use by th~ o~ er sp kers in the relevant 
structureg cooperation between them an t e spea 
subsets. 4 
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The "linguistic division of labour" thesis allows me to explain why Kuhn's 
earlier incommensurability thesis is implausible and why his earlier talk of 
scientists inhabiting "different worlds" 55 is unhelpful S· " 
• mce SCIentIsts do not 
all share the same extensions of terms and do not all shift allegiance from old 
to new paradigms at the same time, then scientific discourse reflects both old 
and new extensions of terms for some time after periods of "revolutionary 
science". Consequently linguistic practices that link new terms with old remain 
within the scientific community so that sense can be made of the idea of 
progress. That is not to say that one idea of progress governs all future ideas 
of progress. Rather it is that the idea of progress becomes, like the extensions 
of terms across the scientific community, spread across not only the scientific 
community but other communities as well, evolving with each change in 
linguistic practice. The Kuhnian incommensurability thesis is implausible 
precisely because speakers and communities of speakers do not remain in 
isolation from one another. 
Let us now consider the notion of commensurability as it might apply across 
forms of discourse by making reference to Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking. 56 
On Goodman's view it matters little whether we hold that there is a world of 
which it is possible to have a right verSIon or whether we want to say that 
our versions are just our worlds, as long as we realise that what we say does 
not correspond with the wor ld. Goodman suggests that we find the idea of 
multiple wor Ids unpalatable because we try to stretch the use of the word 
'world' beyond its reach so that the world either becomes a fixed entity 
leading to utter resignation on our part as to the possibility of ever knowing 
d es ts that we should it, or to "irresponsible relativism". Instead Goo man sugg 
accept a "judicious vacillation" between worlds, rather like the physicist who 
ld f ves and a world of particles. 
flits back and forth betw~en a wO.r .. 0 wa uite as the wind blows but 
••• we are monists, plusaJIStS, or nIhIlIsts not q 
as befits the context. 
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The important point here is that the physicist's descr iptl·on 
of electromagnetic 
radiation depends upon the way in which that description enmeshes with other 
forms of discourse in which the phy sicist engages. The physicist's use of the 
term 'wave' depends for its effectiveness upon a richness that is derived from 
a 'family resemblance' between the roles that the term pI . 11 f ays In a orms of 
discourse in which that set of letters has meaning. The same may be said of 
other scientific terms. Hence scientific terms are not used in isolation from 
other forms of discourse, rather their scientific use is parasitic on non-
scientific usage. 
Rather than there being a privileged set of terms, for Goodman any set will 
do, whether these are fundamental particles or everyday objects or even 
fictional entities. Thus when we are asked to consider whether someone is a 
Don Quixote or a Don Juan, we find this question just as useful, and probably 
slightly easier to answer, as asking whether someone is paranoid or manic-
depressive. Hence "wor Id-making" is not just the preserve of the scientist; the 
artist too makes worlds. 
When a scientist first relates heat to motion or the tides to the moon, 
our wor ldviews are drastically altered. And when we leave an exhibit of 
the works of an important painter, the w~rld .we step into is not the oyg 
we left when we went in, we see everything In terms of those works. 
Even though Goodman accepts that there are many "right" ways of 
worldmaking, that does not mean that all "right" alternatives are equally good 
for every purpose. Instead we need to construct "right" versions for particular 
purposes. These versions may involve extensional logie, fundamental particles, 
or paintings. On Goodman's view, a "right" version cannot be grounded in any 
context- free way. 
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We may then have different "versions" of the 'world' and each version can be 
"right" in the sense that a "right version" maximise "th 
s e cogency and the 
compactness and comprehensiveness, the informativeness d .. 
an organIsmg power 
of the whole system". 59 "Rightness" is primarily 
a matter of "fit", - fit to 
what is referred to in one way and another; goodness of fit is limited by all 
sorts of things, including deductive rightness, inductive rightness and rightness 
of categorisation. For example: 
~hether a picture. is ~ightly designed or a statement correctly described 
IS tested ~y examInatIon and reexamination of the picture or statement 
and what It refers to by trying its fit in varied applications and with 
other patterns and statements. 60 
Hence theories are not only to be understood as constituent parts of one form 
of discourse, but also are related to all forms of discourse through a process 
of gradual adjustment brought about by the use of their terms in different 
contexts. The richness of meaning of both scientific and non-scientific terms 
depends upon family resemblances between them and our rationality depends 
upon our ability and willingness not to try to find one form of discourse to 
which all others are supposed to relate but rather to be open-minded enough 
to challenge all of our preconceptions by continuing to place features of 
various forms of discourse in temporary "cosmic exile" while the coherence of 
the rest of our theoretic network is increased. 
Quine's "seamless web" may thus be made up of all kinds of material. Yet it is 
not hard to envisage some overall theoretical web within which a variety of 
forms of discourse constantly shift into the most coherent arrangement, both 
on the basis of theories about the sorts of lives that people want to lead and 
on the basis of those theories that have the most empirical content. The 
upshot of all this discussion is that there are not likely to be any significant 
differences between various means of preferring any particular type of theory. 
Theory preference is always underdetermined by 'experience' and so 'value' 
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considerations must be taken into account in order to enabl d . 
e us to etermme 
theory choice in the concrete instances in which such choices are made. In 
the next chapter, I argue that the values that Kuhn 
suggests are the guides to 
natural science may themselves be filtered out over time according to the way 
in which a variety 0 f discourses enmesh. 
In this chapter we have moved beyond objectivism and relativism to see how 
Kuhn's account of natural science offers the possibility of accounting for the 
way in which a theoretic network that includes various types of theory might 
develop according to the ways in which the proponents of rival theories 
interpret what each other is doing. We have seen how natural SCIence may be 
considered to be made up of subsets of speakers and we have seen how the 
idea of the linguistic division of labour thesis within natural science must be 
applied to other forms of discourse in order to account for linguistic practice 
within science. 
The overall VIew that emerges is of a theoretic network that is supported by 
a var iety of linguistic communities whose memberships, practices and 
evaluative concerns over lap, making the effort of interpretation both 
worthwhile and possible. Moreover it is during the process of interpretation 
that the use of a term in one form of discourse acts as a 'touchstone' for its 
use in other forms of discourse. We may achieve the opportunity of temporary 
cosmic exile from our developing network of theory by continuing to place 
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In the prevIous chapter I argued tha t the question of accounting for theory 
preference in the natural sciences involves the proponents of rival theories 
interpreting what each other is doing according to those values that are 
shared by members of the natural scientific community. I also argued that the 
members of a community of educational theorists might be sufficiently 
attracted by the results of those interpretive procedures within natural SCIence 
that they attempt to emulate them when theorising about education. I begin 
this chapter by examining whether there is an additional interpretive dimension 
involved in the case of theorising about education that is not present in the 
case of natural science. For the purposes of this examination I assume that 
educational theory may be considered to be a subset of social theory. My 
earlier argument in favour of the holistic idea of a network of theory 
comprised of overlapping subsets makes this assumption uncontroversial for me. 
I go on to consider the question of the nature of practical interest and 
discuss the educational implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics in which he 
shows how theory and practice can be fused in the notion of a conversation. 
The Idea of an Interpretive Social Science 
Natural and social science are often contrasted by those who point to the 
different types of discourse involved in each case. So Winch 1 follows 
Wi ttgenstein in arguing that any form of discourse is rule-governed. He 
assumes that both natural and social sciences are concerned with the 
investigation of regularities and that these investigations presuppose that 
d" t rules appropriate to the jUdgements of identity can be made accor lng 0 
h asserts that there is a three way relationship particular acti vi ty. Winc 
and socI"al sciences between the objects of study, the operating in both natural 
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scientist, and the scientific community In each case th . . 
. e SCIentIst 
communicates the regularities about the object of study he claims to have 
isolated to the scientific community of which he is a member. 
However in the case of the natural scientist the only communication that 
takes place is that between the scientist and h is colleagues in his scholarly 
community; this presupposes only one set of rules governing judgements of 
identity essential to the identification of regularities in that discourse, For the 
social scientist, by contrast, there are two kinds of communication: that which 
takes place between the scientist and the objects of study (people), and that 
which takes place between the social scientist and his colleagues in his 
communi ty. This presupposes two sets of rules appropr iate to the identification 
of regularities in that community; this is sometimes referred to as the "double 
hermeneutic" 2 operating in the case of the social science. 
According to Winch, the "double hermeneutic" imposes on the social scientist 
the joint requirement - and the double problem - of being both a part 0 f the 
object of study as well as a member of a community of fellow social 
scientists. Social scientists aim to provide an account of the objects of study 
that satisfies the rules of intelligibility and identity operating in the case of 
both the social scientific community and of the community being studied. In 
other words, Winch rules out the possibility that the social scientist can grasp 
the rules operating among those who serve as the objects of study, without 
being a member of both the social science community and of the community 
being studied. Furthermore if the social scientist is a member and participant 
in both communi ties, the possibility 0 f appraising beliefs or actions in one 
community as more or less rational than beliefs or actions in another 
community seems to be excluded. 
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Suppose for example tha t a social scientist wishe t" " 
s 0 inVestIgate the effect of 
astrology on the lives of a particular group of people who regularly consult 
horoscopes and in some way adjust their lives accordingly. Suppose as well 
that the social scientist considers that it is irrational to believe in the 
findings and recommendations of astrology How can the "I " " 
. SOCIa SCIentIst 
understand those for whom astrology is important and for h "" d w om It IS regar ed 
as rational to consult horoscopes? Only, according to Winch, by entering the 
'form of life' of the astrology believers. But this is impossible. The 
'disinterested' (if such a position is possible) social scientist simply cannot 
identify instances when astrology is important for people because such a 
possibility is ruled out ~ priori for him; and pretending that astrology is 
important cannot help him. 
\\inch seems to be unable to account for the way In which people from 
different 'forms of life' might come to understand what each other is doing. 
However he a voids this difficulty by noting that while the social scientific 
community and the astrology believers disagree about astrology, they share 
what Winch calls "limiting notions". 3 These are notions that all humans share 
regarding such biological universals as birth, death and sexual relations. These 
"limiting notions" are supposed to give us the basic purchase required on the 
enterpr ise 0 f understanding each other. 
However it is inter-cultural as opposed to intra-cultural actions that present 
the most important occasions for social scientific analysis and enquiry. For 
example for some social scientists, an analysis of Zan de witchcraft may well 
be interesting but less important than an analysis of soccer hooliganism or 
mugging. Winch treats such instances as "culturally situated" and hence 
" "" not1"ons" cannot serve to determine which 
conventional. Furthermore "l1m1ung 
to be Preferred from among a multitude of account of a social phenomenon is 
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possibilities. Winch's problem is that he wants to work out a way In which 
ordinary language can be used to redescribe ordinary language 
and so gets 
caught up in the familiar difficulty for Wittgensteinians 4 th f . 
- at 0 accounting 
for the alleged superior ity of anyone form of discourse ov th P h er 0 ers. er aps 
as Gellner 5 suggests, Winch might agree with Louch 6 that social science 
cannot offer anything more than descriptions of the ordinary talk of ordinary 
people who happen to want to talk about certain aspects of their lives. 
Such a move effectively puts an end to the idea of a 'social science'. The 
move is therefore commonly resisted on the grounds inter alia that it would 
also put an end to the idea that theoretical understanding is a necessary 
underpinning for rationality. Such a move would rule out the possibility of 
social theorists claiming some special status for their contributions to debates 
on the social controls and pressures that might be brought to bear In a 
particular con fHct between interested parties in a plural society. In order to 
resist this move, Giddens suggests, social scientists should develop a technical 
meta-language tha t serves both to distinguish the activity of the social 
scientist from that of lay-actor and serves to account for the superiority of 
the former'S theoretical output. 
This move may seem to suggest that the social sciences follow the model of 
the natural sciences but Giddens stresses that social sciences have to deal 
with an additional frame of meaning not present in the natural sciences and 
involving the "double hermeneutic". As he puts it: 




~c~e~ces ~so in 
a certain sense a form of life in itself, the concept~ 0 w l~. :ve f 
be mastered as a mode of practical activity genera.tlng spechl. Ihc . YP~~e~dY 
. h deals with a Universe w lC IS a descr iptions .•. SocIology, owever ~ . I tors themselves and 
constituted within f~a~es .of meaning by .so~l:cha~mes mediating ~rdinary 
reinterprets these WIthIn Its own theoretlca , 
and technical language. 7 
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In this way Giddens seems to suggest that natural 
scientific discourse is set 
apart from ordinary discourse: the only interpretive d' , ImenSlOn relevant to the 
work of the natural scientist is that involving his ' t ' 
In erpretatlOn of the work 
of other natural scientists. However I think that Giddens is mistaken in his 
apparent assumption that natural scientific discourse is any more "all of a 
piece" than, say, a combination of sociological and ordinary discourse. As 
Hesse puts it; 
I take it that it has been sufficiently demonstrated that data are not 
detach~ble from th~ory, and that their expression is permeated by 
theoretIcal categories; tha t the language of theoretical science is 
~rre~ucibly ~etaphoric~l and unformalisable, and that the logic of science 
IS cIrcular interpretatIon, reinterpretation, and self-correction of data in 
terms of theory, theory in terms of data. 8 
In other words, "the language of theoretical science" is no less "metaphor ical 
and unformalisable" than ordinary language. Moreover the very broad 
distinction within natural science between the experimental and theoretical 
communities involves a member of the 'theoretical' community interpreting both 
the work of his theoretical colleagues and the work of the 'experimental' 
community. The same may be said for a member of the 'experimental' 
community. Now this very broad distinction within natural science may be 
likened to the distinction between social scientist and social actor. Just as the 
theoretical physicist has to interpret what his experimental colleagues are 
saying, so the social scientist has to interpret the ordinary language of the 
actor, as well as interpreting what his own theoretical colleagues are saying. 
It may well be, 
the case of the 
as Giddens argues, that there is "considerable complexity" 9 In 
sociologist/actor relationship that is not so obvious in the 
case of the theoretical/experimental physicist relationship. Nevertheless this 
I and social sciences one of 
"complexity" makes the difference between natura 
degree rather than kind. Giddens also argues that: 
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there is a continual 'slippage' of the conce ts ' 
whereby these are appropr ia ted by tho ~ constructed In sociology, 
originally coined to analyse, and hences~e~d ose conduct, they were 
of that conduct (thereby in fact potent' 11 to beco~~ Integr,al features 
usage within the technical vocabulary oifa y ~olmpr?mISIng Ithelr original SOCIa SCIence). 0 
Now we have no reason to suppose that this "slippage" IS any more a feature 
of social science than of natural science. Yet such" I' s Ippage" may be much 
more obvious or apparent in social science because social science is so closely 
connected with ordinary forms of discourse and the interests that such 
discourse reflects. 
As I have already argued, there is a 'linguistic division of labour' at work 
across the scientific community that brings it about that scientific 
communication is only partial and that there are many interpretive dimensions 
relevant to the choice of theories that the community makes. In particular, 
the notion of the possibility of theory-preference depends upon the range, 
richness and functional utility 0 f those metaphors that are theoretically 
situated - a richness that is itself dependent upon the ways in which terms 
from a variety of forms of discourse come to interact. 
However even if it were accepted tha t there are many interpretive dimensions 
relevant to theory preference in natural and social science (such that natural 
scientific discourse is no more "all of a piece" than social scientific discourse) 
and even if it were accepted tha t theory in both cases were underdetermined 
by data, it could still be argued tha t those interests that determine theory 
preference in natural scientific theory are different from those that determine 
theory preference in social scientific theory. It might be argued that the 
, " , 'f ' I' 't h rence scope and so on are of a na tural SClenti fiC Interests 0 SImp ICI y, co e , 
different kind from the practical interests that might determine which of two 
rival educational theories are to be preferred, for example. 
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Implicit in this View is the distinction between interests that are theoretical 
and impersonal, and those that reflect the personal commitments that a 
theoretical account is regarded as intended to transcend. However just because 
natural scientific theory is not so obviously related to immediate human 
concerns as educational theory, which might imply practical recommendations, 
is no reason to suppose that the latter type of theory might not be guided by 
the same interests as the former type. Nor is there any reason to suppose that 
the natural scientific interests of simplicity, coherence and so on, do not 
imply practical recommendations for the natural scientist that guide the way 
that he conducts the professional part of his life. 
Instead the distinction between practical and theoretical interests might be 
more a matter of degree of commensurability with immediate human concerns 
rather than a difference in kind. For example Hesse argues that in natural 
science there is an overarching pragmatic criterion that "filters out both 
simplicity criteria and other value judgements". 11 Hesse is not arguing for a 
new form of pragmatism; she simply avers that presently we can make sense 
of the idea of increasing predictive success. As she puts it: 
ho OIl h th d c °bed IOn a basiOcally Newtonian or The spaces Ip Stl goes ~ e er es rl 
relativistic framework. 1 
This might be taken to mean that both frameworks are useful devices for 
predicting the movement of spaceships and that the pragmatic criterion can be 
both framew orks despite their radical conceptual seen to be applicable to 
differences internally. 
° dO ff It ° tha t under lie the notions of There are notOrlOUS 1. ICU Ies ~··o ° he basic observation language. 
underdetermioned !he~rles and cntlcls~:f~i~utlties for others by bypassing 
The pragmatIc crIterlon trades the~e 1 f I lan~J.lage and resting on the 
the question of the reference of t eore ~cao rj , 
non-linguistic concept of successful predIctIon. 
Page 146 
However it is difficult to understand what Hesse means by 
the idea of a "non-
linguistic concept". She does not seem to mean th 
a t such a concept is 
transcendental since she goes on to argue that this concept could in time be 
replaced. Perhaps she means to suggest that the replace t f h ' men 0 t e pragmatIc 
criterion would not come about simply as a result of mod' f' t' I lca lOns to natural 
scientific discourse but rather as a result of a complex rearrangement of a 
variety of forms of discourse including ethics. 
For example it could be argued that the enhanced status of the natural 
sciences results from successful technological applications of them. It could be 
argued that the explanatory and predictive success 0 f natural scientific 
theories are of less concern to most people than their technological 
applications. Just as the traditional practices of building and farming command 
our attention because 0 f the way that they a fford us shelter and food, so too 
it could be argued tha t natural science commands our attention because of the 
way that natural science affords us mains electricity, washing machines and so 
on. 
However e vents such as those that took place at Chernoby I and Three Mile 
Island tend to shake our belief in the idea of progress based on the natural 
science. These events tend to make us reassess the kind of world we want to 
inhabit and, while the resulting ethical discussion does not directly bear upon 
the values that guide the natural scientific community, such discussion does 
have perturbations across a range of forms of discourse and the precise 
formulation of the pragmatic criterion, that Hesse suggests "filters out" other 
values, itself shifts. To an extent we may imagine that certain forms of 
discourse are legitimated by appeals to the claimed pragmatic benefits that 
, ' h h th' 's not a straight-forward 
are obtained from their applIcatIon, t oug IS 1 
appeal to immediate utility. Instead such appeals are mediated by the way In 
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which they enmesh with other appeals from other forms of discourse, some of 
which are concerned with speculations about the sort of world 
that we want 
to inhabit - in other words, with axiological considerations. 
The picture that I am suggesting is one of a developing network of theories 
whose theory extensions are not only governed by observation statements but 
also by axiological considerations which, through a process of "filtering" across 
many forms of discourse, come to function as values that guide various 
communities of theorists. The proximity of their theoretical concerns with our 
ethical discussions is a matter of degree but does not give rise to any clear 
distinction between so-called theoretical and practical interests. 
According to this VIew, there is no reason for theories, in which a particular 
interest IS apparent, to be any less informative and useful than those where 
personal interest is less apparent. Even minimally articulated, social theories 
can illuminate aspects of our lives despite the interests of their proponents. 
The question is, how can such illumination come about? How can an account 
that is "interested", and in that way 'prejudiced', possibly illuminate our 
choices about what we might do? In order to answer these questions I turn 
now to Gadamer's account of hermeneutics. 
Gadamer's Hermeneutics 
Post-empiricist philosophers of science may be thought to have moved the 
focus of the problem of the theory-laden nature of observation statements 
back to the problem of the value-laden nature of all theory. In the first case, 
falsl° fYIOng l°nstances depends upon an overall the idea that the identification of 
understanding of the way in which a network of theories fits together seems 
to be prime. In the second case, the notion of dependence upon a common 
the part of all theorists is a dominant motif. commitment to certain values on 
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But both share the pre-conception that our sel t· .. 
ec lOn or rejectIon of a 
particular theory depends upon our hav ing some t f . 
sor 0 prlOr understanding of 
the "scientific" /theoretic enterprise tha t has alre d . . 
, a y In a sense determIned 
our selection or rejection. But it also leads to vicious circularity within 
scientific discourse. 
Hermeneutics, conceived as the study of the problem of the possibility and 
intelligibility of our attempts to give an interpretation and achieve 
understanding, contains its 0 wn "cr itical circle" 14 that is supposed to a void 
that kind of viciousness. According to Heidegger: 
Any interpretation which is to contrib~t5 understanding must already have 
understood what is to be interpreted. 
What Heidegger means is that, In order for us to interpret part of the 
behaviour of a community, we need to understand the way that the part we 
are concerned to analyse relates to the overall way that a community lives. 
The opposite is also true: in order to understand the whole, it is necessary to 
understand the various constituent parts. To take another example; in order to 
convince people of the 'correctness' of an interpretation, we need to assume 
tha t they understand what is being interpreted in the same way as we do. If 
they do not, then all we can do is to try to interpret other expressions in the 
hope that we shall convince them of the suitability or appropriateness of our 
interpretation. However, at bottom, Tay lor points out: 
We cannot escape an ultimate. appeal tOl C common understanding of the 
expressions, of the 'language' Involved. 
So if we cannot convince someone else of our 'correct' interpretation, then 
there may well arise doubt about our own supposedly correct interpretation. 
The hermeneutic "circle" is therefore 'critical', in the sense that its adoption 





This apparent circularity is not vicious, however, since l·t IS 
actually 
presupposed in every act of understanding. Again 
according to Heidegger: 
if we see this circle as a vicious one and 1 k .. 
it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitabl~oim out for. ways of avoIding 
of understanding has been misunderstood from t~erfectl~n, then the a~t 
decisive is not to get out of the circle but t e groun . up ... Wh~t IS 
Th · . 0 come to It In the rIght way. IS cIrcle of understanding ••• is not to b d d 
. . . . e re uce to the level of 
a. VICI0~S ~lrcle, or e~e~ of a CIrcle which is merely tolerated I th· clrcl~ IS hidden a posItIve possibility of the most primordial k: dn f IS 
knOWIng. 17 In 0 
For Heidegger, the hermeneutical circle has ontological status because the 
circularity is not only present in the understanding of others but also when we 
reflect upon what we ourselves do. The hermeneutical circle provides us with 
a means of attaining a reflective kind of self understanding that is, for 
Heidegger, an essential part of being human. 
Or iginally hermeneutics was concerned with understanding what was 
problematic about the meaning of certain religious and historical texts. 
Schleiermacher 18 and Dilthey, 19 working in accordance with the ideals of 
the Enlightenment, attempted to transcend the distortions inherent in accounts 
influenced by an interpreter's own tradition, in the attempt to produce a 
'correct' or the 'definitive' interpretation by constant application of a 
particular 'impersonal' method. Gadamer follows Heidegger in attempting a 
different project for hermeneutics. 
Gadamer is not concerned to find one method 0 f interpreting texts which will 
produce a "once and for all" complete and correct interpretation. Indeed he 
maintains that this is neither possible nor desirable. According to Gadamer 
hermeneutics is equally likely to affect the way that an interpreter sees his 
own immediate participation in a tradition, which itself influences the 
expectations which are brought to bear on a text, as well as affecting the 
interpretation of the text itself. 
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Gadamer calls the effect 0 f tradition "preJ'udice" (V 20 
orurteil) and seeks to 
show in considerable detail how the Enlightenment d f d h 
e orme t e use of the 
word 'prejudice' so that it now seems only to function in ' , 
a peJoratlve way. 
Gadamer seeks 
interpret a tion. 
to reinstate 'prejudice' as an essential part of the process of 
Instead of searching to isolate and then elevate the idea of an 
a-temporal, bias-free interpretation, Gadamer acknowledges the essential 
temporality and prejudicial nature of our knowledge. As Linge puts it in the 
"Introduction" to Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics: 
The role of the past cannot be restricted merely to supplying the texts 
or events that make up the 'objects' of interpretation'. As prejudice and 
tradition, the past also defines tre ground the interpreter himself 
occupies when he understands. 2 
By substituting the words "world" and "experiment" for the words "past" and 
"interpretation" in the above quotation, we could easily read it as a statement 
of the problem of the theory-Iadenness of observation statements. The words 
"prejudice" and "theory -laden" seem to perform complementary roles. The ease 
of such a proposed exchange reinforces my ear Her point about the natural 
sciences also involving a hermeneutic dimension. 
Since for Gadamer understanding is a temporal event in which a text is 
mediated by an interpreter's expectations or "horizons" - and these in their 
turn are themselves mediated by the tradition which led to the original 
encounter between text and interpreter - interpretation is not something final 
but is a dynamic part of an ongoing conversation. Instead of there being one 
final interpretation or reconstruction, understanding consists of a series of 
mediations or "fusing of horizons" 22 between interpreter and text. For 
Gadamer, interpretation, theorising and application are all present in the 
" f d standing as a 'fusion of moment of InterpretatIon. The concept 0 un er 
, t s well as the text hor izons' indicates that the horizons 0 f the Interpre er a 
change in the acti vi ty 0 f seeking and coming to understanding; thus the 
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interpreter's present situation is fluid . d' 
, preJu Ices are continuously being 
discarded and reformed as a result of the understandings that we are 
constantly achieving, and reconstructing This puts ad' .. 
• n en to empIriCIst notions 
of what claims to be "disinterested" educational research leading to theories 
that are applied in concrete practical situations. 
The notion of a 'fusion 0 f horizons' also puts an end to what I ear lier called 
the professionalisation of educational theory, that is to say, the process 
whereby educational theorists are assumed to be guardians of educational 
rationality (and as a result both claim and are offered enhanced institutional 
status including the right to the tutelage of teacher trainees). The present 
move to what is called "the primacy of practice", that often results in the 
promotion of the notions of action research and action learning, may be seen 
to arise out of Gadamer's hermeneutics. On this basis we might claim that 
learning gets its moment of application in actual practice; for this reason we 
might think that so-called educational theorists should converse with so-called 
educational practitioners in order to enhance mutual understanding. 
However Gadamer's hermeneutics involves a more radical shift than this. It is 
not just that theory should be more related to practice or that theorists and 
practitioners should understand each other better: it is that there is no such 
thing as theory that is not itself a form of practice nor are there theorists 
who are not themselves practitioners or vice-versa. Crucially for Gadamer's 
hermeneutics it makes no sense to imagine that there are theories to be had 
which guide practice. The radical thrust of Gadamer's hermeneutics applied to 
education today is to deny much of the present institutionalisation of the 
'theory guiding practice idea', whether that be in Colleges and Departments of 
Education or Colleges of Further Education providing the vocational theory that 
is supposed to guide vocational practice. 
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The idea that rational practice only It f 
resu s rom successful theoretical 
deliberation must be rejected in favour of a view of . . practIce that Incorporates 
the constant mediation between talk about what to do next and action in the 
appropriate practical context. For example the idea of 
a vocational preparation 
and the present thrust towards vocationalism needs to be rejected in favour of 
a system in which people learn how to do certain things on the job, as it 
were. 
If there are simply not enough jobs to go around, that is a problem but it is 
not an educational problem. One of the implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics 
is that our educational tradition should make us regard it as insufficient for 
the education system to be conceived primarily as the "preparation" of people 
for an economic role In society and to be held primarily responsible for a 
society's failure to achieve its economic targets. In a situation in which 
educa tiona 1 resources are likely to remain in short supply, it may be 
preferable to cease to support those parts of the public educational system 
that are held to be responsible for providing an exclusively vocational 
education and this would mean, for example much further education and M.S.C. 
provision like the Y. T.S. etc., - and to move resources in the direction of the 
nursery, primary a nd secondary sectors whose aims might be more widely 
concei ved than merely having a narrow emphasis on vocationalism. It is much 
more reasonable to maintain, as M. Warnock 23 has argued, that education 
should be concerned both with a preparation for working life generally and 
with learning something about the ways in which different groups of people 
choose to Ii vee No-one totally shapes the society 0 f which they are a part, 
any more than anyone totally fits into it like a piece in a jigsaw puzzle. 
f G d 'hermeneutics IS that it The crucial educational implication 0 a amer s 
. f tabula rasa. Instead it underlines 
challenges head-on the empiricist notIon 0 a -
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the "prejudicial" nature of all knowledge and the ways in which our 
cognitive 
prejudices are transformed through a continuous encounter with other 
prejudices. There may be no final rule or principle th t 
a governs the ways that 
our prejudices develop nor may there be any "bits" of knowledge 
waiting to 
fill up any gaps in our conceptual scheme. Further Gadamer enables and 
encourages us to account for the role tha t tradition plays in understanding and 
to criticise the idea that education is simply b a out transferring know ledge. The 
point is that knowledge is not a static piece of equipment or commodity just 
waiting to be "slotted in" to some part of our cognitive apparatus where there 
is felt to be a conceptual deficiency, any more than an educand is a static 
commodity just waiting to be slotted into an economic deficiency. Instead to 
come to know something is to have engaged in conversations in which one's 
prejudices have been transformed; as a result of such encounters and 
engagements one both acts and speaks differently. 
Gadamer's notion of the mediation between text and interpreter can be seen as 
a dialogue in vol ving equality and active reciprocity with 'prejudice' on both 
sides being discarded, as in a conversation between learners and teacher. Just 
as with a text that is interpreted, so a conversation is about something to 
which con tr ibutors direct their attention. The contributors do not, according to 
Gadamer, concentrate on each other's personality; rather they attempt to make 
each other's attempts at communication their own. It is imagination that 
enables the contributors to see what is questionable in the subjects of their 
conversation and to go beyond their original horizons in a process of enquiry 
that, whilst continuing the hermeneutic circle, has in a very real sense a life 
of its own. 24 
Gadamer suggests that the phenomenology of the game may be a useful way of 
vie~ing a dialogue. Playing a game involves a wholehearted commitment to the 
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to-ing and fro-ing of the game. It involves taking a risk that frees the 
participants from their subjectivity and from the technicalities of the game. 
Similarly the contributors to a conversation do not already possess the 
language they use in any perfect or final sense. The selection of a word 
appropriate in any phase of the conversation is not made according to pre-
given rules which the speaker possesses. Rather the meaning of the word is 
situation-dependent. The selection of a word is an act that in itself involves 
an infinity 0 f P ossibili ties which intr igue the participants into investigating 
ever new language situations. 
Whereas for Winch learning new language-games involves 'socialisation' into 
those games, and whereas for the empiricist learning involves the acquisition 
of knowledge in preparation for playing language-games, for Gadamer, our 
initial language game learning provides the basis for altering and fusing those 
games with other games. If we imagine language as consisting in an ever 
changing and expanding map of overlapping language-games, then, while Winch 
seems to assume tha t we move to different parts of the map by a series of 
different socialisations and the empiricist seems to assume that knowledge 
provides an overall blueprint for action, in Gadamer's view we move through 
the map by a series of encounters which take the form of translations in 
conversa tion. 
A difficulty for Winch's case is that we can understand all sorts of things as a 
result of a conversation without actually having ever played its language 
games themselves. Winch gives his 'limiting notions' considerable work to do In 
accounting for our being able to understand something of another person's life 
without our actually being part of the same community. For Gadamer by 
contrast a statement is seen as a response to a question and every question is 
. . an answer. This is what Gadamer prompted by a further question to which It IS 
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means when he writes about th tt 
e a empt to make each oth ' er s attempts at 
communica tion one's own: 
When one enters into dialogue with another pers d h' , 
1 f th b h d " on an t en IS carried a ong ur er y t e lalogue It is no longer th 'II f " , 
h ld ' , ' e Wi 0 the mdIvldual person, 0 lng Itself back or exposing itself that' d " 
R h h 1 ' ,IS etermmatlve. at er t e aw of the subject-matter is at issue i'n th d' 1 
I, , e la ogue and tha t e IcttS statements and countersta tements and in the end 1 h ' 
each other. L) pays t em mto 
Gadamer's insistence on the importance of prejudice and his refusal to establish 
demarcation criteria for good 'prejudices' may be seen by some theorists of the 
objectivist persuasion to lead to relativism. After all, it might be argued, if 
learning is supposed to involve learners in conversation, how are they supposed 
to know what is right? We may respond that learners are not prisoners within 
their prejudicial frameworks which they have adopted by uncritical adherence 
to some authority, whether that authority is the authority of tradition as 
presented in textbooks and so on or the supposed authority of someone in 
power, like that of a teacher. Instead learners are constantly modifying their 
prejudicial frameworks with every hermeneutic encounter, not just those that 
take place while at school. The more that learners risk their prejudices, the 
more likely it is that their frameworks will change. 
Even gIven the provisional nature of our adherence to authority - and despite 
the fact that our acceptance of authority may become associated in some 
'd 'h b d' l'n pOsl'tl'ons of power - Gadamer still seeks to mm s WIt 0 e lence to persons 
rid the notion of authority of what he considers to be its post-Enlightenment 
h d ' , t' b tween faith in authority pejorative overtones. For Gadamer t e Istmc Ion e 
and the use 0 f reason has led some people to an erroneous belief that there is 
a distinction and a choice between either author ity or reason; but just as 
is it a source of truth. Authority is a 
authority is a source of prejudice so too 
recognition of superior knowledge. While 
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it is true that it is persons that have auth " 
persons is based ultimately not on the b" on~y .•. the authority of 
su Jectlon and bd" " 
reason, but on recognition of knowled k a lcatlOn of 
other is superior to oneself in jUdgem!~t - dn~wI~dge, namely, that the 
his judgement takes precedence. 26 an insIght and for this reason 
The validity of our claims to knowledge demands that one should gIve 
cognitive respect to the person in authority but thel"r authority may be 
validated by other impersonal means, that lOS, by d groun s based on reason. The 
recognition of authority in discourse serves as a device further to enable 
understanding. It is not as if every problematicised knowledge claim has to be 
discursively validated; it can simply be accepted on the strength of the 
authority. Nor is it that a person is accepted as an authority across all fields 
of discourse; it is simply that authority, like prejudice, can be enabling. 
This reinforces my earlier point about the interest-relativity of forms of 
explanation. 27 Sometimes an appeal to authority is all that is required to 
explain or justify a course of action but these appeals can only be effective if 
personal authority is recognised and not imposed. Such a recognition has 
implications both for the role of the teacher and for the role of the manager. 
Most teachers are well aware that their effectiveness depends upon their 
students having a respect for their authority and that might be why they may 
take great care in preparing the first few encounters with a class in order to 
establish the authority tha t they hope will sustain them through any 
subsequent mistakes they might make. I suggest that the talk of establishing 
good relationships in the classroom is a way of referring to problems to be 
solved on the way to securing recognition of the teacher's authority. 
The writers of "distance learning" materials are faced with the problem of 
establishing a respect for the authority of their writing without any personal 
" capable of achieving 
contact with their readers. Of course some Writers are 
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this easily. However it remains to b h 
e seen ow many teachers can turn their 
hand successfully to this type 0 fit t' 
ns ruc lon, and authority relationship, if the 
move to distance learning and modular instruction were to continue to gain 
momentum, pushed along as it might be by the effect of economic 
considera tions. 
There is a further educational implication of Gadamer's discussion of the 
nature of authority. This is the one concerned with the authority of those who 
are paid to manage teachers in accordance with the kind of promotion 
structure tha t was discussed ear lier in connection with the Main report. 28 For 
Gadamer authority can only be recognised and not imposed - and that means 
recognised by those whose actions are in some sense circumscribed by the 
author ity. In other words, instead 0 f having a promotion procedure that is 
"top-down", in the sense that someone is appointed by people who occupy 
positions above the applicant in the promotion structure, on Gadamer's view it 
is people "below" these higher managerial levels who should have a much 
greater say in promotion procedures based on the authority that they 
recognise. 29 
It seems obvious that some centralisation of decision-making in education is 
both inevitable and necessary. However just because someone's authority IS 
recognised over a period of time is no reason to suppose that they will remam 
in authority for ever nor that their authority is based on any thing other than 
the respect of their colleagues. Instead there would be much to be said in 
favour of fixed -term appointments, the termination of which would not be seen 
of fal·lure on the part of the incumbent but as a consequence of some sort 
rather as a normal part of the way in which a community of educational 
. _ a kind of institutionalised dynamism of practitioners goes about its busIness 
authority transference and easement of change. 
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Much of the strong feeling that has recently been directed 
against proposals 
to strengthen the management of educational institut' 30 IOns may be seen to 
have resulted from teachers perceiving an asymmetry b t h ' 
e ween t eir own 
struggle to establish their authority with their students and the apparent lack 
of question with which they are supposed to accept the authority of others. 
There may be a mismatch between the democracy of the classroom and a 
management structure that is perceived to be anti-democratic and this may be 
compounded by the difficulty 0 f recognising those people who are likely to 
command respect from their colleagues over a period of time. In this respect 
teachers are in a very difficult position for not only do bad appointments 
often lead to bad decisions that may set up inadequate organisation and so 
make it even more difficult for teachers to establish their own authority, but 
teachers might be unable to do much about ameliorating such procedures other 
than continuing to do those things that might enable them to gain promotion, 
the gaining of which might not necessarily improve the authority they can 
hope to command from other unpromoted teachers. 
Gadamer suggests an explanation as to how this problem might have arisen. His 
suggestion depends upon the reinstatement of two other pre-Enlightenment 
notions: phronesis which is wisdom as to conduct and praxis which is practical 
knowledge of how to Ii vee 31 According to Gadamer praxis has become 
deformed into techne which is merely a skill or technique that can be learned 
and forgotten. He argues that, by risking our own post-Enlightenment 
, , ' f tical knowledge has become preJudIces, we come to see how the notion 0 prac 
equated with the means part of instrumental rationality. Just as we have come 
f hronesis in which we relate a to view application as a subsequent part 0 .L.P ___ -
, h e come to view praxis as a pre-gi ven uni versal to a particular, so too we av 
wh ich we uncritically apply a scientific maxim subsequent part of episteme In 
to a technical si tua tion. 
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Instead, Gadamer maintains, both praxis and t h 
- ec ne proceed in a dialectical 
relationship. This involves a const t d" 
an me Iation between knowledge and 
application; yet praxis involves the notion of some 'good' end _ it is 
teleological. While praxis has the dimension of a science in that it deals with 
some regularities, it is only achieved in its I' , 
app IcatlOn. The characteristics of 
praxis also hold true for hermeneutics By reflecting upon th 'b'l" f 
. e POSSI I ltles 0 
interpretation and understanding, understanding itself is enhanced. Gadamer 
draws the analogy as follows: 
understanding, like action always remains a risk and never leaves room 
for. the simple applicatio~ ~f a general knowledge ... understandin~ (like 
actIon) means a growth In Inner awareness of future possibilities. ~j2 
Gadamer's hermeneutics involves a mediation of past and future horizons that 
is rooted in the experiences we have in the world. Hence hermeneutics is 
practical philosophy and its chief task is to 
correct the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of 
scientific method and of the anonymous authority of the sciences and it 
vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen - decision-making 
according to ~ne's own responsibility - instead of conceding that task to 
the expert. 3 
It follows from any acceptance of Gadamer's account by educators that debate 
about what to do in educational institutions must become a much more open 
process in which the notion of different groups of practitioners being 
circumscribed by different sorts of objectives is rejected in favour of the 
notion that the forms of discourse typical in education involve both evaluative 
and descriptive components and that these evolve according to the ways in 
which those forms of discourse interact. Since the Enlightenment, however, the 
'theory guiding practice' idea has become so pervasive that some imagine that 
all practices are guided by our pre-existing epistemic and/or axiologic 
concerns and tha t all practice needs to be "managed" similar ly in the light of 
Only this supposed distinction them. If we follow Gadamer we may give up not 
1 t hose distinctions purported between normative and empirical theory but a so 
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to subsist between theoretical and practical knowledge 
and between manager 
and teacher. Instead we have a different starting point .. 
theory and practice 
are fused within linguistic practices that are the I 
, mse ves constantly being 
transformed. The only problem is that Gadamer does t 
no suggest how one 
transforma tion is to be preferred to another· but he doe t 
, s no seem to see this 
as a problem, being content merely to argue that the pre-Enlightenment uses 
of certain terms are to be preferred. The nearest that he gets to a 
clarification and solution of this issue is to be found in his account of how it 
is that we judge works of art. 
For Gadamer, in so far as our attention is engaged by a work 0 f art, there IS 
an interaction between spectator and work that is essential to the 
completeness of the work. It may be objected that if there is no one meaning 
or correct interpretation of a work of art and if art appreciation involves an 
individual encounter between person and work of art, then it looks as if we 
are caught up in a sophisticated form of evaluative relativism. However 
Gadamer a voids this conclusion by drawing an analogy between the 
performance of a piece of music and our appreciating the plastic arts. 
In order to perform a piece of musIC the performers must understand and 
interpret the score; similarly a sculpture needs to be interpreted. Now we 
often have no difficulty in judging good or bad performances, so why, asks 
Gadamer rhetorically, should we have any difficulty with judging works of art 
in general? If we are inclined to the view that objective judgement always 
involves an infallible algorithm or universal acclaim, then we shall be 
disappointed with Gadamer's explanation. However this disappointment can be 
a voided if we recognise that understanding 
. . t being of meaning, in which the 
is part of the process of the commg l~fo art and those of eV4erything else 
significance 0 f all sta tement~ - those j 
tha t has been transmitted - IS formal and made complete. 
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For the objectivist however, this move IS 
not acceptable. The problem is that 
Gadamer seems to take language itself "th . 
as e gIven" and to rely on a form of 
'decisionism' as the ultimate arbiter of 1· .. 
mgulstlc practice transformation. That 
is to say, ultimately we just act, decide or prefer some transformations as 
opposed to others, and we go as far as we can in justifying those preferences 
- the content of our justifications depending upon the context in which a 
justification is required. Gadamer does not seem to take account of the fact 
that power relations often operate in such a way as to deform language and 
hence deform the way s in which linguistic practices are transformed. This IS 
the main criticism tha t Habermas directs against Gadamer. I discuss this 
criticism and some other aspects of Habermas's work in the next chapter. 
Gadamer seems to be a ware that linguistic practices can easily degenerate into 
manipulative cleverness without a living shared acceptance of ethical principles 
and norms. 35 But as Bernstein points out; 
we are [presently] in a state of great confusion and uncertainty ... about 
what norms or "universals" ought to govern our practical lives. Gadamer 
[does not] confront a crucial question - the question of what material, 
social and political co~ditions need ~o ?e con~r~tely r~l!ised in order to 
encourage the flourishIng of phronesls In all cItIzens? 
In one sense, Gadamer confronts this question by accounting for the way that 
reason functions within tradition: within tradition prejudices are actually 
enabling. "Prejudices" can be seen as a way of linking the theoretical with the 
practical. For if we cannot understand something the answer may be to change 
ourselves. Wittgenstein's advice may be apposite. 
. life IS to live m a way that The way to solve the proble~ y~u see In 37 
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CHAPTER 7 
CRITICAL THEORY 
We have seen that the idea of continuous discursive critigue lies at the heart 
of Gadamer's hermeneutics. However Gadamer'S thesis rules out the possibility 
of our going beyond a 'fusion of horizons' in the attempt to frame a critique 
of social institutions that might serve to check or even render otiose the sort 
of unconstrained discourse required by a purely hermeneutic account of social 
theory. Habermas has taken issue with this and other aspects of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics and IS now working out a view of social theory that aims to 
deepen the meaning of 'critical' embodied in the hermeneutic ideal of "critical 
self understanding". There is much in common however between the work of 
Gadamer and Habermas and their differences have served not only to publicise 
their work but also have given rise to a long-running debate. In this chapter I 
give an account of this debate, together with an appraisal of Habermas's 
philosophy and some of the theoretical underpinnings of a tradition of 
educa tiona I action research that claims to be derived from it. I conclude with 
an attempt to show that Habermas's consensus theory of truth may serve as a 
regula ti ve ideal to which all theorists aspire. This attempt enables me to begin 
to answer the question posed in chapter I regarding the purpose of 
educa tional theory. 
Habermas's work may be divided, broadly speaking, into two phases. The first 
resulted in the publication of his Knowledge and Human Interests. The second 
2 
workl"ng out of The Theory of Communicative Action. is concerned with the 
However a dominant theme running throughout both phases of his work 
concerns the inadequacy of those approaches to institutional organisation that 
3 " t h t empirical science is considered to be 
he calls "scientistic", In the sense a 
co-extensive with knowledge of persons and society. 
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Habermas's critique of 'Scientism' 
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas attempts to show that there 
three categories of knowledge guided by three separate Interests. The 
are 
generation of technically exploitable knowledge is the interest that guides the 
empirical/analytic sciences. Even though Habermas 
wrote Knowledge and Human 
Interests without the benefit of the insights of post-empiricist philosophy of 
science, he realised that the activity of the empirical/analytic sciences 
presupposes an in vestiga ting community that sustains itself through 
communicative action which cannot be reduced to instrumental action. Hence 
Habermas proposes a second category of knowledge: the historical hermeneutic 
sciences are governed by a practical interest in maintaining reliable 
intersubjectivity of understanding. 
In the second phase of Habermas's work these categories of knowledge are 
broadened into the categories of "system" and "lifeworld". "Systems rationality" 
is means-ends rationality with systems theory taking on the role of 
determining efficiency of means, while "lifeworld rationality" has the aim of 
maintaining understanding. According to Habermas: 
Subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the 
horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is formed from more or less 
diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions .... The lifeworld 
also stores the interpretive work of previous generations. It is. the . 
conservative counterweight to the risk of disagreement that. arl.ses wIth 
every actual process of reaching understanding; f?r communlcat~v.e actors 
can achieve an understandinQ only by way of takmg yes/no posItIons on 
cr i ticisable validity claims. 
Habermas diagnoses one of the problems of modern times as the increasing 
"colonisation of the lifeworld" by systematic rationalisation processes. This 
diagnosis is another way of saying, like Gadamer, that since the times of the 
Enlightenment there has been a growing conflation of the practical with the 
technical. As a result, the administration of society has become increasingly 
scientistic with the result tha t: 
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n? .attempt at all is made to attain a rational 
cItIzens concerned with the practical control o~ons~nsus o~ the part of 
is taken by the a ttempt to attain technic I theIr destmy. Its place 
f . h . . a control of history b per ecting t e admInIstration of society an a tt h" Y 
impractical as it IS unhistor ical. 5 ' empt tat IS Just as 
Habermas concludes: 
the empir.ical, analytical sciences produce technical 
th f h 6 recommendation, but ey urniS no answers to practical questions. 
Gadamer would agree with this conclusion. However as Giddens notes In 
criticism of Gadamer, there is 
a necessity. - of a~alysing social conduct iQ terms which go beyond those 
of actors sltuated In particular traditions, I 
Habermas seeks to rectify this alleged deficiency by proposing a third category 
of knowledge which he calls "critical theory" that is guided by an 
emancipatory interest in freeing practitioners from the ideological constraints 
that their language places on them. Critical theory also serves as a way of 
systematically reflecting upon both empirical and hermeneutic theory in order 
to mediate between the two. (though that presupposes they are still distinct) 
Therefore the meaning of 'critical' takes on an additional dimension to the one 
employed by Gadamer. Not only does 'critical' imply the sort of continuous 
self-understanding implied by the hermeneutical circle nor is it sufficient, 
Habermas believes, to "reinstate" previously held notions like praxis. Instead 
Habermas wants a "depth hermeneutics" 8 to transcend the actor's conversation 
and to re-orient the power relations that distort the language that 
conversational partners use. For Habermas, 
Language is also ~ medium of domi~ation and social force .•. Language IS 
also ideological. (original emphasIs) 
Habermas looks to psychoanalysis to provide the model for the systematic 
reflection on language required by critical theory. As in psychoanalysis, where 
b reconstructed and brought out into repressed motives and private needs can e 
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the open In order to present a coherent narrative wh' h b 
, IC can e verified by 
the patient and which can result in the elimination f th d' , 
o e IstortlOns which 
the repressed motives and privatised needs have caused 
, so too critical theory 
seeks to reconstruct and bring into the open the events that take place and 
the process by which our ideology becomes distorted and to pr t h 
esen a co erent 
narrative which results in the elimination of the distortions of which our 
language makes us bearers. In some ways psychoanalytic constructions are like 
hermeneutic accounts, in that interpretation must take the form of a 
translation into the lifeworld of the patient; but in other ways psychoanalytic 
constructions function as causal hypotheses, which can be corroborated only by 
the continuation of the patient's self-formation. That is to say, the patient's 
acceptance or denial of the construction is not sufficient in itself as decisive 
confirmation or falsification of the psychological construction. 
There are however difficulties with the psychoanalytic/critical theory analogy. 
As Habermas himself points out, a precondition of the success of 
psychoanalysis is the patient's own desire to be helped, whereas critical theory 
is meant to reach people precisely because their distortions make them unable 
to see tha t they are suffering and need help. Furthermore psychoanalysis 
sometimes involves temporarily prolonging a patient's suffering. It is hard to 
see how a critical theorist could prolong the suffering of some social group 
without having an institutionalised power to do so! 
So Habermas maintains that free open communication, which is the aIm of the 
materI'al necessI'ties, which are the products of the hermeneutic sciences, and 
d b supplemented by a reor ientation of empirical/analytic sciences, nee to e 
power relationships, that will be brought about by the emancipating interest of 
critical theory. It is 
character of both a 
because critical reflection undermines the dogmatic 
wor ld and a form of life that knowing and acting are 
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fused. However "the emancipating interest in knowledge has a derivative 
status" 10 and this is supposed t I 
o resu t in practical engagement. But it IS not 
clear how Habermas relates the idea of reflection to th t f " 
a 0 practIcal 
engagement. It seems as if Habermas's notion of critical theory, which seeks to 
unite theory and practice, might only serve to split the two into either 
reflection or reconstruction. In this connection it is interesting to recall 
Habermas's accusation tha t Gadamer absolutises language and tradition. 
A structure ?f prejudices that has been rendered transparent can no 
lon~er functIon as a prejudice. But this is precisely what Gadamer seeks 
to Ir:n~ly •... ~adamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudice certified by 
tradItIon denIes the power of reflection ... language is a metainstitution 
on which all social institutions are dependent ... Hermeneutic experience 
... changes into the critique 0 f ideology. 11 
In his reply Gadamer 12 points out that criticism is necessarily partial and is 
itself made on the basis of taken-for-granted-presuppositions. Reflection is no 
less historically-situated and context-dependent than other modes of thought. 
Furthermore Gadamer rejects the view that language is one dimension of social 
life among others that has to be explained within a more comprehensive 
framework that includes labour and power. For Gadamer labour and power are 
part of the same form of life that presupposes a linguistiC community. 
"Nothing is excepted from this community, no experience of the world 
whatever." 13 Thus economic, material and social factors are themselves 
linguistically mediated and the attempt by Habermas to set aside critique of 
ideology apart from the hermeneutic circle is impossible. 
absolutise hermeneuticS into a denial of Similarly Gadamer does not want to 
the necessity 0 f empirical science. 
" r" f modern science has Nobody would deny that practIcal app IcatIon 0 1 14 
fundamentally altered our world, and therewith also our anguage. 
h d ot mean "that the But the point is that our language also changes. T at oes n 
conscI" ousness claims to determine all the material linguistically articulated 
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, f l'f ' 15 
bemg 0 1 e-practlce". It does mean though that reality "comes about" and 
is only percei ved, articulated and appraised within language. 
Even though the 
language games of science seem rarefied, they must "remain related to the 
metalanguage presented in the mother tong " 16 Th' 
ue • IS takes us back to the 
importance of hermeneutics in helping us to understand the language games of 
science, not in isolation but against a background of connections with other 
aspects 0 f our form 0 f Ii fee 
For Gadamer hermeneutic reflection on the presuppositions and limits of 
science is essential to our ability to avoid the methodical alienation which has 
resulted in the deformation of praxis in favour of a functionalism that directs, 
from the 'outside', the life 0 f each individual and community. It is n ot that 
Gadamer seeks to reify tradition; rather, he believes, it is through encounters 
with tradition that ideological distortion can be recognised. 
Habermas's appropriation of psychoanalysis as an analogy seems to rest on the 
assumption that the analyst has some special insight not accessible to the 
analysee, whereas Gadamer considers that the critic of ideology assumes a 
superiority for his insight that he cannot justify: 
the very ideal of reason forbids fny one to claim for himself the correct 
insight into another'S delusion. 1 
For Gadamer, the analogy between psychoanalytical and sociological theory 
breaks down because of the impossibility of distinguishing between professional 
and communal relationships. 
, ' d d th social partnership in its Where does the patient-relationshlp en an e 'h t If 
, 'M f dentally· over agaInst w a se -unprofessional rIght begIn? ost un am . "h) is it 
interpretation of the social consciousness {and all moradhtYhiS s~c 't 
, . d h t ciousness - an w en IS 1 in place not to enqulre behln t a cons 
not? 18 (or iginal emphasis) 
is the object of our hermeneutic The point is that normally the unconscious 
b d 's probed in hermeneutic concern and, while the unconscious can e an 1 
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encounters and while the power of reflection seems critically to examine our 
unconscious presuppositions, that is no reason to su h ppose t at an analyst has 
any 'correct' or 'final' or unique insight into our individual consciousness or, as 
Habermas seems to suppose, our 'collective' conscious appropriation of forms of 
language that serve to conceal our 'true' or 'real' interests. It is not just when 
we see through pretexts or false pretences that we can be said to understand. 
Nor can we be said to understand only when we act in an enlightened way. 
Habermas attempts to answer these criticisms 10 his Theory of Communicative 
Competence. 19 In this he attempts to give a rational reconstruction of the 
universal conditions of reason. The theory is outlined below: communicative 
action, which includes speech as well as non -verbal communication, requires a 
background consensus that meets four claims: utterances must be intelligible, 
the propositional content true, the performative component correct, and the 
acting subject sincere. Whilst the satisfaction of each of these conditions can 
be problematic, they can be redeemed in "discourse". 
In discourse the 'force' of the argument is the only permissible 
compulsion :.. discourses do not compel th~~ participants to act 
discourses produce nothing but arguments 
The aIm of discourse is to distinguish the challenged consensus from a rational 
consensus, one that is attained when argument alone prevails. This distinction 
does not appear to help us distinguish between distorted and undistorted 
and dl'scourse are inevitably interwoven. However communication, since action 
Habermas supposes that 
, ' ' cessarily implied in the 
the design of an ideal speech ~ltuatlOn IS neh even intentional deception 
structure of political sp~ech, SInce ~ll ;~~e~d' a can only be analysed 
is oriented towards the Idea of, trudt., IS 1 s;rained and universal 
with regard to a consensus achIeve 10 unre 
d ' 21 Iscourse. 
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Habermas anns to show that implicit in speech is the 
normative foundation of 
what discourse requires - tha t is, genuine symmetry between and among 
speech-partners, where no form of domination exists d 
an argument alone 
prevails. In this respect Habermas seems to accept th t th "d I a e 1 ea speech 
situation exists as a counter factual only That is to say H b d 
• , a ermas oes not 
suppose that such situations could ever be realised. Nevertheless he argues 
that we may always imagine the situation in which a group of people discuss 
what they should do with no concern other than that of coming to an 
agreement on the basis of argument alone and not on the basis of coercion , 
manipulative cleverness or personal preference. Consequently he argues that we 
may always answer the question: 
How would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the 
development of productive forces have collectively and bindingly 
interpreted their needs ... if they could and would have decided on the 
organisation of social intercourse through discursive will-formation. 22 
Our answer to this question enables us to select one interpretation of a social 
development in preference to others for the correct interpretation is the one 
given in our answer. The normative foundation of critical theory rests on the 
possibility that the ideal speech situation is inherent in the structure of social 
action which critical theory seeks to analyse. Hence anyone who participates 
in rational discourse cannot argue that non-discursive standards of rationality 
are just as good as their own. As McCarthy points out in connection with 
Winch, "at most Winch could silently join the Azande and become as they 
are". 23 However this argument does not show that discursive rationality is 
universal. To show this Habermas has to attempt to show that the ability to 
reason argumentatively and reflectively about truth is a species-wide 
competence. 
Habermas hopes to fulfil this task by drawing on the developmental theories of 
d elucidate the logic of different Kohlberg, Piaget and Chomsky, in or er to 
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types of discourse and elicit a system of formal qualifications which all 
competent speakers must possess. Such an elucidation should provide him with 
explicit theoretical knowledge (knowing that) of implicit pre-theoretical 
practical knowledge (knowing how) through what he calls a "reconstructive 
, ,,24 A " t t' , , SCIence • recons ruc I ve SCIence" IS an attempt to provide the 
foundations of the emancipatory critique presupposed by his previous work. The 
"pay-off", as Bernstein puts it, of having such foundations is that we can 
avoid the continued deformation of the lifeworld by systemic considerations. As 
Bernstein goes on: 
we can explain why there has been a colonisation of the lifeworld ... We 
can not only explain, but also diagnose the "pathologies of modernity." ... 
We can even approach the study of new social movements from this 
communicative-theoretical perspective: movements such as the ecological, 
antinuclear, women's, and liberation movements ... They can be seen (even 
when misguided) as defensive reactions to preserve the integrity of the 
communicative structures of the life-wor ld against the impingements and 
dis:orti~ns ,impo~~d upon it by the processes of systemic 
ratlonalisa tlon. 
However we can do all this usmg other notions such as that of the 
deformation of praxis by techne. The contention that the "reconstructive 
sciences" are empirical is little help since the recognition of falsi fica tions 15 
dependent upon the interpretations which a community chooses to make. In this 
connection, we may ask what advantages Habermas's theory offers us. While 
Habermas appropriates much of the hermeneutic insight, his attempt to justify 
that insight with the results 0 f an empirical study leads him straight back to 
the problems of accounting for the superiority of the particular community 
'b'l't for validating these "reconstructive that he charges with the responsl 1 1 Y 
sciences" . 
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The Move to Practice 
We have already noted part of the so-called "move t ' 
o practIce" within 
philosophy of education when we examined "mat '1' , 
ena 1st pragmatIsm" In 
chapter 4. Let us now examine another part of this "move" to which 
Habermas's work may be seen to contribute and Whl'ch l' , 
cu mmates In the notion 
of educational action research. For some time many philosophers of education 
have doubted the profitability of elucidating the nature of educational theory. 
Lloyd for example would like to 
encourage a. little scepticism towards the view that we need a theory of 
educa tion, :L6 
Instead he suggests that 
thinking wh~1ft being engaged m teaching IS more likely to be 
beneficial. 
However it is not difficult to see tha t Lloyd's suggestion confuses two senses 
of theory. No one would deny that thinking about teaching is likely to be 
beneficial but to imagine tha t teachers thinking about teaching is a substitute 
for having some idea of the way tha t all the contributions to the educational 
enterprise might cohere and give direction to the enterprise is absurd. Lloyd is 
so concerned to refute the notion that educational theory is a particular blend 
of psychology, sociology and philosophy, as it was until relatively recently 
administered in some Colleges and Departments of Education, that he elevates 
excessively the primacy of what he calls "reflection on experience". 28 
John Wilson too is among those who doubt the need for any extended account 
of educational theory. By 1975 there had been an adverse reaction to what I 
ear lier referred to as the "immersing teachers in theory" account of 
educa tiona! theory and Wilson's Educational Theory and the Preparation o} 
Teachers 29 cast doubts on the benefits of theory and indeed on the question 
11 R tI in a review enti tied "Do of whether educational theory existed at a. ecen y 
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we need educational theory?" 30, Wilson suggests that: "anything properly 
called 'educational theory' is a non-starter". 31 
A more modest, and philosophically more convincl'ng move to assert the 
primacy of practice has been made by Pring. He suggests that it is misleading 
to look a t questions like 
In wh~t sense can practical decisions be based on empirical evidence and 
value Judgements? •.• Instead [he claims] a more useful approach would 
be through an analysj~ of action and the conceptual connection between 
action and thought. 
and goes on to argue 
that educational practice embraces an indefinite range of activities but 
tha t the characterisation of anyone activity requires reference to 'the 
intention and thereby to the thought of the agent, and thus to a 
con~eptual framework that might or might not be called theory depending 
on It~ level of reflection an,d articulation. To attempt to thjnk of 
practIce apart from theory IS to create an unreal dualism. 3 
In other words theory and practice are coextensive and the justification for 
practice depends upon reference to the theory or conceptual framework within 
which the practice is to be identified. According to this argument intelligent 
practice involves "some logical analysis of the theoretical framework within 
which one is acting." 34 Philosophy is presumed by Pring to be concerned with 
this logical analysis, and so as a result of philosophy 
one sees one's intention'S differently or, rather, that one has different 
intentions. One has as jt were, remapped the geography of the area in 
which one is acting. 3) 
w. Carr 36 takes up Pring's account of theory and suggests that, while in 
general theory guides practice, only appropriate theory guides educational 
practice. For Carr there is a gap between theory and practice in education 
when it is assumed that the theoretical practices of psychology, sociology and 
'd educatl'onal practl'ce, whereas he supposes, it is the 
other disciplines gUl e 
schemes of practitioners that guide their practice theories or conceptual 
, ,,37 
"rather than the theory guiding any theoretical practIce. 
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Carr is correct to denigrate the idea that ed· . 
ucatl0nal practIce IS parasitic 
upon the "disciplines". However to equate theory . h 
Wit the beliefs, values and 
assumptions implicit in the theoretical f 
ramework acquired by practitioners 
through precedent, habit and tradition is one thing, to equate theory with the 
emancipation 0 f practitioners from their dependence on s h h . uc a t eoretlcal 
f k 38· . 
ramewor IS qUIte another. Having got a purchase on the notion of theory 
by linking it with the notion of a 'conceptual scheme', Carr develops his ideas 
further by linking theor ising with the 'action research' tradition by 
appropriating much of Habermas's work. 
Action Research 
In Educational Research: The State of the Art 39 J. Nisbet attempted to 
review the present state of educational research in Britain. He distinguishes 
three "traditions" in educational research. First he refers to the familiar 
empiricist tradition of educational research which as I earlier argued is still 
the dominant tradition, whether in the form of experiment, exploratory survey 
or curriculum development. However, as Nisbet points out, educational 
researchers have not been insensitive to the "protest against the scientific 
detachment of traditional psychological and psychometr ic studies" 40 and as a 
result a second tradition - that of the interpretive, open-ended inquiry - has 
been adopted by some researchers. According to this tradition: 
Grounded theory is built up from observation, not imposed 2: prior~ ...• 
theory is yrounded in the everyday life of the people who are be10g 
studied. 4-
Consequently the researcher must become involved with and be accepted by 
the community being studied. However the extent to which a researcher can 
become a full participant in a community being researched, when his 
introduction into and departure from that community are planned 10 advance, 
is a highly contentious issue, particular ly when the intention behind his 
of t he community. involvement is unconnected with the common concerns 
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The third tradition of 'action research' brings 
research and innovation together, 
so that practice becomes the beginning and end of research. Klafki 42 
characterises 'action research' as follows: 
(1) it is educational practice that is the starting pOI"nt for the problems the 
action research a ttempts to solve. 
(2) Educational action research takes place in direct cooperation with the 
educa tional practice that the research seeks to serve. Research and practice 
develop coextensively so that the nature of the research problem evolves as 
research and practice proceed. 
(3) The distinction between researcher and practitioner is dissolved in an 
action research project. All participants have equal access to the decision-
making arena and the "discourse" 43 that ensues may itself be the major 
product of the research. 
It is not clear however how if at all 'action research' differs from what we 
have traditionally understood as development work. 44 Nor is it clear how 
some forms of traditional empirical research differ from 'action research' 
except that, as it has been traditionally conceived, educational research 
precedes theory precedes action, whereas all three in an 'action research' 
project are mutually interacting. A further difficulty for 'action researchers' IS 
the extent to which practitioners and researchers can engage in the sort of 
equal partnership and "liberation from compulsion to act" that is supposed to 
characterise such a "discourse". 45 Finally, as Nisbet remarks, 
The tension exists between the two concepts, action and re~earch: action 
has all the popular qualities - commitment, involvement, bel"le~, 
enthusiasm; the qualities needed for rese~r~h h\v6e a more limIted appeal 
- detachment, suspension of belief, scepticIsm. 
O " I" C d Kemml"s 47 have recently attempted to espite these diffiCU tIes arr an 
promote 'action research', as a development of Carr's earlier work which 
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suggested tha t educational theor ising might be Cd' 
oncerne wIth the 
emancipation of practitioners from habit and cust C 
om. arr and Kemmis consider 
that educational problems arise because d ' 
e ucatlonal practice is in various ways 
often inadequate to its purposes: 
They arise, in other words when there is some discrepancy between an 
educational pract4ce and the expectation in terms of which the practice 
was undertaken. .~ 
They argue that practitioners h ave a "theoretical framework" that explains and 
guides their practices and that educational problems arise as a result of the 
operation of inadequate frameworks. Since they conceive 'theory' as the 
pragmatic response to educational problems then they assert that it is the 
practitioners' own frameworks that need to be investigated by the practitioners 
themselves - and for Carr and Kemmis, that means that teachers need 
critically to appraise their own practice. Carr and Kemmis therefore reject the 
scientific conception of educational research as "not really concerned with 
educa tional problems at all." 49 Additionally the interpretive approach: 
•.. by refusing to recognise any evaluative criteria for assessing teachers' 
own interpretations and by failing to provide alternative explanations 
against which their existing interpretations can be judged, an interpretive 
approach to educational rese~rch excludes any concern with resolving 
educa tional problems at all. 0 
I think that Carr and Kemmis overstate their opposition to the 'scientific' and 
'interpretive' conceptions of educational research here and in so-doing, 
misappropriate some of Habermas's work. They dismiss both nomological and 
" h d t' I theory can only be critical interpretIve research and suggest t at e uca Iona 
theory, in the very limited sense 0 f its being a product of action research. 
Yet Habermas does not elevate critical theory above nomological and 
, 'h to that extent·, for him all three are important. It seems Interpretl ve t eory 
attempt t o interpret an educational practice (e.g. absurd to suggest that any 
"bl f a certain course of 
the attempt to find out how many children are ehgl e or 
study) is "not really concerned with educational problems". 
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Instead Carr and Kemmis require ed t' 
uca lonal research to be scientific 51 In 
the sense tha t it 
ema~c~pates teachers from their dependence on' .. 
provIdIng them with the skills and resources tha~ab~t and tradltlOn by 
reflect upon and examine critically the inade u . wIll en~ble them to 
conceptions of educational practice. 52 q aCles of dIfferent 
From this Carr and Kemmis elicit five defining cha t . . rac er IstlCS of educational 
theory conceived in this way. These may be summarised as follows: 
1. Action research does not construe its object positivistically. Instead its 
object is construed as praxis. Carr and Kemmis liken praxis to Polanyi's 
notion of "personal Knowledge", which is authenticated by rational 
reflection. The reflective process is viewed as a continuous spiral with 
the actor researching his own praxis. 
2 Action research encourages equal participation and collaboration in order 
to facilitate the achievement of an objective. So-called "outsiders" are 
not part of the research process, since they have no access to the 
practitioner's own meanings and may also distort the balance of equal 
participation. In a reference to the account of action research that 
Nisbet 53 outlines, Carr and Kemmis lament: 
wha t passes for action research today is not action research at all, 
but merely a species of field experimentation or applied research 
carried out by academic or service researchers who co-opt 
practit~oners into gathering data about educational problems for 
them. 4 
When this happens the outcomes are often technical rather than 
emancipating or practical. 
3. Action research should involve methodical reflection in order to enable 
practitioners to distinguish between ideologically distorted interpretations 
and correct interpretations. Action researchers therefore need freedom of 
discourse in order to "redeem validity claims". They need open 
I experl' ences in order to engage in the communication gained in actua 
resolution of tactics and the conduct of 





The above requirements 
with the existing social 
lead action researchers to identify 
what is wrong 
those aspects of it that order and particular ly 
frustrate their researches. Action researchers 
intervene critically in all patterns of t" " 
communi ties and isolate indi viduals ~~ "IOn" WhICh fragment 
the basis of social solidarity. 56 .•. IS VIew of collaboration IS 
Even though action research is directed by " practIce, it must "relentlessly" 
pursue all aspects of irrationality inJ"ustice and d " " 
, omma tIOn and not rest 
content with small changes which merely "anchor the conditions of the 
status quo". 57 
I turn now to a critical appraisal of the position advanced by Carr and 
Kemmis by examining their example of the way in which a school staff might 
set about implementing a programme for action research. According to Carr 
and Kemmis, the staff should have 
constituted itself so that its discourse was rational and authentic: so 
tha t people could speak openly and freely, so that (as individuals) they 
could understand what was being said (authenticity), and so that there 
would be mutual understanding through the language used 
(communication), ~nd so that they could develop a common orientation 
towards action. 5 
To achieve this sort of constitution, however, might not be possible within the 
legal and administrative framework presently laid down for British schools to 
work within. For example, teachers are legally bound to a set of conditions of 
service that reflect and are entrenched within a hierarchical organisational 
structure. While promoted members of staff might be willing to relinquish their 
rights to certain privileges and salary differentials, they may not be able to 
relinquish their rights to pension differentials and their legal responsibilities 
for the efficient running of the school. The present legal framework may 
preclude the constitution of an 'action research' community ab initio and the 
discourse of those communities that purport to be constituted as above, in 
fact might be systematically distorted. 
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Even if these legal and administrative problems could be 
overcome, Carr and 
Kemmis recognise that 
as real decisions are taken, the self-interests of s f h 
ome 0 t e staff will 
?e served a t the expense of the ,self-interests of others, and self-
Interests O(f the staff may come into conflict with self-interests outside 
the group those of students and parents, for example) )9 
As I argued earlier, 'theory' cannot be both a conceptual framework that 
presently guides individual practitioners and the means of emanCipating those 
practitioners from their frameworks. Moreover there are other individuals 
interested in the educational enterprise, as well as teachers, and it may be 
that these other individuals need to be emancipated from their inadequate 
conceptual frameworks. By construing 'educational theory' exclusively as a 
response to the problems that teachers face, Carr and Kemmis lack any means 
of knowing just whose conceptual framework is inadequate and to what extent 
it is inadequate. It will not do to imagine that the activity of teachers 
incorporating the notions of praxis and open communication will make it 
obvious to all which problems are to be tackled first and by whom. 
Were the maIn focus 0 f a ttention for 'action research' to be classroom 
practice, then it might not matter so much that Carr and Kemmis construe 
action research as a response to the problems that teachers face. As it is, 
however, Carr and Kemmis are keen to avoid limiting the scope of action 
research in this way. 60 Yet if action researchers are to move beyond 
classroom research and to "reject all conditions which sustain irrationality, 
61 h I't follows that teachers as 'action injustice and domination" t en 
researchers' should be able to recognise when such conditions arise. However 
, of whether it is irrational that "our this conclusion begs both the questIon 
" making" 62 and 
society is not marked by participatory processes of deCISIOn 
whether 'actI'on research' provides a way of distinguishing ideas the question of 
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that are more systematically dist t d b or e y ideology from those that are less 
systematically distorted? 63 
The constitution of an 'action research' community presupposes the superiority 
of a particular form 0 f ra tionali ty based on the idea that minimum ideological 
distortion is achieved in the 'ideal speech situation'. Yet it cannot be 
uncritically assumed that a community of 'action res h' . earc ers operatmg within 
a legal and administrative 
be any more successful in 
framework that is allegedly "irrational" is going to 
approaching the 'ideal speech situation' than any 
other community tha t is interested in education. Therefore I believe that Carr 
and Kemmis make a mistake when they go on to recommend a form of teacher 
professionalism in which teachers alone are supposed to be able to make 
informed educational judgements: 
in thes~ times of increasing bureaucratic management in education, the 
professIon must organise itself to support and protect its 
professionalism. 64 
As I argued in chapters 2 and 3, the professionalisation of educational theory 
is supportive of and in the 1960's led to the entrenchment of the very 
conception of rationality tha t Carr and Kemmis reject. We may wonder whether 
the effect of professionalising educational practice within an administrative 
framework that still reflects a bureaucratic conception of rationality would 
not be further to entrench that conception of rationality. In other words, we 
may wonder whether teachers are in any better position to make informed 
educational judgements free from prejudice and outside interference than 
"professional educational theorists" employed in the Colleges and Departments 
of Education. Putting it more strongly, we may wonder whether Carr and 
Kemmis's proposal would lead to the so-called "professional judgement" of 
teachers becoming simply another device for theoretically legitimising a 
bureaucra tic conception of rationality. 
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For me, the notions of 'professionalism' and 'practical d' , " 
IscurSIve ratIOnalIty' are 
logically incompatible. Educational decision -making c b b 
annot e oth the open 
process presupposed In the notion of an 'ideal speech situation' and the closed 
process presupposed In the notion of professionalism. If teachers were to 
organise themselves in the ways that Carr and Kemmis recommend, then it IS 
not clear from what perspective or even from what source the knowledge, 
skills and abilities requisite for action research would be supplied in order 
that teachers might become action researchers. It is also unclear how a 
reconcilia tion would be achieved between the need to exclude so-called 
"outsiders", who might distort teacher discourse and the need for educational 
institutions to allow their members to participate in the wider social practices 
of communication, decision-making and collaborative action 65 that is required 
by Carr and Kemmis's appropriation of Habermas's prescriptions for a rational 
society. 66 This is the fundamental problem for Carr and Kemmis: they fail to 
show how the professionalisation of educational practice is compatible with 
practical discursive rationality and hence they fail to grasp the key question 
as to how educational theory might serve to mediate between the various 
interests that compete, in order that we should be able to decide what to do 
in educational institutions. 
Natural Science as a Model for Educational Theory 
Rorty has generalised Kuhn'S account of natural science to discuss how social 
philosophy might be concei ved if it were modelled on Kuhn's account of 
natural science. It might be helpful to examine Rorty's discussion before going 
on to examine how educational theory might appear if it too were modelled on 
67 I' K hn's account of normal and revolutionary that account. Rorty genera Ises u 
science into what he calls normal and abnormal discourse. Just as natural 
, t' 1 tension" 68 between 
science is supposed by Kuhn to depend on an 'essen Ia 
h R rty supposes that, for tradition and innovation in scientific researc ,so 0 
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conversation to remaIn open, there must be an 'essentl'al t ' 'b enSlOn etween 
tradi tiona I or "normal" discourse, in which there are accepted procedures for 
settling disagreement, and innovatory or "abnormal" discourse, where such 
procedures do not exist. Epistemology is the aim of "normal" discourse and 
hermeneutics the aim of "abnormal" discourse. On this account, the difference 
between epistemology and hermeneutics becomes simply one of familiarity. 
We will be epistemological where we understand perfectly well what is 
happening but want to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen or 
teach, or 'ground' it. We must be hermeneutical where we do not' 
understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it, rather 
than being blatantly 'Whiggish' about it. This means that we can get 
epistemological commensuration only where we have agreed upon 
practices 0 f enquiry (or, more generally, of discourse) ... We can get it 
not because we have discovered something about 'the nature of human 
knowledge' but simply because when a practice has continued long enough 
the conventions which make it possible - and which permit a consensus 
on how to divide it into parts - are relatively easy to isolate. 69 
(original emphasis) 
According to Rorty, "epistemological commensuration" is not restricted to those 
communities we call "scientific". Instead of our imagining that scientists are 
concerned with something called "objective truth", while everybody else is 
merely concerned with "subjective conditions", Rorty suggests we should see 
that to be a scientist is no more than to be someone concerned with certain 
types of problem: 
'objective truth' is no more and no less than the be~t i?ea we :u,rre~tly 
have about how to explain what is going on ... 'SUbjectlv: condltlOn!r ... 
are just the facts about what a given society, or prOfeSSI?n, or otto 
group, takes to be good grounds for assertions of a certam sort. 
Just as scientific communities agree In the language games they play, so too 
h types of community. What we know do farming, building, legal and many ot er 
t within these communities and the depends upon the networks of agreemen 
f accepting and recognising their 
contingency of meeting their members and 0 
" In Rorty's opinion, no one 
authority. That is not to advocate relatIvIsm. 
d h t Y account that 
believes that every member is equally competent an t a an 
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might be offered is as good as any other. Our inabilI'ty to justify moral claims , 
for instance, in an algorithmic way does not mean, as the 
emotivists would 
argue, that such claims can never be settled. Fairly obviously many moral 
claims are settled in ways that satisfy the claimants at the time of the claim. 
Of course those who the community recognises as having superior competence 
in the areas of discourse within which the dispute is located are more likely 
to be able to support their claims than those whose competence is inferior but 
this ability is precisely what refutes emotivism and what stops any slide into 
(moral) relativism. 
There appears to be a measure of agreement between Rorty and Gadamer here, 
in as much as Gadamer's notion of authority as the recognition of someone 
who knows can be understood as the recognition that someone is a full 
member of a 'normal' community. We do not have to be a full member of that 
community ourselves to recognise the authority nor do we have to be a full 
member of that community in order to cast doubts on its practices. However 
Rorty departs from Gadamer's position when he writes: 
It is the commonplace fact that people may develop doubts about what 
they are doing, and thereupon begin to discourse rl ways . 
incOITDleIlsurable with those they used previously. (my emphasIs) 
By USIng the term "incommensurable", Rorty seems to me to fall into Kuhn'S 
ear lier difficulty of attempting to reconcile the ideas of 'theory -preference' 
and 'revolutionary conceptual shifts'. If Rorty were to accept Kuhn's later 
resolution of this difficulty and adopt the idea of epistemology as communally 
agreed interpretation, his account of abnormal discourse might be more 
. th t bnormal discourse floats free plausible than one whIch seems to suggest a a 
of any communally agreed norms. While Rorty concedes that 
. . . n normal 
abnormal and 'existential' discourse IS always parasItiC upo .. 
t · is always paraSItiC upon ... di~course, .•• tft possibility of hermeneu ICS 
epIstemology. 
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Rorty does not develop the notion of "parasitl'c" f 
urther. If he were to 
embrace Gadamer's insight that all conversations h 
s are the characteristics of 
normal and abnormal discourse to varying degrees d d' 
, epen mg on the amount of 
conceptual innovation involved, he would be able to account for the way that 
abnormal discourse is related to normal discourse through 'family resemblances' 
that prevent hermeneutics from sliding into relativism. To put it in Gadamer's 
terms, the jettisoning of useless prejudice is made on the basis of a fusion of 
horizons. The hor izon 0 f expectation which a participant brings to an 
encounter is itself the result of the fusion of the many horizons that are 
rooted in normal discourse. 
We may regard a 'fusion of horizons' as the risking of the prejudices of normal 
discourse in order to help us come to an understanding of what each other IS 
saying. 'Risking' does not mean jettisoning them and the resultant abnormal 
discourse nevertheless has some things in common with normal discourse, for 
which accepted authorities and standards of adjudicating claims to truth exist. 
So it is the consensual norms and intersubjective meanings of the communities, 
of which the conversational partners are members, that sustain abnormal 
discourse and crucially keep the conversation going. 
The way may now be open for us to essay an account of educational theory 
that has both the characteristics of a practice and at the same time serves to 
mediate between those practices that are constitutive of the educational 
enterpr ise. I suggest that Kuhn's account of natural science may serve as a 
model here, for if it is accepted that natural science is itself constituted by a 
range of forms of discourse and that theory-preference becomes a matter of 
interpreting what the proponents of different theories are doing according to 
, . d ub-groups of natural scientists, then practIcal Interests that are share among s 
theorising about education may follow the same pattern. 
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I can now try to bring the var ious arguments that have been presented In this 
and the previous three chapters together In chapter ,. 
• '1' we saw that 
educa tional theory might be v iewed as a subset of a 11 
n overa network of 
theory that develops scientifically. In chapter 5 we saw that t 1 ' 'f' 
na ura SClentl lC 
and other types of theory development were parasitic upon each other because 
of the 'linguistic division of labour' both across communities of theorists and 
between communities of theorists. We saw also that theory-preference is 
always underdetermined by observational data and that values guide the 
choices that theorists make. However those choices are not made solely on the 
basis of a list of criteria that a community simply applies. Instead choices are 
made on the basis of interpretations within some commonly agreed temporary 
framework that binds the community together. In chapter 6 we saw that the 
distinction between practical and theoretical interest is more one of degree 
rather than kind and that even though the values that appear to guide 
educational theorists are close to our practical educational interests, there is 
no reason to suppose that educational theory might not be modelled on natural 
scientific theory. In this chapter I have discussed Habermas's notion of "the 
ideal speech situation". I believe that a further explication of this notion may 
offer the possibility of avoiding the idea that educational theory can only be 
a response to immediate practical problems and finish paving the way for 
modelling my elucidation of the nature of theorising about education on Kuhn's 
account of natural science. 
We noted that Popper's theory of truth as 'a regulative ideal to which a series 
of scientific theories approaches assymptotically' leads to the mistaken 
l'S exclusl'vely concerned with "puzzle solving" conclusion that scientific theory 
w."th."n a common framework of enquiry. If we 
- eliminating "minor anomalies" 
theory of truth based on "the ideal speech substitute Habermas's consensus 
situation" for Popper's correspondence theory of truth, we can expl.ain 
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"revolutionary" changes m science. R th a er than imagining that c onsensus In an 
"ideal speech situation" informs a series of theories, we may suggest that an 
'ideal consensus' informs each a ttempt at th " eonsmg. As Hesse puts it: 
Every theory making truth claims in a f 
includes its own 'anticipations' of the t~r /cular conceptual framework 
it is relevant to that theory. The comm~t~e~~ture of, ~he world as far as 
the commitment to abandon falsified 'f to antIcIpated consensus IS 
conceptual schemes that do not lead ~~SIC Ions, and also to abandon 
th h" onsensus. There is no last 
eory or t eOrIst In the sense tha t science stops there frozen in 
whatever conceptual scheme happens to be th 
' h d' en current. But every 
seriOUS eory an smcere theorist is 'the last" th 
where the accounta?ility in the face of ideal c~~sen~u:e~~:r:~:! ~~\\~ 
To enter ~h,e sC7)ntlfl~ ,community presupposes acceptance of that . 
accountablh ty. (origInal emphasis) 
In this way each attempt at theorising may call into question either individual 
theories or a complete framework of enquiry and so each attempt at theorising 
may lead to "revolutionary" changes. 
This explanation depends upon the assumption that an 'ideal consensus' should 
function like any other value judgement as a guide to theory-preference. 
However this assumption may be made only after an option is taken for 
practical discursive rationality rather than technical bureaucratic rationality as 
a means of organising social institutions. As Hesse notes: 
The choice of 'persons' and participatory meanings as fundamental 
concepts in the hermeneutical sciences is not a necessary choice, as is 
shown by Habermas's barely disguised fears that scientistic and impersonal 
'systems theor ies' may after all prove technically successful in organising 
post-capi talist society on a stable basis. The choice of the concept 
'person' becomes 'transcendentally necessary' only after an 09tion is taken 
for practical discursive rationality and individual humanity. Ii (original 
emphasis) 
In other words, despite the complexity of Habermas's account of critical 
theory, the only alternative to the systems-theoretic approach of the 
empiricist is a form of practical rationality based on the "ungrounded hope" 
that human life will be improved if social theorists are guided by a concern to 
secure an "ideal consensus". At the end of the first phase of his work, 
Habermas expressed this "hope" as follows: 
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on thi~ unavoidable fiction rests the humanity of intercourse f 
are st111 men. 75- 0 men who 
Even though educational theories may never be "objective" accounts of 
educational 'reality' and even though it may b not e practically possible to 
redeem the validity of every theory in "discourse", that does not mean that 
we cannot advance reasons to support particular educational theories, where 
that support is required. In this study I have tried to support the claim that 
theorising about education should be modelled on Kuhn's account of natural 
science rather than on an empiricist account of natural science. To support 
this claim further, I suggest that it is possible and profitable to speculate how 
theorising about education might be improved if the educational community 
were to emulate those features of the natural scientific community that are 
held by Kuhn, to be important in enabling natural scientists to make choices 
that are commonly regarded as propitious for our overall theoretic 
development. 
, I '" 76 For example, we migh t suggest that there should be an "essentla tensIon 
between innovation and tradition in educational research and that tradition 
should play a larger part in educational practice than might be allowed by 
h' k' ,,77, empiricists. Kuhn denigrates the idea that "divergent t m mg IS more 
important than "convergent thinking" in scientific research. He makes the 
practical point that a scientist who questioned every anomalous observation 
simply would never complete a first research project and points out that 
tradition gives stability to the evaluation of innovatory proposals. He also 
h the natural scientific community has a draws our a ttention to the fact t at 
f l'tS research problems than is the case much greater say in the selection 0 
SCl'entl'sts whose interest is primarily technical and for a community of applied 
determined without the community of whose research problems are largely 
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applied scientists. Finally Kuhn recognises the role that 
experiment plays m 
scientific research by providing "anchoring points" h' h ' on w IC to pm a 
developing network of theory, at least temporarI'ly N h'l 
. ow w I e these 
suggestions barely explain what it is about the scientific community that 
enables it to regulate itself in such a way as to anchor a developing network 
of theory in propitious ways, they do give three pointers as to how we might 
improve our theorising about education. 
First, even though theory and practice are coextensive and everybody is, to a 
different extent, both theoretically and practically inclined, that is no reason 
to doubt that there might be some advantage to be gained in instituting what 
might be called a theoretical practice, that attempts to reinterpret what was 
gomg on across a range of other practices, in the hope that such a 
reinterpretation might make for a greater perspicuity in the choices that 
educational practitioners face. The distinction between experimental and 
theoretical natural scientists may form a model here: just as the theoretical 
physicist cannot proceed for long without reference to the work of the 
experimentalist, so too we may suggest that the educational theorist could not 
proceed for long without reference to the work of the educational 
practitioner. By constantly interpreting what each other is doing the 
practitioner and theorist may share linguistic practices in order to avoid a loss 
of meaning of those terms that are of central importance to the evaluation of 
" ' " d' I'dea of a conversation serves 
rival mterpretations. On thIS VIew our or Inary 
as a guide to the importance of sustaining a conversation between those whose 
interest is predominantly 'within a practice' and those whose interest is 
, 'constituting educational institutions predominantly 'across a range of practices 
and their typical forms of discourse. 
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Second, we may make progress by placing greater emphasis on tradition in 
educational theory and practice. We may resist some innovatory curricular and 
managerial initiatives on the grounds that we do not have a stable tradition of 
educa tional discourse against h' h t I 
w lC 0 eva uate such innovations. Even though 
there may be considerable political pressure on educational theorists to 
innovate, we might be on firm ground in resisting this pressure and paying far 
more attention to achieving a consensus between educational theorist and 
practitioner regarding those innovations that command widespread support. This 
suggestion would involve changes in the way in which educational theory IS 
presently conceived in relation to policy -making and implementation. 
In order to explain this second point we may compare private and state sector 
schooling. Many parents prefer to send their children to private schools. It 
might be suggested that this is because private schools are better resourced, 
have pupils whose parents are generally more articulate than their state 
counterparts and so on. However it can also be suggested that private sector 
schools are characterised by a stability not present in the state sector. The 
private sector school seems not to have to respond to anything like the rate 
of curricular change tha t has recently faced and currently faces the state 
sector. 
It can be argued tha t the private school curriculum is basically academic and 
that changes like those towards computing or craft, design and technology can 
be planned against a fairly settled curricular background. In other words those 
who work in the private sector have a more settled form of practical 
discourse which enables them to 
is not open to the s ta te sector, 
appraise educational developments. This option 
which takes the brunt of the for ward thrust 
h· ned by any financial reserve and more of foundationalist empiricism, not cus 10 
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immediately compelled to accept and implement th . 
ose recent curricular 
developments that have been largely directed towards th I bl . 
e ess a e child. 
However the private sector has some less able children too and it might be 
suggested tha t parts of the state sector might emulate the private sector by 
deciding simply not to accept uncritically many of the new "exciting curricular 
developments" and instead adapt, update and modify many of the old. The 
empiricist's idea that learning involves the accumulation of relevant bits of 
knowledge might be rejected in favour of a hermeneutic idea of learning which 
stresses the importance of moving from present 'prejudice' towards future 
understanding. In other words the emphasis might be shifted away from a 
narrow vocationalism back towards an ideal of more liberal and/or academic 
education within the state sector, the detailed content of which might only be 
important to the extent that it enables learners to go on and find things out 
for themselves - and encourages them to do so. In this way the manner In 
which teachers view what they are doing and the satisfaction that they get 
from their job become crucial determinants of the success of their teaching. 
Finally we might find it profitable to cease regarding education as a sort of 
technology that can be insti tuted and/or deployed to solve any social problem 
we face. I have already criticised the idea of an exclusively vocational 
education as if, for instance, education could resolve the problem of 
., . . . b dvanced against the idea of an unemployment. A simllar CritICIsm may e a 
exclusively political education for democratic autonomy. As Edgley points out: 
. th uestion· should schools train 
political education for aut~nomy raIses e q Its ·bein so indicates the 
revolutionaries? The very Idea. I~ [a] fantasy ·d· f its p~wers in political 




The point is that education is simply one factor in the development of a 
society and is a facilitator of just one conversation among the many that 
people engage in during the course of their lives. We should not imagine that, 
by setting educational objectives from without the educational community, our 
social problems will necessarily decrease, as if educational theory were some 
kind of applied science. Instead we should note that pure research in the 
natural sciences has had far greater technological 'pay-off' than any attempt 
to tailor research to satisfy some perceived need; for this reason perhaps, 
educational theorists should emulate the natural scientific community by 
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EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE 
Throughout the ear lier part of this study many consl"d t" 
, era IOns seemed to be 
leading us either to the view that there must be a permanent neutral 
framework of enquiry that serves to mediate between competing educational 
claims (objectivism) or that all claims are as valid as each other (relativism). 
In the latter part of this study I have argued that the notion of interpretation 
can offer us the possibility of avoiding this kind of either/or opposition. The 
argument that led me to this v iew may be summar ised as follows: 
interpretation involves the attempt to make clear and to bring coherence to 
something that may prima facie appear too condensed, negatory, ambiguous, 
confused or incoherent. In any occasion of interpretation there are at least 
three parties involved: the interpreter, the interpreted, and some individual or 
group who might be potentially, if not always actually, interested in the 
interpretation. A successful interpretation must appeal to some common 
meanings which the interpreter and the group of people share. If these 
common meanings are not available then not only is the achievement of a 
fresh understanding impossible for the receivers but the interpreter may have 
good reason to doubt his own interpretation. We can respond to this 
uncertainty either by searching for something which approaches an algorithmic 
account of interpretation (this roughly has been the response of the 
empiricists,) or we can - as Taylor suggests - simply decide to accept the 
ambiguity and live with it: 
•.• perhaps the only sane response to this would be to say that such 1 
uncertainty is an ineradicable part of our epistemological predicament; 
In this final chapter, I attempt to substantiate the claim that educational 
theory should be viewed as an interpretive practice by arguing that 
Page 195 
interpretation, understanding educational the d . 
, ory an teachIng constitute a 
family of concepts related through the idea of . 
a practIce. I go on to argue 
that Gadamer's account of a "conversation" may serve as 
a guide to the nature 
of the relationship between theory and practice d f' 11 
an lOa y I suggest a way in 
which educational theory might be validated. 
The Idea of a Practice 
I use MacIntyre's definition of a practice: 
By ~ 'practice'. I am going t~ mean any coherent and complex form of 
~ocially established cooperat~v~ human ac~ivity. through which goods 
Int~rnal to that form 0 factI VI ty are realised In the course 0 f trying to 
achIeve th.o~e. standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partly defmItIve of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human co~ceptions of the ends and 
goods involved are systematically extended. 
However I do not agree with MacIntyre when he suggests that 
Bricklaying is not a PJactice; architecture is. Planting turnips IS not a 
practice; farming is. 
Instead I suggest that, while bricklaying and turnip planting do not obviously 
involve their own "standards of excellence", that are "systematically extended", 
nevertheless such involvement and extension are necessarily involved in any 
endeavour in which a group of people are engaged. Therefore by "practice", I 
do not just mean the exercise of technical skills. I mean to imply something 
akin to the notion of praxis where a community shares a conception of the 
relevant goals to which technical skills are put and which are partly 
consti tuti ve 0 f the practice. Like MaCIntyre I do not suggest that these goals 
are fixed once and for all: 
the goals themselves are transmuted by the history of th~ activit~. It 
therefore turns out not to be accidental that every practIce has ItS own 
history and a history which is mor~ and ?ther4 than that of the 
improvement of the relevant technIcal skills. 
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MacIntyre's examples of the practices of paint" d 0 
mg an phYSICS are easy to 
elucidate: they plainly involve technical skills, yet h t ese skills are interwoven 
with the ends which they serve. Furthermore h dO t e lscourse(s) that take(s) place 
within these practices reflect(s) those things that the tOtO prac I loners value. Such 
values are not articulated once and for all or on an annual basis, like the 
setting of objectives within a bureaucratic plan. Rather the discourse reflects 
the way that previous practitioners have valued what they were doing. To 
enter into a community of practitioners is not only to enter into a relationship 
with its present members but also to enter into, and to confront, a tradition. 
Some other possible candidates for our consideration as practices are not so 
easy to elucidate, for example, activities such as building and nursing. In those 
cases, it appears tha t technical skills are involved in the service of ends that 
are externally set. Thus the builder follows the plan of an architect, the nurse 
follows the instructions of a doctor and/or administrator. The reason that 
these practices are not easy to elucidate is that they have been subject to 
the kind 0 f professionalising trend that I argued has been imposed on the 
activity of teaching. Just as educational theorists are commonly supposed to 
guide the practice of teachers, so architects, administrators and doctors are 
supposed to guide the practice of builders and nurses respectively. 
Much as some might mourn the so-called "professionalising" trend in such 
cases, and the apparent deformation of the practice in question, I believe that 
nursing, building and teaching are practices In the sense that I outlined above. 
This is because it is not possible to engage In discourse that solely reflects 
h F r example while a builder may the evalua ti ve concerns of some ot er group. 0 , 
1 plan, the plan cannot, however detailed, cover be working to an architectura 
o 0 k 0 certain order fastening windows 
every aspect of actually puttIng bnc s In a , 
and so on. Throughout the building work, the builder needs to have some idea 
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of how the building might be used, in order to help him make the sort of 
decisions necessary successfully to conclude th k 
e wor • Moreover the architect 
may have made a mistake which the builder will h . ave to mterpret and correct 
in order to get on with his work. 
It may be possible to hypostatise some objectives with which builders are 
concerned, such that they function as descriptive propositions that serve to 
give a broad outline to certain aspects of a practice: for example the type of 
materials required, the required pitch of a roof and so on. Yet, any form of 
discourse involves the interweaving of evaluations and descriptions throughout 
the propositions that make up the form of discourse. For practitioners there 
will always be a variety of ways of giving sense and purpose to the work that 
they are doing other than to simply repeat the externally set objectives. 
In the case of teaching, while learning objectives may be set by some external 
curriculum agency, the teacher needs to make the objectives his own in the 
sense that he takes a sympathetic interpretation of those objectives and 
imbues it throughout the total fabric of his professional discourse. For 
example, if those learning objectives are to have any meaning for teachers 
then the curriculum designer's use of the terms in which the objectives are 
formulated needs to share a demonstrable connectedness with teacher's use of 
those terms. Moreover the values that guided their selection need to be 
rela ted to the teacher's 0 wn values. If for some reason these conditions are 
not met, because, say, of the rigidity or the unsuitability of the objectives, 
then teachers would seem to have little choice other than overtly to conform 
t d of t hem as regards the course administration to whatever norms were expec e 
h . that 
and so on, while in the class room they continue to teac In a way 
. ff· S me recent moves towards 
seems to them to be practIcally e ectlve. 0 
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criterion-referenced internal assessment may h f 1 
ave a tered because teachers 
were unable to understand the intentions of the cu '1 d' 5 
rrICU um eSlgners. 
Even where a practice IS supposedly analysed into its component parts and 
practitioners are classified according to the part that they play in the whole 
(for example in joinery or bricklaying) it is still necessary to decide upon 
things like the type of screws to be used, how many bricks should be carried 
at a time and so on. To object that these are mere "technical skills" is to 
mIss the point that "technical skills" do not float free of the acts, work and 
judgements of the people who promote those skills and the conversations that 
they have during such a promotion. To imagine that a "technical skill" can be 
isolated from the context in which it is practised is to make the same mistake 
as to imagine that descriptive propositions can be isolated from evaluative 
propositions once and for all on the basis of some pre-given criteria. If this 
mistake is a voided then the notion of a practice can be applicable whenever it 
is possible to discern a group of people who are engaged in the same sort of 
activity, however elementary that activity appears to be. 
It might be objected that some one can lay bricks without having the slightest 
conception of the overall use to which the wall will be put. It might be 
argued that the decisions that have to be made, such as whether to leave 
drainage channels, how many, where to leave them and so on, can be dealt 
with by some sort of supervisor such as a foreman. However even in this case 
there remains the possibility that other ends imported from other parts of the 
l'nfect whatever discourse the bricklayer is supposed building enterprise might 
estl'mated completion date, the rates of pay for to have - for example the 
ear ly finishes and so on. 
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This infection of practical discourse b 
y norms arising from contiguous and even 
often apparently unrelated parts of othe d· 
r iSCourses is not peculiar to 
bricklaying or turnip planting. To differing 
extents all practices are deformed 
in differing degrees by such infection. For 
me, MacIntyre's neat separation of 
practice from skill is too much informed by a .. . 
romantiC Vision of the continuity 
and purity of tradition, as if people ever existed withi·n one community whose 
only concern was with the pur ity of their di·scourse and the excellence of its 
deeds or achievements. 
The same objection may be raised against MacIntyre's distinction between 
practices and institutions. MacIntyre argues that some things are considered to 
be intrinsically worth while within a practice - things like accuracy, sty Ie and 
perhaps commitment, though the precise nature of these "internal goods" 6 
depends upon the practice concerned; whereas "external goods" - things like 
power, status and money - may result from the practice but are not inherently 
or intrinsically connected with it. 
There are always alternative ways for achieving such goods, and their 
achievement is never to be had only by engaging in some particular kind 
of practice. On the other hand there are the goods internal to the 
practice ... which cannot be had in any other way ..• nor ... identified 
and recognised [other than] by the experience of participating in the 
practice in question. 7 (original emphasis) 
Institutions are characteristically (and for MacIntyre necessarily) concerned 
with external goods, in order to sustain the practice(s) with which they are 
related. For MacIntyre there is a tension between the institution'S competitive 
search for resources (equivalent to external goods) to sustain the practice, and 
its practitioners' attempts to realise intrinsic goodS. 
[T]he ideals and creativity. of .the. pra~tice are always vulnerable to the 
••• competitiveness of the InstItutIon. 
Hence the institution has the power to corrupt the sense of community among 
practitioners necessary for the successful flourishing of a practice. 
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Teaching 
It is possible to descr ibe the extent to which a practice has been deformed by 
the identification of external goods that may have' 
mfected the practical 
discourse through its relations with other forms of discourse, institutional or 
otherwise. Instead of arguing, as MacIntyre does, that such infection is always 
undesirable, 9 I maintain tha t a certain amount of such infection is inevitable 
and, indeed, necessary, for in trying to get someone to understand a practice I 
need to dra w upon a common language, a common background of shared 
experiences, and shared conceptions of what is worth valuing. Unless my 
conversational partner has already participated in the practice, in which case 
he already understands it, then there has to be some entering wedge by means 
of which we can develop a shared understanding and so get a purchase on our 
practice. Our common experiences and interests provide this entering wedge. 
MacIntyre's conception of a practice as something self-contained leads both to 
the idea that all aspects of a practice remain closed to the possibility of 
understanding on the part of those 'on the outside', and to the idea that 
understanding a practice involves a sort of conversion which occurs all at 
once. 
Both ideas are untenable. I do not wish to argue tha t, when someone "grasps 
an idea", "gets my meaning" or "cottons on", as it were, something like a 
conversion does not appear to have taken place; rather I suggest that such 
conversions occur throughout an explanation. That is not to suggest that such 
Sort of activity whereby the learner "tries conversions always involve some 
h1'mself". Instead such conversions often involve nothing more something out for 
'fam1'ly resemblance' between the two uses of a than the learner identifying a 
l'S familiar and the other of which the term with one of which the learner , 
learner is trying to understand. 
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When people are interested in a particular practice, th en they may simply 
watch and interpret the practice on the basis of their own "horizon of 
expectations". Alternatively they may actually work with a group of 
practitioners as apprentices. MacIntyre seems t I' 'I ' o ImIt earnmg to these two 
instances and even then does not account for the way in which such acts of 
observa tion or apprenticeship can help one get a purchase on the learner's 
'horizon of expectation'. I want to leave room for another instance in which a 
teacher engages a group of learners in conversation, the purpose of which is 
to intr igue them into posing ever new questions concerning the possibilities of 
understanding what is going on around them. If MacIntyre is correct in his 
suggestion that practices are self-contained, then it is difficult to envisage 
how thi s latter instance 0 f learning could ever take place. 
As I argued earlier, even "technical skills" do not float free 0 f the 
conversations that people have whilst they practise those skills. Similarly 
observations do not float free of some kind of organising interest, some kind 
of "theory". Furthermore there would be no previous experience upon which 
observers could draw in order to interpret their observations, if practices were 
self contained. Instead we should have a fixed number of self-contained 
practices maintained by communities, whose members WOUld. be the masters 
whose task consisted of inducting novices into the constitutive and regulatory 
rules of the practice. 10 
However, learning and understanding, teaching and interpreting converge when 
someone interprets the practice for the learner on the basis of their having an 
understanding of the way that that practice relates to other practices and 
other discourses. People's understanding may be enhanced by engaging in a 
f t tions' is fused with the conversation in which their own 'horizon 0 expec a 
prejudices of tradition that stores the interpretive work of people's previous 
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attempts to understand. The teacher takes on th I ' 
e ro e of conversatIOnal 
partner in order to present the prejudices of tradition. 
To put it in Gadamer's terms, a conversation involves the t" , par lClpant s useless 
"prejudice(s)" being continually discarded as a result of th "h e recognitIOn t at 
the other participant's prejudice is superior in the added dl' , f b'l' 
, menSIOns 0 a 1 Ity 
and insight it confers; that is to say that "prejudices" are discarded as a 
result of the recognition of another viewpoint's superior 'authority'. To 
recognise that authority is to take the first step towards being taught. 
While the recognition of authority enables students to learn it does not 
determine their learning. The teacher is not just presenting the prejudices of 
tradition in the form of a structured series of texts designed to increase 
students' knowledge on the basis of maxims like "move from the known to the 
unknown" or analogies and metaphors. The teacher is also trying to intrigue 
students into posing new questions for themselves, and then to see that the 
answers to these questions pose new questions and so on, in the hope that 
students will be able to go on on their own. As Gadamer puts it, greater 
understanding may lead to "a growth in inner awareness of 'future 
possibilities'" 11 which in turn intrigues the learner into reinterpreting what 
presently goes on in order to try to resolve a tension between "future 
possibilities" and present understanding. It follows from this account of 
teaching as the presentation of the prejudices of tradition with the purpose of 
intriguing the learner into posing new questions about his predicament, that a 
broad interest across many forms of discourse is likely to be productive in 
sustaining the diverse kinds of conversation through which the student learns. 
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Social Theor~ 
This account of teaching as a species of " ' 
conversatiOn" may also serve as an 
account of social theory. Just as teaching , 
, on my argument, Involves the 
presentation of the prejudices of tradition in order 
to enable the teacher to 
encourage learners to engage in conversation w'th th' , 
,I e aIm 0 f enabling them 
to continue on their own, so too social theory mI'ght b d' 
e suppose to Involve 
the presentation of the prejudices of tradition t'n th f f h e orm 0 a co erent 
narrative with which to engage people in "the conversation of mankind", 12 to 
use Oakeshott's phrase. Oakeshott speaks thus to draw attention to the way In 
which tension between "present condition" and "future possibilities" is never 
finally resolved but serves as an impetus for a continuing conversation 
between a variety of forms of discourse, all of which are concerned, in one 
way or another, critically to reappraise all the various features of the human 
predicament. 
This idea tha t the "conversation of mankind" should remam open IS closely 
related both to Kuhn's thesis regarding the existence of an "essential tension" 
between innovation and tradition in natural science and Rorty's generalisation 
of this thesis into the notion that there should be an "essential tension" 
between abnormal and normal discourse. The close relationship between the 
aspirations of natural scientific and social theorists is important to my account 
of social theory because of the way in which I have argued that all types of 
theory are related within the same theoretic network and suggested that social 
theorists might emulate the activity of natural scientists. 
On this VIew there is no distinction to be made between a narrative and 
dialogue. The use of the phrase "coherent narrative" is thus not meant to 
imply that there is any definitive narrative to be produced. Instead it is to 
suggest that to tell a s tory about what is going on is just as likely to intrigue 
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people into reinterpreting their predicament as any other form of discourse In 
which people might engage. 
However the analogy between social theory and teaching IS not total. The 
teacher-student relationship involves an asymmetry in authority relations not 
necessarily present in the case of social theory. If a student fails to 
understand, because the teacher is unable to engage the student in 
conversation, the teacher-student relationship as regards its pedagogic intent 
breaks down. In such cases teachers may attempt to change their orientation 
by attempting to get students to learn something else or the same thing in a 
different way. However their status as teachers depends upon their ability to 
engage most students in conversation for most of the time; hence the onus IS 
on the student to attempt to understand something 0 f other practices in order 
to further a con versation with a teacher. It is therefore up to those who 
organise educational institutions to provide learners with a range of 
opportunities to acquire those diverse forms of discourse and to learn 
something of a wider range of practices. Teachers are "in authority" because 
they are acknowledged to be an authority for most of the time. In other 
words they are assumed to be bearers of a tradition of interpretive practice 
for the purpose of encouraging and enabling others to join that tradition. 
By contrast, the social theorist carries no such status. It is a contingent 
matter whether social theory succeeds in engaging people in the "conversation 
of mankind ". In the case of other people's failure to understand or respond, 
the theor ist may simply give up for the time being. However there is no easy 
equi valent in social theory of "waiting for the student to understand" other 
there any reason why social actors should attempt to practices. Nor is 
understand other practices - they may simply deny that social theory has any 
relevance to their lives and choose to solve their problems pragmatically. Now 
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for social theory to have any point, it must h 
s ow actors how things might look 
if they understood and responded to it and moreover it must convince actors 
tha t the possible s ta te 0 f a ffairs it adumbrates is also desirable. In other 
words, without some idea of the sort of practices in which actors might 
engage, it is not clear how the social theorist could ever present a convincing 
narrative with which to engage those actors in a "conversation". Consequently 
the social theorist may have to propose changes to the social world of which 
he is a part. As Tay lor puts it: 
The practical and the theoretical are inextricably joined here. It may not 
just be that to understand a certain explanation one has to sharpen one's 
intuitions, it may be tha t one has to change one's orientation ... This 
puts an end to any aspirations of a value-free or 'ideology-free' SCIence 
of man. A study of the science of man is inseparable from an 
examination of the options between which men must choose. 13 
That does not mean that social theorists must not take the greatest care to 
avoid bias and achieve objectivity. The consideration that social theory is also 
a species of moral theory has been thought to make it difficult for social 
theorists to a void the charge that their work is biased and subjective. However 
as Taylor points out: 
Of course, it is hard, almost impossible, and ~recisely because 
are also a t sta~e. But it helps, rather than hmders, the cause 
a ware 0 f this. 4 
our values 
to be 
h A 0 Research 15, Carr and Kemmis In Becoming Critical: Knowing throug ctlon 
provide an example of a social theory in the sense outlined above. These 
a narratIO ve that is supposed to convince their readers that writers present 
teachers should become 'action researchers' and they go on to interpret a 
o such as those relating to administration, 
range of present practices, 
research, in order to present a view of teacher management and 
o t pplant the presently dominant empiricist 
professionalism that IS meant 0 su 
notion of professionalism in educational theory. 
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I should like to identify social theory as " t " 
In erpretl ve practice In order to 
contrast the empiricist's conception of theory h " 
, were content lS all important, 
with the hermeneuticist's conception of th h 
eory, were the search for, the 
creation 0 f and the espousal of theory are all equally lmportant. In the case 
of social theory as I have presented it it is the " 
, conversatlons that people 
have that are important, for it is during such conversations that one's 
practical orientation can change. By stressl"ng th " e practlcal nature of social 
theory, I seek not only to emphasise the way th a t communi ties are necessary 
for theorising but also to emphasise that theorising and practical reorientation 
are coextensive. 
For example, when Klafki states that the major product of an 'action research' 
project may be a "discourse", 16 I take him to mean that social theory need 
not always be conceived as a text or a text-analogue that sets out a 
narrative. Instead social theory may be conceived as a practice that involves a 
dialectical relationship between thinking about what to do next and acting in 
solidarity with other participants in the "discourse". In this way social theory 
is concerned to foster a set of communal relations that are non-coercive and 
authentic. No one can know in advance the time at which the production of a 
narra ti ve or the engagemen t 0 f others in collabora ti ve action is going to be 
most efficacious in furthering the "discourse" towards the "ideal speech 
situa tion". 1 7 Hence the idea 0 f social theory as interpretive practice includes 
both the production of a narrative such as the one produced by Carr and 
Kemmis 18 and changing one's practical orientation through conversation with 
others. 
There is no one way that such reorientations may take place. For example, 
within practices, simply thinking about what to do next is theorising in a very 
go beyond this stage if it is to important sense. However social theory must 
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avoid the difficulty tha t faces Carr and K . 
emmiS when they suggest that the 
institution of a "discourse" among a s 11 
ma group of 'action researchers' will 
make the superiority of a for f . 
m 0 practIcal discursive rationality obvious to 
the rest of us. 19 Instead I argue th . 
a t SOCIal theory should be conceived as 
something more than a series of pragmatic responses to the problems that a 
group of practitioners face. People are also interested in the way that many 
practices might cohere and gIVe sense to the way that they frame their lives 
as a whole. That is to say, no one is exclusively theoretical or practical or 
exclusively a parent, a bricklayer or a teacher. Instead people's interests 
extend outward from all their practical involvements towards a search for this 
coherence. 
It seems to me tha t to promote this kind of searching is a central aIm of 
educa tion - the development of ra tionali ty. As I have argued, our conception 
of rationality should be characterised as a search for theoretic coherence by 
continuing to place all theoretical claims in jeopardy, though not all claims at 
the same time. As a result educated people continue to reformulate what J.P. 
White has called a "life plan" 20 throughout their lives. Such a 'plan' has many 
of the characteristics of a theoretic network - it involves assumptions, claims 
and predictions that may be modified and, just as a theoretic network is 
rearranged to incorporate new evidence, so too a "life plan" is modified in the 
light of changing circumstances. Such changing circumstances prompt rational 
people to look again a t their "llfe plans" and to reflect upon whether the 
1 f t of those plans might lead to greater coherence within rep acement 0 one par 
the reformulated whole. 
Instead of the empiricist idea that the conclusion to successful theorising IS 
the production of a theory, I believe that there are no distinctions to be 





dominant empiricist notion that causal ' conjunctions of phenomena are 
everywhere to be found. It is assumed by the . , , empIriCIst that theory is the 
effect of theorising (conceived as mental ") actIvIty, and that effective practice 
comes about by applying the theory. 
Rejection of this empiricist idea does not mean that we have to gIve up the 
prospect of ever offering any kind of explanation or judgement. Rather we 
must accept that there is a var iety of different ways of justifying and 
explaining - indeed that sometimes it is inappropriate even to try to explain 
or justify at all. Far from being unhelpful, such an acceptance helps us to 
concentra te on the issue 0 f deciding which 0 f those things that presently 
concern us is worth pursuing rather than casting about anywhere for any 
causal conjunctions that we might find in the hope that our picture of the 
wor ld w ill somehow emerge better or more complete. The problem for the 
empiricist is his assumption tha t he is an investigator detached from the 
wor ld; for it is this that prevents him from ever knowing by direct experience 
which parts of the world are worth investigating and those parts that require 
personal engagement. 21 
As I have already argued, the practice of theory-comparison In natural science 
depends upon the way in which the scientific community is united by a 
concern with certain values. A similar point may be made in the case of social 
theory: there is something beyond the identification of behaviour as brute data 
(if indeed there can ever be any such data), something that relies upon a 
I's worth valuing that makes rational debate about shared conception of what 
wha t to do next possible. 
, hermeneutics, that there is no such 
I argued, in connection with Gadamer s 
thing as a meaning waiting to be interpreted, as if meaning were somehow a 
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static property of practical discourse. Instead I d h ' 
argue tat commg to 
understand something involves a 'fusion of hori' zons', i'n 
which both the 
interpreter's and the interpreted's point of view ch I 
ange as a resu t of the 
confrontation of traditions, and that with the change i'n 't f ' pom 0 View comes a 
change in the meanings that certain expressions have for the interpreter. 
There is no way such changes can be anticipated. Instead to be a member of a 
community of practitioners is to have entered into a series of relationships 
through which the meanings encompassed by the practice are continually being 
transmuted. To be a member of such a community is to have an interest m 
such changes as they a ffect what a community values that is different, but 
not totally different, from those who might seek to understand the community 
'from the outside' as it were. The point is that practices are not self-
contained. Hence each move within a practice has significance not only against 
the background 0 f tha t practice but also against the background of the overall 
way in which the practitioners interpret what they are doing. 
It is this point that Carr and Kemmis 22 fail to grasp when they propose that 
teachers as "professionals" are the only group competent to interpret the 
needs of their "clients". These "clients" have needs that are informed by a 
variety of practical points of view that compete to determine what 
educa tional institutions should seek to achieve. Retreats into the notion that 
teachers alone should judge these competitions miss the point that the 
terms i'n which the proponents come to formulate their meanings of the 
" 'h f the conversations that the proponents have. Viewpoints change in t e course 0 
To imagine tha t teachers are the only people qualified to interpret the ways 
, "to make a similar mistake to the in which these terms change their meanmg is 
one that some empirical educational researchers make 
, d h'le the behaviour that meaning can be hypostatise w i 
actors is correIa ted. 
23 when they assume 
of different social 
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Since man is a "self-interpreting animal", 24 
any attempt to treat him as a 
supplier of raw data to be sifted into empirl'cal theory is bound to fail 
because the raw data will be constantly in a process of change, making 
prediction in the sense associated with the natural sciences impossible. 
However it is possible to inte t h rpre w at people thought they were doing after 
the event, as it were. Prediction is impossible for social theory conceived as 
hermeneutics because we lack the terms in Whl'ch to h ' c aracter Ise the future. 
However, retrospective interpretation is possible. Of course the language of 
retrospecti ve interpretation is not readily available; it is not just the language 
that the practitioners used at the time. Instead interpretive practice involves 
the development 0 f a language that enables the past to be made more 
coherent. 25 
Hence interpretive practice frequently involves the search for 'abnormal' 
discourse (in Rorty's sense). That is to say, the social theorist searches for a 
new form of discourse with which to understand the ways in which various 
forms of 'normal' discourse enmesh and from which they have emerged. As I 
indicated earlier, the abnormal/normal distinction is nothing like so sharp as 
Kuhn originally claimed. What characterises social theory as opposed to any 
other sort of theory - and especially that of natural science, - is the range 
of forms of discourse which might be utilised by interpreters seeking to bring 
coherence to the ways in which people view their lives as a whole. This is 
both an advantage and a disadvantage. It is an advantage in the sense that 
social theorists have a greater opportunity to find forms of 'abnormal' 
discourse from the range of discourses available; it is a disadvantage in that a 
plurality of forms of 'abnormal' discourse and a rapid rate of conceptual 
revision can often lead to a breakdown in the consensual norms and 
meanl'ngs of the normal discourses that sustain abnormal intersubjecti ve 
discourse. 
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This is the import 0 f my ear lier argument in favour of 
educational theorists 
paying far more attention to sustaining a tradit· f d . lOn 0 e ucatlOnal practices 
against which innovations may be evaluated. Many 
social theorists, for example 
Taylor and Bernstein, argue that such a form f 
o support, whilst being essential, 
is presently being undermined by what Taylor call th "f . s e uture-onented 
productive juggernaut" 26 that is fuelled by the epistemology of foundational 
empiricism. In this way social theory conceived as hermeneutics is critical of 
an epistemology that fue Is the production of a plethora of forms of abnormal 
discourse tha t undermine a tradition of social practices. 
Interpreti ve practice is critical inasmuch as it calls into question the very 
intersubjective meanings that presently sustain normal discourse. Whereas 
empirical social science treats the idea of meaning as something simply 
subjective and always diagnoses protest as some sort of individual or joint 
psychological malady, interpretive practice explains protest by referring to the 
tension between the meanings embodied in our institutional practices and in 
~he utilisation of which we are all involved, and changes or losses in the 
meaning of many of the terms that are common to our other practices. 
Taylor gives an example of the ways in which this "tension" might have led to 
what he sees as an apparent increase in the level of protest in western 
societies. He argues that the institutional practices that once sustained the 
empir icist "thrust into the future" are no longer appropriate to a society that 
believes it has overcome pre-Enlightenment notions of oppression, misery and 
material paucity. As he puts it: 
Suddenly the horizon which was essential to th~ sense of meaningful 
ur ose has collapsed, which would show that like so n:a~y othe.r ~nl~htenment-based dreams the free, p~odu~'Yve, bargaining SOCiety 




As long as the level of protest in western societies remal'ned low he goes on, 
the attraction of an em " 11 plrlCa y -concei ved social science remal'ned .. empiricist 
models of the natural sciences seemed to account for a continuing supply of 
consumer goods and it seemed obvious th h at t e accounts of such phenomena 
offered by the soc ial sciences should I emu ate them. However on this matter 
Taylor's writings converge with those of Rorty, Bernstein, Habermas and 
Gadamer and suggest that there is something fundamentally wrong with 
institutional structures based on bureaucratl'c 'f conceptIons 0 rationality as 
presently conceived within empiricist epistemology. For Habermas the crisis IS 
characterised as the "increasing colonisation of the lifeworld by the 
systemwor ld" 28. For Gadamer, the crisis is characterised as the deformation 
of praxis. 29 For Tay lor, the crisis is characterised as a tension between 
present institutional realities and future possibilities for enlightened human 
action. He writes: 
The structures of this civilisation ••. are beginning to change their 
meaning for many, and are beginning to be felt not as normal and best 
sui ted to man, but as hateful and empty. And yet we are all caught in 
these inter-subjective meanings in so far as we live in this society, and 
in a sense more and more all-pervasively as it progresses. Hence the 
virulence and tension of the criti~~e of our society which is always in 
some real sense a self-rejection. 
By this, I take Taylor to mean that the set of common meanings that support 
our present institutional practices conflict with another set of common 
meanings that support the notion of authenticity in human relationships. This 
latter set of common meanings forms the basis of a 'horizon of expectations' 
that goes beyond a concern with material well-being and aspires towards a 
future in which non-coercive human relationships flourish. Yet this tension is a 
t 'horizon of expectation' is itself a fusion self-rejection insofar as our presen 
of previous 'horizons' that were formed on the basis of a set of meanings that 
h h 's often a certain unreality we now reject. It is for this reason t at t ere 1 
d b T I for forms of practices that about arguments, like the ones advance Y ay or, 
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embody non-bureaucratic conceptions of 
rationality. The terms with which we 
seek to character ise preferred changes are not yet de I ' 
ep y rooted In practice. 
Yet these terms do have a place in th ' 
ose practIces in which the importance of 
personal relationships is paramount I f h 
. re er ere to those practices that occupy 
us In our leisure-time. A bureaucratic conceptI'on f o rationality places these 
practices 'at the margin' of ' I our SOCIa practices by embodying both the idea 
that human relationships should be treated as nleans rather than as ends in 
themselves and the further idea that in undertaking our administrative tasks , 
we are not morally implicated. The "tension and virulence" that is endemic to 
the critical function of social theory results from our k ma ing a compromise 
between giving up something of our free-will at work in order to obtain the 
affluence that is supposed to allow us to enjoy increased freedom at home. I 
ear lier argued that this compromise is a device for legitimising a bureaucratic 
conception of rationality. 
I have argued tha t the dominance of foundationalist empiricism as the 
epistemic framework within which much educational theory and practice is 
currently conceived, is undesirable. My ear lier arguments may now be 
supplemented by an interpretation of the tension between a set of meanings 
that sustain our present educational practices and a set of meanings that 
sustain other practices into which students are supposed to be initiated. The 
idea that students should continue to form 'hor izons of expectation' that 
intrigue them into poslng ever new questions concerning the possibility of 
understanding what is going on around them, may conflict with the idea that 
students should be prepared for a "world of work" that depends for its 
effective operation upon workers severely limiting their 'horizons of 
expectation' to a reality that is defined for them and is to be uncritically 
accepted. For example, rather than the assumption that many students might 
be demotiva ted because the curriculum is alleged to be insufficiently relevant 
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to the "world of work", 31 such lack of motivatl"on 
might be explained on the 
grounds of a student's perception of the quality of th " 
e expenence that work IS 
supposed to 0 ffer. Alterna ti vely the notion of educat" " """ 32 lOn as lnltlatlOn may 
be thought by some to be impossible, irrelevant or effete, when the structures 
into which students are supposed to be initiated are themselves fragmented by 
a loss of common meaning and values that Taylor alleges has taken place. 
Moreover in some cases there may be a tension between a sense of the loss of 
community, identity and values outside a school, and a strong sense of 
community within. Hence it may be that students are demotivated not so much 
by the quality 0 f their experiences within the school but more by the prospect 
of the soured outside or lack of any sense of community that awaits them in 
the "real" wor Id. School may be seen to fail to prepare people for work, not 
so much because of an inappropriate curriculum but more because the sense of 
communi ty generated or not in a wider society seems unreal to a student 
population led to believe that reality is a cohesive notion defined inter alia by 
the importance attached to "the wor Id of work" and the unquestioning 
assumptions attaching to it and to them. 
To take another example, the recent industrial action taken by teachers may 
be explained as a protest brought about by a change or loss of meaning of 
many of the terms that are common to the practice of teaching. Teachers 
may, in part, be protesting against what they see as the diminution of their 
role to that of a technician responding to educational needs that are 
determined in abstraction from their practice. As a result the quality of that 
extent that it becomes dominated by "external practice deteriorates to the 
that once sustained a predominance of "internal goods". The set of meanings 
l"S now so diminished that teachers take industrial goods" within the practice, 
"" "t of more "external goods" as might befit any group of workers 
actIon In pur SUI 
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whose objectives are largely set 'externally' 
and that is led to believe that it 
should be rewarded according to its " 
success In achieving those objectives. 
The idea that the constant attempt to replace "internal goods" with "external 
goods" might lead to a loss of a common sense of identI"ty d/ an or purpose 
within a practice is something with which " " " empIriCISm is unable to deal. Within 
empiricism, debate about common purpose and meanings is taken as an 
indication of weakness, because such debate implies that the participants have 
an interest in their practice that might prejudice their work as morally-neutral 
technicians. Whereas according to my thesis, such a debate is an indication of 
the strength 0 f a practice. A common set of meanings makes disagreement 
sustainable and resolvable in a way that preserves the integrity of the 
practice. 
It may be that teachers are becoming increasingly suspicious both of those 
attempts to set pay scales on the basis that extrinsic motivation is all that is 
important, and those a ttempts to find the one form of discourse, like 
computing, marketing or management, that is going to act as a determinant for 
the legitimacy and value of all others and that is going to provide them with 
a new sort of theory to inform future practice. Instead many teachers may 
come to accept that teaching is a practice 33 that sustains its own common 
meanings into which trainee teachers might be inducted by a sort of 
apprenticeship system, and which has as its central point of identity and its 
prime common meaning that the point of learning is to be able to "go on on 
one's own", that is, to be able to modify one's epistemological prejudices by 
" " 'perceptI"on of one's predicament in all the 
continually reinterpreting one s 
var ious forms that that reinterpretation might take. 
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Rizvi 34 is right to argue that 
we should do better to concentrate on 
particular educational problems as they arise 
in particular educational 
contexts. Yet the idea of social theory 
as interpretive practice does allow us 
to account for the way in which some . 
practIces might be preferred over 
others. However Rorty counsels against making 
too much of the idea of social 
theory as in terpreti ve practice. He writes: 
~ha t we hope for from social scientists is that they will t ~~terpreters . for those with whom we are not sure how to at~lkasThiS IS 
e sl~me ~~ng we hope for from our poets and dramatists and· 
nove IStS. 
Rorty wants to stress that the manner in which a theory IS presented is 
crucial for its success but he does not wish to suggest that interpretive 
practice can claim any greater insight than any other coherent narrative. What 
I want to suggest is that social theory conceived as interpretive practice can 
be validated in a way not necessarily open to other forms of narrative such as 
drama or poetry. 
The Validation of Interpretive Practice 
I argue that both theory and practice may be properly conceived within the 
idea of social theory as interpretive practice. I turn now to consider how 
social theory might be validated, for there is little point in having an account 
of theory unless that account includes a way of appraising theories. My 
account of social theory as interpretive practice points towards the idea that 
an 'ideal consensus' may serve as a 'regulative ideal' to guide theory-
preference. However, as we noted at the end of the previous chapter, this 
idea is based on an "ungrounded hope" rather than an "objective criterion" and 
even though objec ti v ists may be deluded in their belief that such a cri ter ion 
can be formulated and usefully applied, their present dominance within 
educational policy-making institutions is likely to militate against any 
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insti tutional changes that might be proposed as part of a socl"al theory that IS 
regarded as validated on the basis of an "ungrounded hope". 
According to my account all practices contain th " elr own ways of validating 
theories, based on the "internal goods" that practl"t" I" loners va ue. Smce I 
characterise social theory as interpretive practice, then it might seem as if 
the validation of social theory were unproblematic for me, being based on 
those "internal goods" that the practitioners of social theory value such as 
style, coherence and authenticity in discourse. However "internal goods" are 
continually being transmuted within a practice and there remains the problem 
of differentiating between such transmutation and the deformation that occurs 
when "external goods" such as power, status and money start to dominate the 
practice. In other words, the common view of what constitutes style, 
authenticity and so on changes and it is not necessarily apparent whether such 
change has been brought about by an undesirable deformation of the practice 
or a desirable and normal change in the meaning that these terms have for 
the practitioners. The writers mentioned above argue that empiricist 
epistemology is necessarily distorting and they invoke the notions of "authentic 
community" and "communal solidarity" 36 in order to suggest that the members 
of a community know when their practice is so severely deformed that 
relationships within the community become distortive and sometimes even 
exploitative. Authenticity is supposed, by these writers, to be achieved when 
the members of a community reflect upon their immediate self-interests and 
distinguish between those interests that are distorted by ideology and those 
that are not. In this way, immediate self-interests are transcended by the 
reflective-discursive process so that practitioners may identify their "real" 
interests and act in "solidarity" with one another. 
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This transcendence may take place but it 
is hardly likely to satisfy the 
objectivist who will expect social theory 
to go beyond a mere recital of the 
ways of validating practices internally" d 
In or er to enable us to appraise 
practices against each other. We may k 
ma e two responses to the objectivist 
here. We can either suppose tha t there is an unbridgeable gulf between 
objectivist and hermeneuticist and go on appeall"ng to notions of "communal 
solidarity" and so on in the hope th t b" "" a 0 Jectlvlsts will see the folly of their 
ways. Alternatively we can grant to the objectivist that there is a need to go 
beyond the internal validation of social theory without our assuming that there 
is some sort of social reality that can serve as an external 'touchstone'. 
Instead we can suggest that it is the forms of 'normal' discourse that happen 
to enmesh with objectivistic and hermeneutic meta-theories that provide the 
'touchstone' for their comparison. 
We get no further towards validating social theories against each other if we 
continue to view theory or practice as things that can be measured, rather 
like weighing apples or assessing happiness or whatever. Nor do we get any 
further towards such validation if we continue to present social theories as 
visions of a moral/political nirvana in which all problems of theory validation 
disappear In some version of a communal "wonderland". Even if practical 
discourse were as deformed by instrumentalism as writers like MaCIntyre, 
Taylor and Gadamer suggest, we should only be able to reorient our values and 
reject instrumentalism if we accepted that the ideas embodied in the term 
'communal solidarity' could function as regulative ideals to guide the 
development of a social meta-theory. Such a meta-theory would need to have 
internal standards of validation that could be invoked to appraise all related 
social practices and these practices would need to be continually discursively 
validated by an on-going fundamental critique. 
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The problem with meta-theories of this kind th 
a t present a moral-political 
vision, which, if realised, would end all problems of theory 
validation, is that 
they tend to be catch-all theories, that cannot themselves be validated and 
certainly not by their own cri ter ia. Any predictions made within such theories 
are always subject to the proviso that we do t h no yet ave anything 
approaching 'communal solidarity'. Instead the attempt to achieve a moral-
political vision involves starting from objectivistic social theories that 
presently inform our practices such as the theories that I discussed in 
chapter 3. That means comparing present practices against alternatives that 
would reflect to a greater extent the notions of 'democratic participation' and 
'communal solidarity'. We might expect our social theories to guide the setting 
up of alternative institutional structures within which such alternative 
practices might flourish. I do not mean that every social theory should involve 
some proposals for alternative institutional practices but that the search for 
such proposals should function for the social theorist like the search for 
abnormal discourse - that is, as a guide to practice that is occasionally 
realised. 
My argument is that at present many of our institutional practices In 
education are sustained by theories that are firmly rooted in objectivism. I am 
attempting to argue for alternative and better institutional practices that are 
rooted in a hermeneutic conception of educational theory. However I believe 
that its internal standards are insufficient to validate that attempt and that I 
I to some 'touchstone' that will provide us with the means still need to appea 
h I suggest that we can make little to validate theories against one anot er. 
. f th tions of 'communal progress towards achieving a full realisation 0 e no 
solidarity' and 'democratic participation' unless we make practical changes that 
. I t ctures flourishing alongside lead to institutions with different managena s ru 
each other. The 'touchstone' by which these institutions could then be 
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compared would doubtless be similar to the forms 
of 'normal' discourse that 
are presently used to appraise those institutions that embody 
objectivism. 
However this modest bo ' h w In t e direction of ob' t" Jec IVIsm IS necessary to enable 
us to make some kind of theoretic comparisons now I' n order that practical 
changes might be set in train and become established and thereby in a position 
to act as a sort of "research programme" b h' h f ' y W IC uture theoretIcal progress 
may be made. 
We may dra w an analogy between natural scientific and social theory to 
illustrate this suggestion: just as theoretical physics progresses because 
experimental physics keeps pace with it and provides the means of checking 
theoretical predictions and continuing the 'scientific conversation', so social 
theory may make progress because institutional practices keep pace with it 
and continue the 'conversation of mankind'. Social theory may remain ossified 
in objectivism unless institutional changes are made that reflect alternative 
conceptions of rationality. In other words, however many convincing narratives 
are produced extolling the virtues of a practical-discursive conception of 
rationality, theoretical progress is unlikely to be made unless some institutions 
are changed so tha t they embody such a conception of rationality. 
I suggest that the validation of hermeneutic social theories depends upon 
subjecting the claims of rival hermeneutic and objectivistic theories to the 
court of appeal that is constituted in and exhibited by the ways that practices 
are both alleged to be and actually are changed by them and that implies 
institutional changes also. To this suggestion it might be objected that the 
possibility of any radical conceptual innovation rules out procedures involving 
prediction. However I am not proposing that statements be tested against the 
proposI'ng that practices that project their own tradition future. Instead I am 
compared wI'th one another. In effect I propose that into the future can be 
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the problem of conceptual innovation, that 
renders traditional empirical social 
theory implauSible, may be I 
part y overcome by comparing practices, which 
necessarily involve their own co I 
nceptua innovations. My equivalent to 
Lakatos's idea of a "research programme" 37 l'S the 
idea 0 f an institutional 
practice such as that of a college. Just as Lakatos 
urges us not to judge 
theories individually but as a series that emanates from a 
decision to treat 
some theories as unproblematic while others are under test, so I urge the 
value of seeking to validate social theory by making the legal changes 
necessary for groups 0 f practices such as colleges and schools to be set up In 
ways that reflect a concern with practical discursive rationality. These 
practices may then be compared with their objectivistic counterparts. 
On this v lew institutional practices are allowed to flourish alongside one 
another. However if we are to avoid the kind of relativism that Feyerabend 
advocates, it may be necessary to agree both upon some time scale within 
which rival practices are to be compared and those forms of 'normal' discourse 
that are to serve as 'touchstones' for this comparison. Objectivists would 
certainly require this much. They would insist that social theories informed by 
hermeneutics include a statement indicating those conditions under which they 
could be falsified. In order to get theoretical comparison going and place 
objecti vism in jeopardy, it seems to me that hermeneuticists must acquiesce In 
this requirement. However their acquiescence enables them to have some basis 
for hoping that objectivists themselves might adjust their practices on the basis 
of the conversations that they have with practitioners of the hermeneutic 
persuasion. In other words there remains the hope that by a process of gradual 
holistic adjustment, hermeneutics might come to replace objectivism as the 
dominant social theory within which our institutional, managerial and validatory 
requirements are conceived. 
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What I am proposing here may be illustrated by 
suggesting alternatives to the 
presently popular pre-vocational curricula 
and hierarchical managerial practices 
tha t, as I ear Her argued, are underpinned b y empiricism and objectivism and 
against which I inveighed. In the conclusion to this study, I examine how the 
pre-vocational curriculum for teachers ml'ght I k 'f ' 
00 1 It were to be informed by 
hermeneutic social theories. Here I examine what is involved l'n 
establishing 
the general claim tha t a hermeneutic social theory may be validated by making 
compar isons between rival institutional practices that embody different meta-
theoretical preconceptions. 
I propose the setting-up of some educational institutions staffed by those who 
are sympathetic to the idea of practical discursive rationality to rival existing 
educational institutions that embody the idea of hierarchical managerialism. As 
the rival institutional practices develop, they should be compared using forms 
of 'normal' discourse that include attempts to apply such criteria as cost, pupil 
interest, parental support, examination results, success in obtaining employment 
or moving on to higher education, confisJence of pupils in finding things out on 
their own and so on over a fixed period of time, after which a decision 
regarding their futures might be made. It is not that such comparisons could 
ever be made precise but, as I have argued, it is an objectivist myth to 
suppose that present institutional comparison can be made precise. Theoretical 
progress may be made however not only when a set of institutional 
arrangements is judged not to have met the previously agreed conditions under 
which they might be continued but also when those who work within rival 
educa tional institutions are sufficiently attracted to each other'S concrete 
successes that they come to visit each other and learn about each other's 
successes. In a Kuhnian manner, they may come to modify what they 
themselves do: 
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[n]o process quite like ch ice h 
new theory nonetheless. 3~ as occurred, but they are practising the 
It should be noted that my propos I ' 
a IS not based on the idea that all 
centralisa tion 0 f decision making I'S U d ' bl n eSIra e. We can c ome to prefer certain 
proposals over others by consider ing their mer its in the contexts in which they 
will be implemented and that does not mean that all centrally -devised policies 
cannot usefully function as guides to particular pract' F Ices. or me, the 
opposition between centrally and locally devised theories may be seen as a 
subset of the more general opposition between relativism and objectivism _ 
oppositions that miss the point that theoretical progress comes about by 
indi v iduals interpreting what each other is doing and coming to see how their 
practices might be improved rather than by assuming that the only valid 
policies are those that are derived locally or that the interpretation and 
evaluation of centrally devised policies is any more problematic than their 
locally devised counterparts. 
For example I imagine that it would be possible to outline a curriculum 
framework tha t could command widespread consensus and serve as a guide to 
curricular decision-making without deforming the practice of teaching by 
imposing externally set objectives that are supposed to detail when and how 
teachers should work. Such a framework may provide the focus of a form of 
'normal' discourse about the curriculum and as such may function as another 
'touchstone' against which institutional comparisons may be made. A curriculum 
framework need not necessarily be conceived and established in such a form 
that debate about how to apply criteria becomes more important than the 
establishing of a fruitful dialogue between different types of practitioner, 
guided by a concern to achieve an 'ideal consensus'. 
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Instead of the idea that education I ' 
a Improvements b 
are rought about by the 
'management' of curriculum change we 
, may envisage a curriculum framework 
wi thin which teachers are given resources and the e 
ncouragement to devise 
their own curricular materials, to plan 
their own learning environment and to 
learn from each other in the Supportive 
a tmosphere brought about an 
organisational structure that promotes practical discursl've 
rationality. 
Institutions which are structured in this 
way may avoid the deformation of 
practice tha t is alleged to occur wI'thl'n 'I' 
a me management' form of 
institutional organisation and may enable practitioners to discuss their genuine 
concerns rather than those concerns that they might feel would least interfere 
with their chances of promotion. The set of conditions under which such 
insti tutions might be disbanded could form a temporary set of common 
meanings that sustains the new institutional practice by setting a hor izon for 
its members in the formative stages of practical development. 
I am not suggesting that education should be a prime vehicle for political 
change. Like Edgley 39 I doubt that this is either possible or desirable. My 
point is that such an institutional change is primarily a matter of facilitating 
progress in educational theory. Nor am I suggesting that a common curricular 
framework should not evolve within the practice of teaching and the 
conversations that teachers have with other kinds of practitioners. Instead I 
suggest that, within certain parameters, particularly financial but also 
statutory and conventional in the sense tha t children work towards similar 
targets, (and here it seems that external examinations with all their problems, 
may be more helpful than internal assessment in providing some 'touchstone' 
for theory-comparison), it should be possible to validate educational theories. 
Valida tion may never be conclusive in the sense that parents were consumers 
who by their choice of school would ultimately also be validating a theory or 
as if "league tables" of examination results could be directly equated with the 
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relative success of different managerial systems. 
However parental preference, 
examination results, pupil f pre erence and so on might all provide the 
'touchstone' necessary for ed t' I h uca lona t eory-comparison. 
It might be objected tha t such a move would complicate the system 
considerably and make it difficult to understand H I 
• owever am not suggesting 
that every aspect of education should be changed at the same time. Rather I 
am suggesting tha t it is rational to put any claim in jeopardy about what 
constitutes a good education but not all claims at once. Hence it is more 
rational to put some aspect of the institutional structure of schools In 
jeopardy rather than to continue to try to implement a range of curricular 
developments all at once. For the latter can lead to a loss of a sense of 
communi ty, a loss of meaning for so many of those terms which teachers use 
to explain to each other what they are trying to do, that it becomes 
impossible to make sense of the idea of theoretical progress because the terms 
in which theories might be compared no longer exist. 
The tragedy of the dominance of objectivism in educational theory is that it 
excludes consideration of many of the issues that affect what goes on in 
schools, for example the allocation of resources. Instead the issues of 
resources, pay and conditions of service, are ruled out of the court of 
objectivistic educational theorising and are left to periodic government review. 
It is as if educational theory were narrowly conceived as thinking about 
I h'l h' I concept in abstraction from the learning as a psychologica or p I osop lca 
actual context in which it takes place. 
, f th hermeneutic persuaSiOn should My proposal that educational theorIsts 0 e 
some 'touchstone' with educational theorists of the endeavour to agree upon 
rl'sky in the sense that either type of theorist may objectivistic persuasion is 
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always invoke an "ad hoc" hypothesis 40 to explain away their rival's 
"successes" and their own "failures" as defined by the agreed 'touchstone'. 
Moreover the distortive effects of the dominance of objectivism may always 
lead us to view a hermeneuticist's success as an instrumental attempt to 
achieve pre-set objectives, thus further reinforcing the dominance of 
objectivism. To put it in Lakatos's terms, the attempt to establish whether a 
"research programme" whose "hard core" is constituted by social theories based 
on a practical discursive conception of rationality is progressing may always 
be thwarted by the impossibility of our ever realising tha t conception in 
practice and may simply serve as a means of further reinforcing the dominance 
of objectivism. However it seems to me that these risks are worth taking. 
Objectivism may still be the most appropriate underpinning for our educational 
practices but without our taking these risks, I do not see how this claim can 
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At the beginning of this t d 
s u y, after a discussion of some of the contributions 
to the debate about the t 
na ure and Scope 0 f educational theory, two questions 
were posed: 
What does educational theory presently do? 
Wha t should educational theory do? 
The remainder of the study was an a ttempt to answer these questions. 
An answer to the first question was gl'ven In h 2 c apter . I argued there that as 
a result of the dominance of foundationalist empiricism as the epistemic 
framework within which educational theory is presently conceived, educational 
theory is instrumental in supporting self-referential policies that are supposed 
to guide educational practice. In particular I argued that many of those who 
work within the Colleges and Departments of Education and who might be 
thought to be concerned with educational theory have been left with some 
combination of explaining curriculum initiatives to teachers or devising 
curricular support materials for teachers to use. In either case, the 
educa tional policy itself remains unchallenged because the empiricist 
presuppositions of these "theorists" that are reflected in their pedagogical 
roles as teacher-educators limit educational research to a supposed "objective" 
investiga tion of the most efficient way of achieving the policy objectives, 
rather than offering a fundamental critique of the objectives themselves. An 
acceptance of foundationalist empiricist epistemology seems to involve both the 
idea that educational means can be determined objectively, and the idea that 
educa tional ends are rela ti ve to whatever values individual policy -makers 
happen to hold at any particular time. 
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This answer prompted me to question 
the rationality of such a procedure. We 
saw tha t the opposition between th . d 
e I eas of objectivism and relativism 
pervades much current thinking about education in one form or another. For 
example, in chapter 3, th .. 
e OPposItIOn between liberal curricular ideas and 
vocationalism was seen to b b 
e a su set of the more general opposition between 
relativism and objectivism. I d h 
argue t at the dominance of the epistemic 
framework of foundationalist empiricism within whI'ch 
much educational theory 
is currently conceived has led curriculum designers away from the liberalism of 
the 1960's to the presently fashionable ideas of vocationalism and 
managerialism. We saw how these ideas might be educationally undesirable. 
A discussion of post-empiricist philosophy of science enabled us to see the 
ways in which we might move a way from foundationalist empiricism towards 
holistic coherence as an epistemological underpinning for educational theory 
without assuming tha t the notion of theoretic coherence can be determined 
objectively. Instead we saw how theoretical progress can be explained as an 
increase in the coherence 0 f a theoretic network brought about by 
practi tioners interpreting and reinterpreting what each other is doing. By 
adopting the notion of interpretation, we saw how the opposition between 
objectivism and relativism might be avoided, for even though there may be no 
algorithmic way of coming to prefer some theories over others nor one form 
of discourse tha t serves as a final court of appeal for claims formulated in 
any other forms of discourse, nevertheless there are considerations that serve 
to guide our interpretations. I argued in particular that our interpretations of 
each other's educational practices might be guided by the same considerations 
that guide what is commonly regarded as our most successful type of theory -
natural science. This enabled me to appeal to the idea that theorising about 
educa tion should be modelled on natural science in order to answer the second 
question concerning the future purpose of educational theory. 
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This meant that educational theory should be s ' 
een as an mterpreti ve practice. 
I take education to be a set of interrelated ' practIces, such as the practice 0 f 
teaching along with certain institutional practices like 
administrative practices. 
I take it too tha t educational practices are related to a wider set of 
practices which people are either interested in learnl'ng 
about or which affect 
the way that they conceive of what they are doing. Philosophy of education is 
interpreti ve practice in the sense that it seeks to understand and explain what 
those involved in the educational enterprise d are oing, with the purpose of 
bringing greater coherence to the way in Whl'ch educatl'onal ' practIces relate to 
one another. That means finding new and more interesting ways of speaking 
and acting in education (rather similar to Goodman'S notion of the different 
"ways of ld k' ,,1) , wor ma mg ,on makmg connections between different forms of 
practical discourse, and on thinking up ways to reinterpret what we do, with 
the aim of framing the various options that educational practitioners face and 
of giving them the theory that will function as 'touchstone' in their 
adjudication and evaluation of the differences between them. 
The familiarity of philosophers with different ways of world-making and 
different ways of viewing the language - thought - reality relationship makes 
them particularly sui ted to tak ing a leading role in an acti vi ty that is 
concerned with getting others to find more fruitful ways of speaking and 
acting, making connections between types of discourse and reinterpreting their 
predicament. I do not wish however to suggest that educational theory is the 
sole preserve of philosophy of education or vice-versa. In my view nothing 
much hinges on whether educational theorists are primarily interested in 
philosophy, psychology, action research or whatever. What matters is that it 
becomes more acceptable to theorise about education from perspectives other 
than that of foundationalist empiricism. It seems to me that those who have a 
broad understanding of many forms of practical discourse are more likely to be 
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successful as educational theorists than those 
who imagine that immersion in 
one or two particular forms of discourse onl l"k 
y, 1 e psychology or sociology, is 
the key to Successful theorising On this 0 0 
• VIew It may be more correct to speak 
of philosophers in education rather than hOI h 
P 1 osop ers of education. 
The hermeneutic idea of act 0 0 0 
ons ant crltlcal remterpretation of theory into 
practice and practice into theory seems to me to be not only preferable to 
the dominant 'theory guiding practice' paradigm of educational theory but also 
to the more sophisticated forms of what I described as the 'move to practice'. 
I argued that the materialist pragmatist (MP) idea that theory is the response 
to a practical problem simply pushed the problem of finding an account of 
theory back to the anterior problem of finding an account of what constitutes 
a problem. 
According to my thesis, it is possible to be theoretical without any immediate 
regard for so-called 'practical' problems and that is about as disinterested as 
anyone can be. Even though theorising relates to practical problems it can 
never merely be a response to them nor does doing theory ever necessarily 
offer any immediate solutions to immediate problems. Nevertheless it may still 
be desirable to free some people from immediate practical concerns in order 
that they might devote more of their attention to theorising in the hope that 
better theory results. This proposal may be validated in the same way as any 
other proposal - tha t is by the setting up of different institutional structures 
with common criteria of success and waiting to see what happens. 
I conclude by sUmmariSIng the changes that might be envisaged if this proposal 
were to be implemented and teacher education were to be located within a 
different set of institutional arrangements than those that presuppose 
foundationalist empiricism. 
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The Future of Teacher Education 
The empiricist 'theory guiding practice' idea has 
given rise to the 
institutionalisation of a particular version of 
theory within Colleges of Further 
Educa tion and Colleges and Departments of Educatl'on. The hermeneutic idea 
that theory and practice are like conversational partners suggests that teacher 
education should be more closely related to the practi'cal teaching context. 
While it is possible for tutors within Colleges and Departments of Education to 
create a context within which useful preparatory work for teaching practice 
can be carr ied out by trainee teachers, using micro-teaching equipment, 
planning lessons, reviewing curriculum content and so on, such preparation IS 
always subject to the criticism that "practice lessons" bear little resemblance 
to those lessons that trainees are supposed to present in schools. 
As a result of this type of criticism there have been moves towards including 
more "school experience" in teacher training courses, - and there are good 
reasons to suppose that these moves will continue to gain momentum. Moreover 
there might be great advantage to be gained if "school experience" were 
largely to replace those parts of the teacher training curriculum that are 
presently concerned with simulating that "experience" and if teachers 
themselves were to become more involved in teacher traif1ing. There have been 
various suggestions as to how this might be organised, ranging from M. 
Warnock's idea of the "teacher tutor" and a "General Teaching Council" 2 to 
the procedure whereby the trainee teacher might work with a variety of 
teachers in a variety of schools on a sort of rotational basis, or indeed a 
combina tion of both. 
The move in this direction was given some momentum in the White Paper 
'Teaching Quality'. 3 However my thesis suggests a more radical break with the 
institutional arrangements suggested by the Secretaries of State when they 
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recommend tha t 
the staff of training institutions wh 
ha h l · 0 are concerned with ped h Id ve sc 00 teachIng experience They sh ld h . agogy s ou a~ teachers in the age range to· which thO~ ave enjoyed recent success 
dIrected 4 elr training courses are , 
According to my proposal, it IS P f bl re era e for all pedagogical matters to be 
dealt with in school and for t h eac er trainers largely to renounce their claims 
to having something special to say to trainee teachers about pedagogy on the 
basis of their supposed theoretical awareness. That is not to say that the 
'theory of pedagogy' should be given up. Rather it is to say that no theory of 
pedagogy is ever likely to replace the sort of apprenticeship that a trainee 
teacher might get by working along with an experienced colleague. 5 
Presently teacher education might be seen to be comprised of two components, 
one concerned with pedagogy, the other concerned with educational theory, 
where educational theory is often conceived to be concerned with something 
approaching an immersion into the 'disciplines'. 6 It is worth noting that 
"curriculum studies" tends to have a foot in both camps, so to speak, and IS 
often used as a supposed bridge between educational theory and practice . 
Recently "professional studies" have come to replace "curriculum studies" 7 as 
a bridge between theory and practice, - "old wine in new bottles" 8 as one 
commentator puts it. 
The dominance of foundationalist empiricist epistemology saw to it that 
teacher trainees passed through the tutelage of so-called educational theorists 
as a preparation for their future careers and many "theorists" tended to 
concei ve the problem of the relationship between theory and practice as a 
search for the ways in which their tutelage was appropriate to the preparation 
of teachers rather than the logically prior issue as to whether their tutelage 
d . h b as the latest in a series of was appropriate. Professional stu ies mIg t e seen 
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attempts to bridge a divide that had only 
opened up because the 
institutionalisation of an epistemol ' I f 
oglca ramework resulted in some studies 
being validated within an academic context d h ' , , 
,an ot ers bemg validated m a 
vocational context. 9 
If teachers were themselves to take over the tral'nl'ng of their trainees, then 
there would remain the question of the most appropriate institutional 
arrangements for enabling those who are charged with the special 
responsibility for theorising about education critically to interpret the work of 
teachers and others involved in the educational enterprise and vice-versa. It 
should be remembered that my proposal for some people to be freed from 
immediate practical concerns in order to search for coherence across a range 
of practices was not based on any academic division of labour but simply on 
the ungrounded hope that better progress in educational theory might be made 
if such a proposal were implemented. However if educational theorists were to 
accept the task of looking a t the ways that teachers interpret what they are 
doing against a range of different considerations, one of the most important 
being financial, then we might have available a range of properly costed 
proposals with which to debate our educational priorities and with which to 
appraise any new developments. We would not have to assume that every new 
development that seemed to have some attractive features was necessarily any 
better than the last. It may be that such an arrangement might lead to the 
production of a series of arguments that give quite specific support to one 
course of action as opposed to another. However my thesis leaves room for 
the view that such an engagement with theory might change the teacher's 
orientation in a way that it would be foolish of me to try to predict. 
It follows that Colleges and Departments of Education should have a much 
broader range of research interests than is presently the case. Instead of the 
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present dominance of psychology as th d' , , 
e ISClpline supposedly most concerned 
with educational measurement cu ' I 
, rrtcu um development and the theoretical 
underpinnings of pedago d gy, e ucational policy too might be offered and made 
one of the main thrusts of educational research, not as 
an after-thought, but 
of debate about the purpose of education, the desirability as an integral part 
of certain sorts of society and the relatl'ons between education and other 
influences which impinge on people's lives. 
This latter concern seems to point towards the institutionalisation of 
educational theory within multi-faculty type institutions for if it is assumed 
tha t the education provided by the state is just one determinant of the 
planned future then, as Jonathan 10 argues, it matters how educational 
provisions are dovetailed in with other influences on development. This 
argument suggests that it might be preferable if educational theory took 
account of developments in other types of theory. A polytechnic-type 
institution might facilitate such exchange of views. 11 
If training In pedagogy is best left to teachers themselves, then it follows 
tha t those institutions responsible for educational theory could be much smaller 
than is presently the case. There seems to be a need for a staff-college 
element within such institutions that would facilitate the continuing 
engagement of teachers with theory. This points towards the desirability of 
some exchange of teachers and theorists between institutions, in order to 
increase the mutual understanding of what teachers and theorists think that 
they are doing, but not to pretend that a term's secondment in schools is ever 
likely to ensure that teacher trainers have "enjoyed recent success as 
teachers". 
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The proposed wide remit for those institutl'ons th ' h at mIg t be charged with the 
special responsibility for educational theory is not meant to imply that such 
institutions should be the final arbiters about which way the state education 
system should develop, as if educational debate would be removed from the 
political sphere and as if teacher and employer associations would be 
unnecessary. Instead educational theorists might outline the prices to be paid 
for var ious developments. However Jona than goes too far when she suggests 
Which nexus of mediated values and purposes (and hence the educational 
programmes implied) might then be endorsed by society is not a matter 
for logic, calculation or expertise, but for further argument in the public 
forum of competing values and interests. 12 
For according to my thesis it is worth hoping that educational theory might 
point the way forward as a result of carefully constructed arguments and it is 
also worth hoping that the suggestions of some educational theorists, at any 
rate, should be endorsed on the basis of the acceptability of some of their 
theorl'se. I agree with Jonathan that "logic, calculation or prev ious a ttempts to 
deter.".,.ine an outcome. However it is worth hoping that it expertise" can never ..... 
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